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Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum

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Abstract

Employee involvement in a very general sense is by and large an accepted policy goal in the European Union. Its forms nonetheless vary considerably among Member States and sometimes include boardroom representation. Board composition, performance and incentive structures are core areas of the ongoing corporate governance debate in Europe and most other parts of the world. These two discourses are rather disparate. Recent EC legislation and jurisprudence do not proactively pursue an integrated approach. The following paper maps out overlapping areas of employee participation and corporate structure, explores some theoretical underpinnings for employee involvement from a contract-theory perspective and analyses issues specific to internationally engaged corporate groups. Finally, a transaction-based approach for modernisation of employee involvement is suggested. Preference is given to default rules that do not require employees to be represented at board level yet leave room for agreements to that effect. The plasticity of private law, the resilience of the corporate form and the governance-assisted employment relationship can defy petrification. Transaction-based employee involvement promotes a productive conjunction of corporate governance components consonant with the specific character of the employment relationship. An evolutionary approach to reform requires flexible legislation instead of deference to existing models. However, consensual model building needs proper enabling tools. Academic groundwork in private international law, contract, labour and corporate law is called for.

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References

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  27. Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at pp. 177, 179; Cf. Roe, op. cit. n. 9, at ch. 6.

  28. Cf., M. Schmitt and D. Sadowski, ‘A cost-minimization approach to the international transfer of HMR/IR practices: Anglo-Saxon multinationals in the Federal Republic of Germany’, 14 Int. J. of Human Resource Management (2003) p. 409 at p. 415.

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  29. The term ‘social dumping’ is often used in a political, non-technical sense for taking advantage of lower wage levels, e. g., in developing or transformation countries. The technical term ‘dumping’ in international trade law means to sell goods or services into foreign markets below cost in order to promote exports or damage foreign competition. In this respect, hiring labour at local cost is not ‘dumping’. Cf., Art. 133(1) EC.

  30. Hansmann and Kraakman, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 22; Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 165. See also Arts. 138 and 139 EC which address the dialogue of ‘management and labor’ [emphasis added].

  31. D. Sadowski, J. Junkes and S. Lindenthal, ‘Labor Co-Determination and Corporate Governance in Germany: The Economic Impact of Marginal and Symbolic Rights’, in J. Schwalbach, ed., Corporate Governance. Essays in Honor of Horst Albach, 2nd edn. (Berlin, BWV 2003) p. 147; with reference to accounting: M. O’Connor, ‘Rethinking Corporate Financial Disclosure of Human Resource Values for the Knowledge-Based Economy’, 1 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. (1997–1998) p. 527.

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  32. Directive 2002/14/EC, loc. cit. n. 1, at p. 29.

  33. For the concept of ‘Wirtschaftsdemokratie’ (economic democracy) as a combination of political democracy with social constraints over the use of private capital in post-war Germany, see Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 167. The editorial of the special issue ‘Towards a civil economy: Participation proves its purpose’ of the Magazine Mitbestimmung International Edition 2004, available at: http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-A305A1E2/hbs/hs.xsl/164_30868.html, states: ‘The shareholder value argument may continue to dominate the debate. But German trade unions remain obstinately convinced that the principles of democracy and participation, that have proved their worth as a way of organising states and societies, also make sense in the day-to-day world of business … Employees don’t stop being self-confident individuals and citizens when they disappear through factory gates and office entrances in the morning…’. This paper will not discuss the difference between a state and an enterprise and the fact that citizens usually coordinate their economic activities by contract.

  34. Strong examples are competing plants in the automobile industry, e. g., General Motors’ restructuring of its European activities, M. Bartmann, Mitbestimmung International Edition 2005, available at: http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-EE0995BC/hbs/hs.xsl/164_37819.html. In countries with pluralistic union traditions, rivalry between unions comes on top of conflicting interests between factions of work forces and sites.

  35. Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler et al., U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, 7 April 2005 (2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 5830) at 53–54.

  36. Hertig and Kanda, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 119; for a European approach to group law, see J.M. Embid Irujo, ‘Trends and Realities in the Law of Corporate Groups’, 6 EBOR (2005) p. 65; C. Windbichler, ‘Corporate Group Law for Europe: Comments on the Forum Europaeum’s Principles and Proposals for a European Group Law’, 1 EBOR (2000) p. 265.

  37. Schmitt and Sadowski, loc. cit. n. 28, at p. 409.

  38. Dismissed too generally by P.I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups — Statutory Law — General (Boston, Little, Brown 1989) passim, and The Law of Corporate Groups — Bankruptcy Law (Boston, Little, Brown 1985); see also Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 176: The German Bundesverfassungsgericht, in its opinion of 1 March 1979 on the constitutionality of the 1976 co-determination law (1 BvR 532/77, 1 BvR 533/77, 1 BvR 419/78, 1 BvL 21/78, BVerfGE 50, pp. 290, 339 et seq.) uses the term Unternehmen (enterprise, firm) rather than corporation (Gesellschaft.), thus concentrating on the identity of the enterprise for which the corporation provides a shell.

  39. C. Windbichler, Arbeitsrecht im Konzern [Labour and Employment Law in Corporate Groups] (Munich, Beck 1989) p. 24 et seq., p. 68 et seq.; see also Qwest Code of Conduct: ‘… This Code sets forth policies and practices with respect to the conduct of all Qwest employees. It does not represent, and may not be interpreted as, an employment contract or other legally binding agreement between Qwest and any employee; nor does it create any contractual or other rights for non-employees or other third parties. Likewise, it creates no contractual or other rights between Qwest and employees. … Any reference to “Qwest” in the Code, policy and M&Ps is not meant to and does not change which entity is your employer. For instance, if you are employed by Qwest Services Corporation, the references here to Qwest do not make you an employee of Qwest Communications International Inc. or any other Qwest entity’. Qwest Code of Conduct, p. 28, available at: http://www.qwest.com/about/media/presskit/companyFact/files/CodeOfConduct.pdf.

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  40. From a corporate law perspective, concepts like joint employer status or the criterion of subordination juridique in French law are either contractual or piercing by attribution (note: piercing the corporate veil is not restricted to liability); cf., in the United States, FLSA 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); Lin v. Donna Karan International, Inc., United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 6 Wage & Hour Cas. 2nd (BNA) 1142 (2001); for labour relations, see Blumberg (1989), op. cit. n. 38, at ch. 13; for France, cf., Cass. soc., 13 May 1969, Droit Social 1969, p. 512; 10 May 1973, Bull. civ., V, No. 296; 15 June 1960, Droit Social 1961, p. 108.

  41. Embid Irujo, loc. cit. n. 36, at p. 65; Hertig and Kanda, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 118 et seq.; Windbichler, loc. cit. n. 36, at p. 271 et seq.

  42. Corporate governance should therefore not automatically be equated with firm governance, and a corporate constitution is not necessarily the same as a firm’s constitution. Cf., Sadowski, Junkes and Lindenthal, loc. cit. n. 31, at p. 149, on the one hand, and Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 176, on the other.

  43. See supra n. 4.

  44. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, available at: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf.

  45. Sec. 303A, NYSE Corporate Governance Rules as of November 2004, available at: http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303A_final_rules.pdf.

  46. See, e. g., supervisory board of DaimlerChrysler as disclosed in its 2004 annual report, p. 85, available at: http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/documents/628999_dcx_gb_2004.pdf; Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at pp. 182–183.

  47. BGHZ 114, 127; German Corporate Governance Code, loc. cit. n. 12, at s. 3; Hueck and Windbichler, op. cit. n. 13, at § 24, n. 26.

  48. See Sadowski, Junkes and Lindenthal, loc. cit. n. 31, at p. 145, on the one hand, and J. Schwalbach, ‘Effizienz des Aufsichtsrats’, 49 Die Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 186 at p. 189, on the other; A. von Werder, ‘Überwachungseffizienz und Unternehmensmitbestimmung’, 49 Die Aktiengesellschaft (2004) p. 166 at p. 170. Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 177: The 1976 model focused on how to ensure ‘social governance’ and largely ignored the implications for shopfloor co-determination. The daily give and take between management and Betriebsrat without adequate supervision may also have contributed to the intensification and petrification of shop floor co-determination. It produces, moreover, methodological difficulties in empirical research based on interviewing techniques.

  49. Schwalbach, loc. cit. n. 48.

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  52. The EC Commission’s Action Plan, loc. cit. n. 4, at p. 3, points out that the objectives of fostering the efficiency and competitiveness of business and strengthening shareholders’ rights and third party protection require a fully integrated approach [emphasis in original].

  53. See Davignon Report loc. cit. n. 2; Recital 5 of the Council Directive 2001/86/EC, loc. cit. n. 3.

  54. Backhaus, loc. cit. n. 51; Sadowski, Junkes and Lindenthal, loc. cit. n. 31; Roe, op. cit. n. 9.

  55. This remark does not assert that German-type co-determination prevents firms from incorporating in Germany. It obviously does not, at least not completely. The decision where to incorporate depends on a host of considerations, especially the tax burden. Therefore, it is methodologically inaccurate to draw quick conclusions from the existence of DaimlerChrysler AG and others with respect to the effects of co-determination. Cf. Tracinda v. DaimlerChrysler, loc. cit. n. 35, at 41.

  56. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Many American unions carry ‘International’ in their names; however, their locals represent workers employed at US plants.

  57. Girndt, Mitbestimmung International Edition 2005, available at: http://www.boeckler.de/cps/rde/xchg/SID-3D0AB75D-A305A1E2/hbs/hs.xsl/164_37825.html.

  58. See supra n. 33.

  59. Girndt, Mitbestimmung International Edition 2005, see supra n. 57; D. Hexel, Mitbestimmung International Edition 2004, see supra n. 10.

  60. For unjust dismissal laws, cf., in Germany SEBG (Law on Employee Involvement in an SE, BGBl. I 2004, p. 3686, § 42; protection for members of the special negotiating body in the United Kingdom: Statutory Instrument 2004, No. 2326, Part 3, ch. 8. ILO Convention 158 states in Art. 5(b) that holding office as workers’ representative does not constitute a valid reason for termination. This rather weak Convention has been signed by thirty-one nations; the United States is not among them.

  61. Cf., Burgerlijk Wetboek, Arts. 2:158–164 and 2:262–274; F.B.J. Grapperhaus and L.G. Verburg, Employment Law and Works Councils of the Netherlands (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2002) pp. 59–60; E. Groenewald, ‘Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: From the Verdam Report of 1964 to the Tabaksblat Code of 2003’, 6 EBOR (2005) p. 291; Rebhahn (2004), loc. cit. n. 7, at No. 18; L. Timmerman and S.-J. Spanjaard, ‘Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung in den Niederlanden’, in Baums and Ulmer, op. cit. n. 7, at p. 85 et seq. Recent changes of the law (as of 1 September 2004) shifted the election right from the board to the shareholders’ meeting leaving the nomination rights for one-third of the seats with the works council.

  62. Cf., in Germany § 21(1) 1. SEBG, see supra n. 60.

  63. Cf., supra n. 42 on the differentiation between firm and corporation.

  64. See supra n. 6.

  65. Pistor, loc. cit. n. 9, at p. 172 et seq.

  66. Pistor et al., ‘Evolution’, loc. cit. n. 21; similar effects may result from more generous recognition of dispure resolution by arbitration, Kirchner, Painter and Kaal, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 195 et seq.

  67. Seibt, loc. cit. n. 22; Windbichler, op. cit. n. 39, at p. 541 et seq.

  68. Council Directive 2001/86/EC, loc. cit. n. 3, Art. 2(k).

  69. Hansmann and Kraakman, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 11 et seq.; for the distinction between internal and external corporate governance, see also Hopt, loc. cit. n. 8, p. 289 at p. 292.

  70. Mitbestimmungsgesetz of 4 May 976, BGBl. I, 1153, § 5(3); similarly in the Netherlands, Art. 2:155(3) of the Burgerlijk Wetboek.

  71. Whether compensation of supervisory board members should include stock options or other incentive-oriented, variable elements is highly disputed; BGH opinion of 16 February 2004 — II ZR 316/02 rules out stock options for members of the supervisory board. For incentive-oriented compensation, see Schwalbach, loc. cit. n. 48. German labour representatives are bound by the articles of association of their union to pay the better part of their compensation into a fund.

  72. These differences are often neglected in a nexus-of-contracts analysis of the firm; cf., J.D. Cox and T.L. Hazen, Corporations, 2nd edn. (New York, Aspen 2003) pp. 39–44; M.A. Eisenberg, ‘The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm’, 24 J. Corp. L. (1999) p. 819; J.R. Macey, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationale for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Duties’, 21 Stetson L. Rev. (1991) p. 23; Windbichler, loc. cit. n. 24, at p. 805 et seq.

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  74. e. g., everybody working at a construction site has to wear a helmet and steel-capped boots, no matter whether the employer is a contractor or subcontractor or ancillary supplier, incorporated, publicly listed or a family business. See also P.L. Davies, Introduction to Company Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) p. 272.

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  75. P. Behrens, ‘Die Bedeutung der ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts für das Arbeitsrecht’ [The Importance of Economic Analysis of Law for Labour Law], Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (1989) p. 209 at p. 224; P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont, Contract Theory (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press 2005) pp. 486–498; I.R. Macneil, ‘The Many Futures of Contracts’, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. (1974) p. 691 at p. 720 et seq.; I.R. Macneil, ‘Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law’, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. (1978) p. 854; I.R. Macneil, ‘Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”’, 75 Nw. U.L. Rev. (1981) p. 1018; O.E. Williamson, ‘Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’, 22 J. Law & Econ. (1979) p. 233 at p. 235 et seq.; J. Jickeli, Der langfristige Vertrag (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1996) p. 61 et seq., p. 77 et seq.; H. Kötz, Europäisches Vertragsrecht (Tübingen, Mohr 1996) p. 19 et seq.; R. Richter and e. g. Furubotn, Neue Institutionenökonomik. Eine Einführung und kritische Würdigung, 3rd edn. (Tübingen, Mohr-Siebeck 2003) p. 476 et seq.; E. Schanze, ‘Symbiotic Contracts: Exploring Long-Term Agency Structures Between Contract and Corporation’, in C. Joerges, ed., Franchising and the Law: Theoretical and Comparative Approaches in Europe and the United States (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1991) p. 67 at p. 100 et seq.; C. Windbichler, ‘Betriebliche Mitbestimmung als institutionalisierte Vertragshilfe’ [CoDetermination as Institutionalised Instrument to Complete Relational Contracts], in M. Lieb, U. Noack and H.P. Westermann, eds., Festschrift für Wolfgang Zöllner (Cologne, Heymann 1999) pp. 999–1009.

  76. To give a practical example: the individual employment contract describes the job as ‘full-time’; the union agreement defines the 38-hour week as full-time employment; the agreement between the employer and the works council arranges the schedule to break up the (average) 38 hours into 8-hour shifts.

  77. For an excellent overview, see Rebhahn (2003), loc. cit. n. 7; also Biagi, loc. cit. n. 7.

  78. In the United States, the so-called Team Act that proposed an amendment to § 8(a)(2) NLRA (29 U.S.C. § 158) 1996 was vetoed by President Clinton, who gave in to union opposition; the amendment would have facilitated quality circles and other cooperative practices; J.G. Getman, B.B. Pogrebin and D.L. Gregory, Labor Management Relations and the Law, 2nd edn. (New York, Foundation Press 1999) p. 351; cf., also M.A. O’Connor, ‘The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation’, 78 Cornell L. Rev. p. 899 at p. 947 et seq.

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  79. Hansmann and Kraakman, loc. cit. n. 26, at p. 22.

  80. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001, loc. cit. n. 3; see also Art. 6(3)(i) of Directive 2004/25/EC of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids, OJ L 142 of 30 April 2004, p. 12: ‘The offer document … shall state at least: the offeror’s intentions … with regard to the safeguarding of the jobs of their employees and management, including any material change in the conditions of employment…’.

  81. e. g., in Germany § 5(1) No 9 Umwandlungsgesetz, 28 October 1994, BGBl. I, 3210; § 11(1)(3) No 2 WpÜG of 1 January 2001, BGBl. I, 3822.

  82. Cf., for the United States, Regulation S-K Item 303, Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (MD&A); for Germany, § 29 BőrsZulV; § 15 WpHG; G. Hertig, R. Kraakman and E.B. Rock, ‘Issuers and Investor Protection’, in Kraakman et al., op. cit. n. 26, at pp. 199–201; Hueck and Windbichler, op. cit. n. 13, at § 27 n. 4; C. Windbichler, ‘Die “kohärente und auf Dauer angelegte Gruppenpolitik”’ [Coherence and Long-Term Consistency in Group Policy], in M. Habersack, et al., eds., Festschrift für Peter Ulmer (Berlin, De Gruyter 2003) p. 683 at p. 689 et seq.

  83. Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002, OJ L 243 of 11 September 2002, p. 1.

  84. Council Directive 2001/86/EC, loc. cit. n. 3.

  85. Council Directive 2002/14/EC, loc. cit. n. 1.

  86. e. g., Backhaus, loc. cit. n. 51; Höpner, op. cit. n. 8, at p. 30 et seq.

  87. The EC Commission’s Action Plan, loc. cit. n. 4, Introduction, p. 3.

  88. Cf., § 8(a)(2) NLRA and the problems associated with co-operative labour practices; Getman, Pogrebin and Gregory, op. cit. n. 78, at pp. 342, 351.

  89. Parts of American literature emphasise the need for protection of implicit contracts against ex-post opportunism and advance a stakeholder approach in corporate governance. See, e. g., M.M. Blair and L.A. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, 24 J. Corp. L. (1998–1999) p. 751; M. O’Connor, ‘Labor’s Role in the American Corporate Structure’, 22 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. (2000-2001) p. 97. From a European management perspective, see Sadowski, Junkes and Lindenthal, loc. cit. n. 31, at p. 144: Firms as a pool of specific investors (capital and human capital). These perspectives gloss over the difference between ‘firm’ and ‘corporation’. It seems, moreover, that the potential of contract governance on the employment level and the problems of board structure are underestimated.

  90. An example for such an exceptional contractual arrangement may be found in German Konzernrecht, the domination contract (requiring shareholder approval) or, in US financing practice, covenants regulating dividend policy of a debtor company. The latter example comes with the reservation that dividend policy is a structural matter that may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

  91. C. Windbichler, ‘Das Arbeitsverhältnis als Austausch- und “Geschenkverhältnis”’, in H. Hirte, K. Frey and R. Wank, eds., Festschrift für Herbert Wiedemann (Munich, Beck 2002) p. 673.

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  92. Council Directive 2002/14/EC, loc. cit. n. 1.

  93. See above: the combination of shop-floor co-determination with boardroom participation…; in favour of symbolic rights: Sadowski, Junkes and Lindenthal, loc. cit. n. 31, at pp. 155–157.

  94. Art. 23(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2157/2001, loc. cit. n. 3: Employee involvement in the SE shall be decided pursuant to Directive 2001/86/EC. The general meeting of each of the merging companies may reserve the right to make registration of the SE conditional upon its express ratification of the arrangements so decided; Seibt, loc. cit. n. 22, at pp. 417, 418; Windbichler, op. cit. n. 39, at p. 547.

  95. Pistor et al., ‘Innovation’, loc. cit. n. 21.

  96. Cf., Part 3 of the Annex to Council Directive 2001/86/EC, OJ L 294 of 10 November 2001, p. 22.

  97. Pistor et al., ‘Innovation’, loc. cit. n. 21, at p. 7 et seq., argue that the innovative capacity of a legal system with a high amount of enabling laws is higher than that of a predominantly mandatory regime. For examples for innovative participation agreements, see Seibt, loc. cit. n. 22.

  98. The practice of co-determination according to the German law of 1976 produced strong traditions that are not supported by the statute. One example is the separate preparatory meeting, see supra n. 13.

  99. See § 5 of MitbestG, loc. cit. n. 70; §§ 40(4)-(4b), 176 of the Austrian Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz of 14 December 1973; Art. 2:155(3) and Art. 2:265(3) of the Burgerlijk Wetboek of the Netherlands.

  100. Art. 4(1) and Art. 7 of the Annex to Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European works council or procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees; Annex: Standard Rules Part 2(h) of Council Directive (EC) No. 2157/2001, loc. cit. n. 3.

  101. § 8(a)(2) NLRA.

  102. R.A. Gorman and M.W. Finkin, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargaining, 2nd edn. (St. Paul, Minn., West 2004) pp. 257–270.

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  103. Windbichler, op. cit. n. 39, at pp. 51, 300.

  104. ECJ, C-62/99 Bofrost* [2001] ECR I-2579 and C-440/00 Kühne & Nagel [2004] ECR I-787; the latter ignores specifics of the group structure, and so does SE law. The United Kingdom, in its adaptation of the Directive on European works councils, provided for conflict resolution, including the scope of the group, by arbitration: Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999, in effect since 15 June 2000. See C. Windbichler, ‘Auskunftspflichten in der gemeinschaftsweit operierenden Unternehmensgruppe nach der Richtlinie über Europäische Betriebesräte’, in M. Lutter, M. Scholz and W. Sigle, eds., Festschrift für Martin Peltzer (Cologne, Otto Schmidt 2001) pp. 629–643; C. Windbichler, ‘Prozessspezifika unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des faktischen Konzerns’ [Process-Specificities in Corporate Group Management], in P. Hommelhoff, K.J. Hopt and A. v. Werder, eds., Handbuch Corporate Governance. Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis (Cologne, Otto Schmidt 2003) p. 605 for further critical inquiries into information rights and group structure.

  105. Cf., the Chairman’s Council ‘created … to more accurately reflect the diversity and geographic reach of DaimlerChrysler’s business’, and ‘the Automotive Council … [with the] objective … to explore opportunities for the three divisions to share equipment and plants’, as reported in Tracinda v. DaimlerChrysler, loc. cit. n. 35, at 65.

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  1. Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany

    Christine Windbichler Dr. iur. (Munich), LL.M. (Berkeley) (Professor of Business, Labour and Employment Law)

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  1. Christine Windbichler Dr. iur. (Munich), LL.M. (Berkeley)
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Windbichler, C. Cheers and Boos for Employee Involvement: Co-Determination as Corporate Governance Conundrum. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 6, 507–537 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752905005070

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