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Contractual Arrangements and the Provision of Public Interest Services: A Transaction Cost Analysis

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. ATOM, University of Paris I Sorbonne, France

    Freddy Huet & Stéphane Saussier

  2. ADIS, University of Paris XI Sceaux and ATOM, France

    Stéphane Saussier

Authors
  1. Freddy Huet
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  2. Stéphane Saussier
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Additional information

The authors would like to thank the French Ministry of Ecology and Durable Development (MEDD) for its financial support and the French Institute of Environment (IFEN), the French Ministry of Agriculture (SCEES) and French water agencies for providing data. We also would like to acknowledge Armelle Mazé, Sonja Opper, Patricia Vornetti and the participants of the ATOM-MATISSE-LAEP seminar (Sorbonne-Paris) and of the ISNIE Conference (Budapest 2003) for their useful comments.

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Huet, F., Saussier, S. Contractual Arrangements and the Provision of Public Interest Services: A Transaction Cost Analysis. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 4, 403–427 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752903004038

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