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The European New Markets For High-Growth Companies

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References

  1. Bibliography on the concept of the over-the-counter or off-exchange market is not extensive, as is made plain by the few authors who have treated the subject: see S. Stenzel, Ausserbörslicher Aktienhandel. Teilband 1. Umfang und Ursachen (Berlin 1995) p. 32. The same is true for the parallel market, although Schmidt, Vorteile und Nachteile eines integrieten Zirkulationsmarktes für Wertpapiere gegenüber einem gespaltenem Effektenmarkt (Brussels 1977) p. 336, offers some benchmarks with which to essay the delimitation of the term’s reference.

  2. See S. Corallini/R. Moroni, II mercato ristretto dei valori mobiliari (Milan 1983) p. 18; U. Nieto, El Mercado de Valores. Organización y funcionamiento (Madrid 1993) p. 81.

  3. See A. Madrid Parra, “Repercusión de las nuevas tecnologías en la reforma del mercado de valores”, 73 Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil (1999) 31, 56.

  4. See generally R. Lee, What is an Exchange? (Oxford 1998) pp. 1 et seq.

  5. See T.L. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation (St. Paul, Minn. 1996) pp. 1 et seq. In addition to the securities markets, investors may look to the commodities markets, although generally those are regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission: see L. Loss/J. Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulations (Boston 1995) p. 600.

  6. See L. Loss/ J. Seligman, Securities Regulation, vol. VI (Boston 1990) pp. 2787–2795.

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  7. See generally L. Loss/J. Seligman, Securities Regulation, supra n. 6, vol V, pp. 2578–2579. Regarding the pre-NASDAQ History of OTC trading, see S. Hierro Anibarro, “La Asociación Nacional de Intermediarios de Activos Financieres (NASD) y el mercado NASDAQ”, 79 Revista de Derecho Bancario y Bursátil (2000) 93,118 et seq.; M.J. Simon/R.L.D. Colby, “The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks”, 55 The George Washington Law Review (1986) 17, 19–34; A.I. Burns, “Over-the-Counter Market Quotations: Pink, Yellow, Green and White Sheets- A Gray Area in the Law of Evidence”, 52 Cornell Law Quarterly ( 1967) 262,262 et seq.

  8. Regarding self-regulation in the securities industry, see generally W.L. Cary, “Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry”, 49 American Bar Association Journal (1963) 244; P.J. Chepucavage, “Self-Regulation in a National Market Environment”, 13 Securities Law Review (1981) 313; A.H. Frey, “Federal Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Securities Market”, 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1957) 1; R.S. Karmel, “Securities Industry Self-Regulation -Tested by the Crash”, 45 Washington and Lee Law Review (1988) 1297; S.S. Miller, “Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination”, 42 Washington and Lee Law Review (1985) 855; J.J. Moylan, “The Place of Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry”, 6 Securities Regulation Law Journal (1978) 49; D.L. Ratner, “Self-Regulatory Organizations”, 19 Osgoode Hall Law Journal (1981) 368; M.K. Smythe, “Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation”, 17 Securities Law Review (1985) 459.

  9. See Hazen, supra n. 5, at 2 and 452.

  10. The expression “free market” is a French coinage that soon became popular throughout Europe, see C.B. Viterbo, “II mercato libera di borsa i contratti a premio”, in: Studi di Diritto Commerciale in onore di Cesare Vivente (Rome 1931) p. 723.

  11. See infra sect. 3.2.1.

  12. The banning of the free market was usually accompanied by its incorporation into the exchanges, although as there was little dealing in its stocks, trading declined to the point of virtual disappearance: see R. Grenier, Le second marché: Règles et Fonctionnemet (Paris 1988) pp. 68–69.

  13. See T. Wilmot, Inside the Over-the-Counter Market in the UK (Westport/London 1985) P. 7.

  14. See infra sect. 3.2.1.

  15. It is still difficult to define SME satisfactorily, see K. Ratz, Innovationsfinanzierung für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen. Ergebnisse eines internationalen Erfahrungsautausches (Vienna 1988) p. 9; recently, see T. A. Martin, “Der Neue Markt an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse und Probleme mittelständischer Unternehmen bei der Finanzierung über Eigenkapitalzuführung”, 5 Die Aktiengesellschaft (1998) 221, 222–223. It is customary to consider as SME any company with fewer than 500 workers, see J. González-Estefani, “La problemática de la pequeña y mediana empresa en España”, 24 Anales de la Academia Matritense del Notariado (1981)7,9.

  16. See G. Bannock/A. Doran, Going Public. The Markets in Unlisted Securities (London 1987) p. 73.

  17. See F. Pérez Calatayud, “Los mercados de valores desde la perspectiva de una zona off-shore”, 154 Noticias de la Unión Europea (1997) 53, 54.

  18. See generally Wilmot, supra n. 13, at 10, and Grenier, supra n. 12, at 31 et seq.

  19. See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission European capital markets for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: prospects and potential obstacles to progress, COM (97) 187 final, p. 5.

  20. See L.M. Loll/J.G. Buckley, The Over-the Counter Securities Markets (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1981) p. 167.

  21. See Wilmot, supra n. 13, at 8; Bannock/Doran, supra n. 14, at 11; M.I. Ortega, El mercado bursátil en España: un análisis de su dimensión (Madrid 1998) p. 182; D. D. Buonomo, “Borsa valori e Mercato ristretto. Le condizioni di ammissione”, Banca Borsa e Titoli di Credito (1985) 365, 378.

  22. See Hazen, supra n. 5, at 2 and 452. Since 1990 the Nasdaq Stock Market is the world’s largest stock market in dollar volume terms, see NASD Press Release -06/06/1999. Nasdaq Becomes the World’s Biggest Stock Market by Dollar Volume.

  23. See Pérez Calatayud, supra n. 17, at 55.

  24. See D. Leblanc, “Nouveaux financements pour les valeurs de croissance”, 566 Banque (1996) 16.

  25. See infra sect. 4.2.1.

  26. See M. Izquierdo, Los Mercados de valores en la CEE (Derecho Comunitario y adaptatión al Derecho Español) (Madrid 1992) pp. 185–186.

  27. A market maker is responsible for making “two way” bids on the securities for which it makes a market. As such, the market maker must be willing to stand behind these quotations. The SEC rules require that the market maker is financially able to fulfil these obligations, see Hazen, supra n. 5, at 484.

  28. See S.R. Veale (Ed.), Stocks, Bonds, Options, Futures. Investments and their Markets (New York 1987) p. 240.

  29. See generally OICV/IOSCO, The Influence of Market Makers in the Creation of Liquidity. Report by the Emerging Markets Commute of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (May 1999) especially pp. 8 et seq.

  30. See A. Sánchez Andrés, “La nueva legislatión del Mercado de valores (Fundamentos económicos y jurídicos para la regulatión de la materia)”, in: F. Sánchez Calero (Coord.), Perspectivas actuates del Derecho Mercantil (Pamplona 1995) p. 111.

  31. See N.S. Poser, International Securities Regulation (Boston 1991) pp. 46–47.

  32. See C. Salinas/P. Kirchner, La Reforma de la Ley del Mercado de Valores (Valencia 1999) p. 94.

  33. The Small Order Execution System (SOES). Through this system, the NASD uses its computers to execute orders to trade 1000 shares or less, see L.D. Solomon/L. Corso, “The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation”, 24 The John Marshall Law Review (1991) 299, 315.

  34. EASDAQ Rule Book, rule 7301(b).

  35. See Veale, supra n. 5, at 240. In contrast to the exchange specialist system, in the OTC market at least two dealers must choose to make markets in OTC stocks, see C. Bronfman/K. Lehn/R.A. Schwartz, “The SEC’s Market 2000 Report”, 19 The Journal of Corporation Law (1994) 523.

  36. See N. Wolfson/T.A. Russo, “The Stock Exchange Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis”, Duke Law Journal (1970) 707. For more information about the specialist, see Loss/Seligman, supra n. 5, at 605–606.

  37. Regarding the NASDAQ market, see Hazen, supra n. 5, at 487.

  38. See D.A. Oesterle/D.A. Winslow/S.C. Anderson, “The New York Stock Exchange and Its Out Moded Specialist System: Can the Exchange Innovate to Survive?”, 17 The Journal of Corporation Law (1992) 223, 223 et seq.

  39. See Hazen, supra n. 5, at 489; J.L. Cochrane/B. McNamara/J.E. Shapiro/M.J. Simon, “The Structure and Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange”, 18 The Journal of Corporation Law (1992) 57, 72. Against: J. Macey/H. Kanda, “The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges”, 75 Cornell Law Review (1990) 1007, 1026–1027.

  40. See D.R. Fischel, “Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock”, 54 University of Chicago Law Review (1987) 119,126; D.A. Oesterle, “On the Business of Defending NYSE Specialists”, 18 The Journal of Corporation Law (1992) 79, 88; Macey/Kanda, supra n. 39, at 1027 et seq.

  41. See Hazen, supra n. 5, at 490.

  42. See Wolfson/Russo, supra n. 36, at 745.

  43. Specialists are subject to special capital requirements, and are limited in their dealings with the issuers of the particular stocks, large institutional investors and other broker-dealers, see Hazen, supra n. 5, at 490. For more information, see Wolfson/Russo, supra n. 36, at 727 et seq.

  44. Regarding the NASDAQ market, see Fischel, supra n. 40, at 126.

  45. Instead, the London Stock Exchange based its trading system, known as Stock Exchange Automated Quotations (SEAQ), on the NASDAQ system. The London Stock Exchange had to implement several changes to adopt not a stock exchange trading system, but rather a system for over-the-counter trading. Most important, the NYSE attempted to prevent its members from trading in London in the 200 stocks listed on both exchanges during the one hour of the day when both exchanges are open. The NYSE’s reasoning was that SEAQ had become an over-the-counter market, not an exchange, therefore NYSE Rule 390, which prohibits members from doing any trading as principal in NYSE-listed common stock over the counter, applied to these trades: see Poser, supra n. 31, at 41 et seq. Besides SEAQ, a limited system was created in 1985, known as SEAQ International (SEAQI), for off-exchange trading, particularly in foreign equities: see K.J. Houghton, “The Economic and Political Debate Over the Regulation of Off-Exchange Securities Trading in the European Community’s Single Financial Market”, 32 Virginia Journal of International Law (1992) 747, 766–769, and Stenzel, supra n. 1, at 39.

  46. See A. Haelterman/M. Duplat/M. Hailake, “EASDAQ: the Pan-European Stock Market”, 25 International Business Lawyer (1997) 503, 504. The EASDAQ market was also inspired by the fact that NASDAQ has its headquarters in Washington: see S. Yassukovich, “EASDAQ: Europe’s Stock Market for Growth Companies”, 21 Fordham International Law Journal (1997) 397, 399.

  47. See M. Olislaegers/A. Haelterman/L.C. Verbeke, “Easdaq market opens for business”, 16 International Financial Law Review (1997) 14, 14–17.

  48. See Ratner, supra n. 8, at 369.

  49. See J.E. Canseco, “El fenomeno Bolsa”, in: J.L. Sánchez Fernández de Valderrama, (dir.), Curso de bolsa y mercados financieros (Barcelona 1996) pp. 218 et seq. and p. 243.

  50. See B. Steil, “Equity Trading IV: The ISD and the Regulation of European Market Structure”, in: B. Steil, et al, The European Equity Markets. The State of the Union and an Agenda for the Millennium (London 1996) pp. 115–116.

  51. See A.J. Alonso Ureba, “Mercados regulados de valores”, 65 Perspectivas del Sistema Financiero (1999) 53, 58.

  52. In recent years there has been a progressive officialization of the stock exchanges’ second markets, see J.-M. Gollier, “La notion de bourse, de marché secondaire et de marché réglementé”, in: J.-F. Thossens, (Coord.), La réforme des marchés et des intermédiaires financiers (Brussels 1997) pp. 117–118.

  53. See Stenzel, supra n. 1, at 35 et seq. It was the registration of automated trading systems that forced the SEC to present for the first time an interpretation of how the “exchange” definition should be understood, see Lee, supra n. 4, at 281. This criterion was later employed to determine the regulatory status of trading systems: see J.-B. Zufferey, Regulation of Trading Systems on Financial Markets (London 1997) p. 235.

  54. See H. Henckel-Donnersmarck, “<Electronic Communication Networks> und <Alternative Trading Systems> — Herausforderung für die Aufsichtsbehörden”, in: R.H. Weber (Hrsg.), Neuere Entwicklungen im Kapitalmarktrecht (Zurich 2000) pp. 262.

  55. See Houghton, supra n. 45, at 749 and 757; Macey/Kanda, supra n. 39, at 1052. See generally: Solomon/Corso, supra n. 33, at 320 et seq.; J. de Bel, “Automated Trading Systems and the Concept of an ‘Exchange’ in an International Context Proprietary Systems: A Regulatory Headache!”, 14 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law (1993) 169, 169 et seq. For Europe, see generally, M. Pagano/B. Steil, “Equity Trading I: The Evolution of European Trading Systems”, in: Steil, supra n. 49, at 43–45; E. Schwark, “Börsen und Wertpapier-handelsmärkte in der EG”, 7 Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (1997) 293, 299–300.

  56. The vertical segmentation was considered to be necessary for the most advanced and sophisticated securities markets: see Wilmot, supra n. 13, at 110.

  57. From this point of view, the problem of the second-tier markets has its roots not so much in the issuing companies as in the search for a way to adapt the stock exchange model to the particular characteristics of this category of company: see A. Madej, “El relanzamiento del <second marché> parisino”, 10 Bolsa de Madrid (1993) 36,41. The adaptation was based solely on relaxing the admission requirements and the obligations imposed on listed companies. This did not improve the financing of SMEs, and in fact even reduced investor protection: see A. Sánchez Andrés, “La sociedad anónima y el mercado (observaciones al paso de una reforma indebida)”, 14 Revista de Derecho de Sociedades (2000) 13, 17. It was also useless as a means of achieving the liquidity necessary to guarantee the survival of any kind of securities market: see F.J. Zapata, “Admisión, suspensión y exclusión de valores”, in: A. Alonso Ureba/J. Martínez-Simancas (dir.), Instituciones del Mercado Financiero, vol. VII (Madrid 1999) p. 4433.

  58. Among others, the following have been pointed out: insufficient analysts and little market information of the kind that might have guaranteed the market’s liquidity (United Kingdom); investor aversion to risk and resistance on the part of the entrepreneurs themselves to finance through shares’ emissions, with the consequent and foreseeable dilution of control (Germany); high level of public debt and stagnation of the savings generated by the economy in risk-free Treasury bonds (Spain); geographical dispersion of trading floors (in Italy the mercatto ristretto is running locally in Milan, Rome, Turin, Genoa, Florence, and Naples); promotion of listing companies to the main market (France): see Pérez Calatayud, supra n. 17, at 55.

  59. See infra sect. 4.2.3.3.

  60. See D. O’Neill, “London Stock Market Starts up. The Alternative Investment Market is devised, like NASDAQ, to succeed through regulation”, 18 The National Law Journal (1995) C1, C2.

  61. See M. Andreen, “How good is the Stock Exchange’s AIM?”, 139 Solicitors Journal (1995) 684; T. Steadman, “The Alternative Investment Market: The Regulatory Issues”, 4 Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance (1996) 125, 126.

  62. See C. Abrams, “The Alternative Investment Market”, 2 European Financial Services Law (1995) 147.

  63. See “Exchange launches techMARK for high-technology companies”, 20 The Company Lawyer (1990) 330.

  64. See H. Hansen, “Der Neue Markt”, 12 Die Aktiengesellschaft-Report (1996) 539.

  65. See Frankfurt Wertpapierbörse, Infoordner Neuer Markt. 1.3. Warum Transparenz und wie?, p. 6.

  66. The decision to create the Nouveau Marché was taken by the Société des Bourses Françaises (the “SBF”) acting in line with the conclusions of the Bruno Roger/Pierre Faurre Report, one of which advocated the establishment of an autonomous market aimed at companies with a high growth potential: see D. Leblanc, “Nouveaux financements pour les valeurs de croissance”, 566 Banque (1996) 16.

  67. See G. Ripert/R. Roblot, Traité de Droit Commercial, t. II (Paris 1996) p. 83.

  68. The organization of the Nouveau Marché was initially entrusted to the New Market’s Board, the Société du Nouveau Marché — until recently a subsidiary wholly owned by the SBF (now part of Euronext Paris SA) — which was given 20 million francs of start-up capital. However, a recent change in the French securities markets organizational structure (prior to the appearance of Euronext) led to the fusion of the four market operators (SBF, MATIF SA, MONEP SA and the SNM itself) into a single entity, Paris Bourse SBF SA. This company combines all the activities of securities dealing, derivatives and operations, although each market still preserves its own regulation and structure.

  69. Règles de Fonctionnements, art. 1-1-3.

  70. Delibera CONSOB, de 27 gennaio 1999, n. 11808.

  71. Delibera 23 gennaio 1997, n. 10464 délia Consob.- Approvazione del progetto del Consiglio di borsa concernente la costituzione délia società per azioni denominata “Borsa italiana s.p.a.”, avente per oggetto la gestione della borsa valori, del mercato ristretto e del mercato di borsa per la negoziazione degli strumenti finanziari previsti dall’art. 1, comma 1, lettere f) ed I) del d. lgs. 23 luglio 1996, n. 415.

  72. Regolamento del Nuovo Mercato Organizzato e Gestito Dalla Borsa Italiana S.p.A., art. 1.2.3.

  73. See M.I. Ortega, El mercado bursátil en España: Un análisis de su dimensión (Madrid 1998) p. 187.

  74. See J. Abellá, La ordenación del Mercado de valores: un ordenamiento dinámico (Madrid 1995) p. 194.

  75. BOE, no. 312, de 30 de diciembre de 1999, pp. 46334–46335.

  76. Instructión Operativa de la Sociedad de Boisas no. 4/2000.

  77. See G. Arranz, “Creación de un segmento especial de negociatión en las Boisas de Valores denominados <Nuevo Mercado”, 113 Derecho de los Negocios (2000) 105, 106.

  78. Orden de 22 de diciembre de 1999 por la que se créa un segmento especial de negociatión en las Boisas de Valores denominado “Nuevo Mercado” y se modißcan los requisitos de admisión a Boisa, dispositión primera, apartado 3.

  79. See G. Finn, “Institutions in NASDAQ’s Competing Dealer Markets”, in: R.A. Schwartz (ed.), Global Equity Markets: Technological, Competitive, and Regulatory Challenges (Chicago 1995) p. 48; E. Hallmann, “Institutionelle Investoren als Zielgrupe für mittlere Wachtumsunternehmen an der Easdaq”, 1 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen (1998) 24, 24 et seq. These kind of markets are generally dominated by sophisticated institutional investors: see Houghton, supra n. 45, at 748.

  80. See H. Schmidt (dir.), Special stock market segments for small company shares: Capital raising mechanism and exit route for investors in new technology-based firms (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities 1984) p. 449.

  81. See J. Martí, “Pasado, présente y futuro del capital-riesgo en España”, 67 Perspectivas el Sistema Financiero (1999) 21, 28–29.

  82. See A.J. Roquette, “New Developments relating to the Internalization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, the European Community, and Germany”, 14 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law (1994) 565.

  83. See A.L. Peters/A.E. Feldman, “The Changing Structure of the Securities Markets and the Securities Industry: Implications for International Securities Regulation”, 19 Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies (1988) 19,21 et seq.; D.E. van Zandt, “The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an International Securities Market”, 32 Virginia Journal of International Law (1991) 47, 60 et seq.; F. Kübier, “Regulatory Problems in Internationalizing Trading Markets”, 9 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Business Law (1987) 107,107 et seq.

  84. See Roquette, supra n. 82, at 567.

  85. Between 1979 and 1981 the SEC revised all regulations regarding the issuing of shares by foreign companies in the US securities markets with the intention of making such issues easier. This measure is regarded as the key to the subsequent success of markets like the NASDAQ in attracting foreign companies: see B.S. Thomas, “Internationalization of the Securities Markets: An Empirical Analysis”, 15 Securities Law Review (1983) 523–528.

  86. See infra sect. 4.2.3.1.

  87. See Poser, supra n. 31, at 2.

  88. See Grenier, supra n. 12, at 75 et seq.

  89. See Schmidt, supra n. 80, at XXX et seq.

  90. See regarding EASDAQ: A. van Cauwenberge, “EASDAQ: A Pan-European Regulated Market Based in Belgium”, in: J.F. Tossens (Coörd.), La réforme des marches et des intermédiaires financiers (Brussels 1997) p. 285.

  91. See N.S. Poser, “Restructuring the Stock Markets: A critical look at the SEC’ s National Market System”, 56 New York University Law Review (1981) 883, 888.

  92. See Houghton, supra n. 45, at 750 and 755; Macey/Kanda, supra n. 39, at 1011.

  93. See J.L. Hamilton, “Marketplace Organisation and Marketability: Nasdaq, the Stock Exchange, and the National Market System”, 33 The Journal of Finance (1978) 487,487 et seq.

  94. See Macey/Kanda, supra n. 39, at 1008–1009. Recently, see P.D. Cohen, “Securities Trading via the Internet”, Journal of Business Law (1999) 299 et seq.

  95. See H. Plewka/ K. Aymans, “Die <Neuen Märkte> in Europa”, 44 Der Betrieb (1996) 2192, 2193; K. Schappelwein, “Die neuen KMU-Börsen”, 10 Österreichisches Bank Archiv (1998) 778; H.E. Büschgen, “Börsenmässiges Eigenkapital für kleine und mittlere Unternehmen”, 2 & 3 Österreichisches Bank Archiv (1997) 94, 99. The Ministerial Rule that created the Spanish New Market gives a definition of this kind of companies: “empresas de sectores innovadores de alta tecnología u otros sectores que ofrezcan grandes posibilidades de crecimiento futuro, aunque con mayores niveles de riesgo que los sectores tradicionales” [Orden Ministerial, 22 December 1999, por la que se crea un segmento especial de negociación en las Boisas de valores denominado “Nuevo Mercado” (BOE no. 312, 30 December 1999)].

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  101. See J. Blake/J. Daghlian, AIM and EASDAQ: the new enterprise markets (London 1996) p. 3.

  102. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the “Communication from the Commission -European capital markets for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: prospects and potential obstacles to progress” — 98/C 235/04, OJ [1998] C 235.

  103. See Plewka/Aymans, supra n. 95, at 2193 et seq.; Ferri, supra n. 96, at 34; Mortier, supra n. 98, at 26–27.

  104. See Loss/Seligman, supra n. 5, at 644. See generally Note, “The NASD, An Unique Experiment in Cooperative Regulation”, 46 Virginia Law Review (1960) 1586; T.B. Rutter, “The National Association of Securities Dealers: Continuing Government-Industry Cooperative Regulation in the Over-the-Counter Securities Industry”, 7 Villanova Law Review (1962) 611, 611 et seq.

  105. See A. Gilardoni, “II Regolamento Generale Consob: analisi e commento”, in: S. Pivato (ed.), II mercato telematico per piccole e medie imprese. Realtà locali e contesto internationale (Milan 1995) p. 45.

  106. See E. Wymeersch, “The Implementation of the ISD and CAD in National Legal Systems”, in: G. Ferrarini, (ed.), European Securities Markets. The Investment Services Directive and Beyond (London 1998) pp. 38–39.

  107. See Ripert/Roblot, supra n. 67 at 83.

  108. See K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 2nd ed. (St. Paul, Minn. 1958) p. 141.

  109. See S.S. Miller, “Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination”, 42 Washington and Lee Law Review (1985) 855, 860 et seq.

  110. See W. Werner, “The SEC as a market regulator”, 70 Virginia Law Review (1984) 755,756.

  111. Generally see L.D. Lowenfels, “A Lack of Fair Procedures in the Administrative Process: Disciplinary Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and the NASD”, 64 Cornell Law Review (1979) 375, 375 et seq.

  112. See van Cauwenberge, supra n. 90, at 286, note 22.

  113. See M. Anslow, “Europe Ready For New Bourses in 1996”, 36 Venture Capital Journal (1996)25.

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  116. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, OJ [1989] L 386. For more information on this directive see J. Malet, “Movement Towards Financial Integration and Monetary Union in the European Communities”, 13 Houston Journal of International Law (1990) 79, 102 et seq.; P. Clarotti, “The Implementation of the Second Banking Directive and its Aftermath”, in: E. Wymeersch (ed.), Further Perspectives in Financial Integration in Europe (Berlin/New York 1994) pp. 43 et seq.

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  134. The NASD had, for a long time, no corporate governance requirements corresponding to the NYSE standards. This disparity was viewed as an important factor in a company’s decision whether to list, and resulted in a number of NYSE delistings into the NASDAQ. Finally, the NASDAQ adopted corporate governance requirements considering this a matter of quality: see Simon/Colby, supra n. 7, at 102.

  135. This rule is similar to the lock-in provision of the AIM. Although not too onerous, some commentators have argued that this may provide a disincentive to management preventing them from listing new companies: see Blake/Daghlian, supra n. 101, at 10.

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  1. University of Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, Spain

    Santiago Hierro Anibarro (Professor of Law)

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Anibarro, S.H. The European New Markets For High-Growth Companies. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 2, 365–400 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752900000483

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