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Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A View from Sub-Saharan Africa

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References

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  29. Ibid., Art. 2, para. 4 which states as follows: ‘Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus.’

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  62. ‘Soft’ law is distinguished by a certain vagueness in the obligation it imposes and is generally not binding on Contracting Parties. See, e.g., P.-M. Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’, 12 Mich. ML (1991) p. 420 at p. 420.

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  72. Ibid, Art. IV, para. 1.

  73. Ibid., para. 2.

  74. Ibid., Art. VI, para. 1.

  75. Ibid.

  76. Ibid.

  77. Ibid., para. 2.

  78. Ibid.

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  85. Ibid., p. 895.

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  86. Dispute Settlement Understanding Art. 4.

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  104. Ibid,para. 6.

  105. Ibid., Art. 15, para. 1.

  106. Ibid., Art. 13, paras. 1–2.

  107. Ibid, Art. 12, para. 7.

  108. Ibid,para. 8.

  109. Ibid., para. 9.

  110. Ibid., Art. 16, para. 4.

  111. This is a prominent feature of the common law legal system.

  112. Ibid, Art. 17, para. 6.

  113. Ibid, para. 3.

  114. Ibid, para. 10.

  115. Ibid., para. 11.

  116. Ibid., para. 1.

  117. Ibid., para. 9.

  118. Ibid., para. 5.

  119. Ibid., para. 4.

  120. Ibid., para. 1.

  121. Ibid, para. 14.

  122. See A. Lowenfeld, ‘Comment: Remedies Along With Rights Institutional Reform in the New GATT’, 88 AJIL (1994).

  123. The question of the relationship between international law and international trade law, even excluding the rather ambiguous nature of remedies, has taken on a greater significance with the development of the legal regime of the WTO. Although in a formal legal sense the WTO differs little from other international organizations like the United Nations and its agencies, its legal regime is built on ‘assumptions that are often at variance with those underlying the traditional sovereign state model’. Moreover, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is playing an active role in the development of the substantive and procedural content of international law. The contributions of this process include clarification of the rules relating to treaty interpretation, and the development of rights of access for non-state entities. These developments have implications for some of the assumptions on which international law traditionally has been based. It is easy to foresee fundamental changes being effected onto the corpus of international law as we know it. For a very stimulating discussion on the interlink between the law being evolved by the WTO and general international law see D. McRae, ‘The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued or New Frontier?’, 3 Journal of International Economic Law (2000) pp. 27–41.

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  128. This extends to compulsory jurisdiction of the Court only. See generally R. Szafarz, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1993).

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  129. Brownlie, op cit. n. 144, at pp. 122–123. Parties before the ICJ have generally avoided raising issues of competence in relation to forms of judicial relief, except in proceedings based on compromissory clauses. The Court (and its predecessor the PCIJ) has also taken a robust line when issues of competence have been the subject of argument. See, for instance, the Factory at Chorzow case, Jurisdiction, PCIJ, Series A, No. 9, p. 21. See further CD. Gray, Judicial Remedies in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1987) pp. 59–64

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  130. See Brownlie, op. cit. n. 144, at p. 131. It is doubtful whether this is a separate category any more that claims for damages. This order was made in the Temple ofPreah Vihear case (supra n. 154), The Tehran Hostages case, ICJ Reports (1980) pp. 44–45; and the Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports (1986) p. 149. Whether such orders are made depends closely on the nature of requests of the parties.

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  139. Ibid.

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  142. Ibid.

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  148. See Mwamunyange Joseph, ‘Now EU lifts Ban on Tanzania’, The East African, Monday 20 December 1999. The writer quotes the remarks of Fred Musika, the Minister of State for Fisheries, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry in Uganda.

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  151. Ibid.

  152. Ibid.

  153. Ibid. There had been a number of people who disputed the reports saying that there were no instances offish poisoning. A spokesperson of Asat Beach Fishermen Group in the lakeside town of Kisumu was quoted as saying that ‘there has not been fish poisoning in Nyanza Gulf, but we will fight those who are trying to introduce it. Our policy is to sell clean fish to Kenyans and the buyers in Europe.’

  154. Ibid.

  155. Ibid.

  156. Ibid.

  157. Many of these concerns were raised in the Kenyan parliament by representatives from those regions that border the Lake Victoria mainly Nyanza and Western provinces.

  158. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1 A, World Trade Organization, The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1999) pp. 59–72 (hereinafter: SPS Agreement).

  159. See SPS Agreement, supra n. 227, Art. 2.

  160. Ibid., Art. 2(1), 2(2).

  161. Ibid., Art. 2(3).

  162. Ibid.

  163. Ibid., Art. 3(1).

  164. Ibid., Art. 3(2).

  165. Ibid., Art. 3(3). The SPS Agreement also includes a footnote to that effect: ‘For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.’

  166. See Victor, loc. cit. n. 234, at p. 876.

  167. SPS Agreement, supra n. 227, Art. 3(3).

  168. Ibid., Art. 2(2).

  169. See ibid., Art. 5(4).

  170. Ibid., Art. 5(5).

  171. See ibid.

  172. See ibid.

  173. See ibid.

  174. See generally J. Bhagwati, ‘Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview’, in J. Bhagwati and H. Patrick, eds., Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s Trade Policy and the World Trading System (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press 1990).

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  175. H. Patrick, eds., Aggressive Unilateralism: America’s Trade Policy and the World Trading System (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press 1990) Ibid. However Hudec has noted correctly that this remedy is rarely required in enforcing multilateral dispute settlement decisions. See Hudec, op. cit. n. 23.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Moi University, Kenya

    Victor Mosoti LL.B, LL.M (Doctor of Laws (SJD) Candidate)

  2. University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA

    Victor Mosoti LL.B, LL.M (Doctor of Laws (SJD) Candidate)

  3. University of Wisconsin Law School, Wisconsin, USA

    Victor Mosoti LL.B, LL.M (Doctor of Laws (SJD) Candidate)

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I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Ronald Brand, Professor of Law and Director of the Center for International Legal Education at the University of Pittsburgh, for inducting me into international trade law and for the germinal discussions on the subject of this paper. Useful discussions and opinions of my classmates are also deeply appreciated. I take responsibility for any and all errors.

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Mosoti, V. Damages as an Antidote to the Remedial Deficiencies in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A View from Sub-Saharan Africa. Neth Int Law Rev 48, 319–355 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165070X00001352

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