European Business Organization Law Review

, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp 147–172 | Cite as

The Protection of Creditors of a European Private Company (SPE)

  • Mathias M. Siems
  • Leif Herzog
  • Erik Rosenhäger


Soon we can expect a new type of company: the European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea — SPE) aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises in the EU. In this article, we analyse how creditors of future SPEs will be protected. In the first part, we identify on a general level how creditors can be protected. Then we turn to the tools used in the different draft versions of an SPE statute (Commission Draft, EP Draft and Presidency Compromise). As these do not cover all aspects of creditor protection, the next part examines how these gaps ought to be filled. Subsequently, we discuss whether, from a normative perspective, creditor protection in the EU should be further harmonised. Overall, we conclude that what emerges is a mixed picture between various levels of European and national rules. This may not be ideal but it may be the price worth paying in order to reach political agreement on SPE law.


European Private Company Societas Privata Europaea creditor protection regulatory competition 


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mathias M. Siems
    • 1
    • 2
  • Leif Herzog
    • 3
  • Erik Rosenhäger
    • 4
  1. 1.University of East AngliaNorwichUK
  2. 2.Centre of Business Research of the University of CambridgeUK
  3. 3.CMS Hasche SigleDüsseldorfGermany
  4. 4.LinklatersMunichGermany

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