Summary
Some neuroscientists argue that advances in neuroscience threaten to undermine our freedom. The argument here is that those concerns are instances of a more general concern about the compatibility of freedom with causal determinism, and that denying that our choices are fully determined under causal laws presents a different set of problems for the claim that we have free will. An alternative account of freedom is presented, consistent with determinism in general, and with advances in neuroscience in particular.
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Bok, H. The implications of advances in neuroscience for freedom of the will. Neurotherapeutics 4, 555–559 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nurt.2007.04.001
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nurt.2007.04.001