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MIT’s moral machine project is a psychological roadblock to self-driving cars

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A Correction to this article was published on 02 November 2020

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Abstract

In the moral machine project, participants are asked to form judgments about the well-known trolley example. The project is intended to serve as a starting point for public discussion that would eventually lead to a solution to the social dilemma of autonomous vehicles. The dilemma is that autonomous vehicles should be programed to maximize the number of lives saved in trolley-style dilemmas. But consumers will only purchase autonomous vehicles that are programed to favor passenger safety in such dilemmas. We argue that the project is seriously misguided. There are relevant variants of trolley to which the project’s participants are not exposed. These variants make clear that the morally correct way to program autonomous vehicles is not at odds with what consumers will purchase. The project is hugely popular and dominates public discussion of this issue. We show that, ironically, the project itself is largely responsible for the dilemma.

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Notes

  1. For representative papers, please see [1,2,3,11,14].

  2. This example is inspired by an example used in Lin [9].

  3. The literature covering these issues is surveyed in Chapter 2 of Machery [11].

  4. See Petrinovich and O’Neill [15], Lanteri et al. [7], Lombrozo [10], Wiegman et al. [18], and Liao et al. [8].

  5. As well as the work discussed in the previous footnote, see Nadelhoffer and Feltz [12], Cikara et al. [5], Strohminger et al. [17], Pastotter et al. [14].

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Funding

This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES–1734521.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Manhattan College, 4513 Manhattan College Parkway, Riverdale, NY, 10471, USA

    Heidi Furey

  2. CU Boulder Philosophy, Hellems 169 UCB 232, Boulder, CO, 80309-0232, USA

    Scott Hill

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  1. Heidi Furey
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  2. Scott Hill
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Correspondence to Scott Hill.

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The original online version of this article was revised: A funding note had accidentally been omitted in the original publication. The missing funding note is given here: “This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. SES–1734521.”. The original article has been corrected.

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Furey, H., Hill, S. MIT’s moral machine project is a psychological roadblock to self-driving cars. AI Ethics 1, 151–155 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-020-00018-z

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