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Nuclear learning and US–China strategic stability in Asia

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Abstract

With intensifying US–China strategic rivalry in Asia, an increasingly salient issue of bilateral strategic stability is drawing growing attention from scholars and policy analysts alike. This paper examines how the nuclear arm competition between the two great powers, each driven by its (mis)perceptions of the other’s strategic intentions, and in the absence of adequate bilateral dialogues at the official level, runs serious risks of mutual misapprehension and miscalculation. Nuclear learning, in a way, offers some unique pathways for both countries to reassess their perceptions and find ways to engage each other and modify worse-case scenario preparation for war. With growing US–China strategic rivalry and a Trump administration determined to check if not derail China’s modernization process, one would expect Beijing to assess the situation, set its priorities, and develop strategies to manage the challenges. One of its priorities would be ensuring that bilateral disputes over security issues do not escalate to open military conflicts and risk escalation to nuclear exchanges largely as a result of misunderstanding, miscommunication, and miscalculation. At the same time, Beijing should be open to bilateral nuclear dialogue with Washington, not with an aim of revealing or accepting an upper limit on its nuclear arsenal, but to get a better understanding of the strategic, technical, and security implications of various potential agreements. Nuclear arms control measures remain viable options for the two powers to avoid nuclear Armageddon.

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Notes

  1. Some early discussions of these can be found in Saunders and Yuan (2006).

  2. US Office of the Secretary of Defense (2020, 56).

  3. See Johnston (1995/96) for a discussion of whether or not Chinese nuclear strategists are debating such a doctrinal shift. See also, Chase and Medeiros (2005); Gill et al. (2002).

  4. The two countries reportedly sought to negotiate a nuclear de-targeting agreement in the late 1990s. See Erlanger (1998).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for International Security Studies, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia

    Jingdong Yuan

  2. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 72, Solna, Sweden

    Jingdong Yuan

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Yuan, J. Nuclear learning and US–China strategic stability in Asia. China Int Strategy Rev. 2, 197–216 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-020-00064-6

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