General Equilibrium Framework
We represent the world economy as a network of input-output relationships embedded in a general equilibrium model as in Acemoglu et al. (2012). The economy consists of K countries, each comprising of the same L industries. The model is calibrated to the world economy using the world input-output database (Timmer et al. 2015), which provides input-output relationships between L = 56 industries in K = 44 countries. The data set includes all major economies and a composite country representing the rest of the world. Within our model, each industry of each country is represented as one monopolistically competitive firm. Each of the K countries also has two representative households, which are differentiated by the source of their revenues. The workers’ representative household receives the labor share of value-added from each domestic sector, while the capitalists’ receives the capital share.
Remark 1
We index each country’s worker by 1, capitalist by 2, and firms by {3, ⋯ , L + 2}. There are thus M = L + 2 agents in each country and we refer to the ith agent in country k either as (i, k) or as (K − 1)(L + 2) + i (so that agents in country k are indexed by {(k − 1)(L + 2),⋯k(L + 2)}). Conversely, we let k(j) denote the country of agent j, with w(j) and c(j) denoting the worker and capitalist of country j. Finally, we let M = 2K denote the number of agents, \({\mathscr{M}}\) the set of agents, \(\mathcal {F}\) the set of firms, \({\mathscr{H}}\) the set of households, and \(\mathcal {K}\) the set of countries.
Each firm j produces a differentiated good using capital provided by the domestic capitalist, labor provided by the domestic worker, and a combination of domestic and international inputs. There are thus a total of M goods in the model corresponding to the output of each industry, differentiated by country as well as by the labor and capital services used in each country.
The production possibilities of each firm is described by a production function combining domestic labor and capital services with the domestic and international inputs put together using a CES form. Namely, the production technology of firm j is of the form:
$$ f_{j}(x_{w(j)},x_{c(j)},(x_{h})_{h \in \mathcal{F}}) =x_{w(j)}^{\alpha_{w,j}} x_{c(j)}^{\alpha_{c,j}} \left( \sum\limits_{h \in \mathcal{F}} \beta_{h,j} x_{h}^{\theta}\right)^{\frac{(1-\alpha_{c}-\alpha_{k})}{\theta}} $$
(1)
where xw(j) and xc(j) are the domestic labor and capital inputs, αw, j and αc, j are the (nominal) share of labor and capital in the input mix. The elasticity of substitution between inputs is given by \(\frac {1}{(1-\theta )}\). Worker i provides a fixed amount of work \(e_{i} \in \mathbb {R}_{+}\) and capitalist i provides a fixed amount of capital services \(e_{i'} \in \mathbb {R}_{+}\) every period. All households have CES preferences of the form:
$$ u_{i} ((x_{h})_{h \in \mathcal{F}})=\left( \sum\limits_{h \in \mathcal{F}} \beta_{h,i}x_{h}^{\theta}\right)^{\frac{(1-\alpha_{c}-\alpha_{k})}{\theta}} $$
(2)
Remark 2
The functional form introduced in Eq. 1 provides an extremely stylised description of the substitutability between inputs. In particular, it does not distinguish the substitutability between inputs from different industries and substitutability between inputs of the same industry from different countries. This simplifying assumption must be assessed in view of the intended usage of the model: inputs will be actually substituted only in the interim period following a shock. Moreover, the ridigity of the assumption is somewhat tempered by the fact that we consider inputs that correspond to sectoral aggregates.
We denote the economic system introduced above as \(\mathcal {E}({\mathscr{M}},\alpha ,\beta ,w,c)\). In this setting, a general equilibrium is usually defined as follows.
Definition 1
A general equilibrium of the economy \(\mathcal {E}({\mathscr{M}},\alpha ,\beta ,\theta )\) is a collection of prices \(p^{*} \in \mathbb {R}^{M}_{+}\), production levels \(y^{*} \in \mathbb {R}^{M}_{+}\) and commodity flows \((x^{*}_{i,j})_{i,j\in {\mathscr{M}}} \in \mathbb {R}^{M\times M}_{+}\) such that:
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1.
Consumers maximize their utility under their budget constraint. That is, for all \(i \in {\mathscr{H}},\)\((y^{*}_{i},(x^{*}_{h,i})_{h \in \mathcal {F}})\) is a solution to:
$$\left\{\begin{array}{c} \max u_{i}((x_{h,i})_{h \in \mathcal{F}}) \\ \\ \text{s.t. } {\sum}_{h \in \mathcal{F}} p^{*}_{h} x^{*}_{h,i} \leq p^{*}_{i} y^{*}_{i} \end{array}\right.$$
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2.
Firms maximize profits. That is, for all \(j \in \mathcal {F},\)\((y^{*}_{j},(x^{*}_{h,j})_{h \in \mathcal {F}})\) is a solution to:
$$\left\{\begin{array}{c} \max p^{*}_{j} y_{j}- {\sum}_{h \in \mathcal{M}} p^{*}_{h} x_{h,j} \\ \\ \text{s.t. } f_{j}(x^{*}_{w(j),j},x^{*}_{c(j),j}, (x^{*}_{h,j})_{h \in \mathcal{F}} )\geq y^{*}_{j} \end{array}\right.$$
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3.
Markets clear. That is, for all i ∈ M, one has:
$$y^{*}_{i} = \sum\limits_{j=1}^{M} x^{*}_{i,j}.$$
where for all \(i \in {\mathscr{H}},\)\(y^{*}_{i}=e_{i}\) to account for the inelastic supply of labor and capital services.
Remark 3
Note that there are no profits to be distributed at equilibrium because production technologies exhibit constant returns. Namely, one has for all \(j \in \mathcal {F}\):
$$p^{*}_{j} y^{*}_{j} =p^{*} \cdot x^{*}_{\cdot,j} $$
The no profit condition implies that the income of households is completely determined by their supply of labor or capital services.
The general equilibrium of the economy defines nominal input-output flows between each pair of agents. These flows form the input-output network of the economy. The structure of this network can be captured by a column-stochastic matrix \(A^{*}=(a^{*}_{i,j})_{i, \in {\mathscr{M}}} \in \mathbb {R}^{{\mathscr{M}} \times {\mathscr{M}}}_{+}\) whose coefficient \(a^{*}_{i,j}\) captures the share of \(j^{\prime }\)s equilibrium spending directed towards i, that is \(a^{*}_{i,j}=\frac {p^{*}_{i} x^{*}_{i,j}}{p^{*} \cdot x^{*}_{\cdot ,j}}\). In particular if \(j \in \mathcal {F}\) and \(i \in \mathcal {F},\)\(a^{*}_{i,j}\) represents the amount of expenditure on intermediary inputs spent on good i per unit of revenue of firm j while for \(i \in {\mathscr{H}}\), \(a^{*}_{i,j}\) represents the added-value received by household i per unit of revenue of firm j.
Out-of-Equilibrium Dynamics
Following Gualdi and Mandel (2016), we define out-of-equilibrium dynamics on the basis of decentralized agent-interactions.
We consider discrete periods of time indexed by \(t \in \mathbb {N}\). Every period the state of each agent \(i \in {\mathscr{M}}\) is determined by the following variables:
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Its stock of output \({q_{i}^{t}} \in \mathbb {R}_{+}\) (equal to labor or capital supply for households).
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The price of its output \({p_{i}^{t}} \in \mathbb {R}_{+}\).
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Its monetary balances \({m_{i}^{t}}\). The monetary balances of the household correspond to its consumption budget. The monetary balances of the firm correspond to its working capital.
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The share \(a_{j,i}^{t} \in \mathbb {R}_{+}^{N}\) of the budget to be spend on input j.
These variables are updated according to the following sequence of actions and interactions:
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1.
Each agent \(i \in {\mathscr{M}}\) receives the nominal demand \({\sum }_{j \in {\mathscr{M}}} \alpha ^{t}_{i,j} {m^{t}_{j}}\).
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2.
Agents adjust their prices frictionally towards their market-clearing values according to:
$$ {p_{i}^{t}}=\tau_{p} \overline{p}_{i}^{t}+ (1-\tau_{p}) p^{t-1}_{i} $$
(3)
where τp ∈ [0,1] is a parameter measuring the speed of price adjustment and \(\overline {p}_{i}^{t}\) is the market-clearing price defined as follows. Given the nominal demand \({\sum }_{j \in {\mathscr{M}}} a^{t}_{i,j} {m^{t}_{j}}\) and the output stock \({q_{i}^{t}},\)\(\overline {p}_{i}^{t}\) the market clearing price for firm i is:
$$ \overline{p}_{i}^{t}=\frac{{\sum}_{j \in \mathcal{M}} a^{t}_{i,j} {m^{t}_{j}}}{{q_{i}^{t}}} $$
(4)
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3.
Whenever τp < 1, markets do not clear (except if the system is at a stationary equilibrium). In case of excess demand, we assume that buyers are rationed proportionally to their demand. In case of excess supply, we assume that the amount \(\overline {q}^{t}_{i}:=\min \limits ({q^{t}_{i}},\frac {{\sum }_{j \in {\mathscr{M}}} a^{t}_{i,j} {m^{t}_{j}}}{{p_{i}^{t}}})\) is actually sold and rest of the output is stored as inventory.Footnote 1 These inventory dynamics together with production based on the purchased inputs yield the the following evolution of the output stock:
$$ q^{t+1}_{i}={q^{t}_{i}}-\overline{q}^{t}_{i} + f_{i}\left( \frac{a^{t}_{w(i),i}{m^{t}_{i}}}{p_{w(i)}^{t}},\frac{a^{t}_{c(i),i}{m^{t}_{i}}}{p_{c(i)}^{t}},\left( \frac{a^{t}_{j,i}{m^{t}_{i}}}{{p_{j}^{t}}}\right)_{j \in \mathcal{M}}\right) $$
(5)
Note that when τp = 1, markets always clear (one has \(\overline {q}^{t}_{i} = {q^{t}_{i}}\)) and Eq. 5 reduces to
$$ q^{t+1}_{i}= f_{i}\left( \frac{a^{t}_{w(i),i}{m^{t}_{i}}}{p_{w(i)}^{t}},\frac{a^{t}_{c(i),i}{m^{t}_{i}}}{p_{c(i)}^{t}},\left( \frac{a^{t}_{j,i}{m^{t}_{i}}}{{p_{j}^{t}}}\right)_{j \in \mathcal{M}}\right) $$
(6)
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4.
Money balances are determined on the one hand by the purchase of inputs and the sales of output. More specifically:
$$ \forall i \in M,\ m^{t+1}_{i}={m^{t}_{i}} +{p_{i}^{t}} \overline{q}^{t}_{i}-\sum\limits_{j \in \mathcal{M}} a^{t}_{j,i} \frac{\overline{q}^{t}_{i}}{{q^{t}_{i}}}{m_{i}^{t}} $$
(7)
Note that Eq. 7 can be interpreted as assuming that firms have myopic expectations about their nominal demand (i.e. firms assume they will face the same nominal demand next period) and target a balanced budget (net of labor and capital costs paid to households).
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5.
As for the evolution of input shares, agents frictionally adjust their input combinations towards the cost-minimizing value according to:
$$ a_{\cdot,i}^{t+1}=\tau_{w} \overline{a}_{\cdot,i}^{t} +(1-\tau_{w}) a_{\cdot,i}^{t} $$
(8)
where τw ∈ [0, 1] measures the speed of technological adjustment and \( \overline {a}_{\cdot ,i}^{t} \in \mathbb {R}^{M}\) denotes the optimal input weights for firm i given prevailing prices. Those weights are defined as the solution to the following optimization problem:
$$ \left\{\begin{array}{cc} \max & f_{i}\left( \frac{a_{w(i),i}}{p_{w(i),i}^{t}},\frac{a_{c(i),i}}{p_{c(i),i}^{t}} \left( \frac{a_{j,i}}{{p_{j}^{t}}}\right)_{j \in \mathcal{M}}\right) \\ \text{s.t.} & {\sum}_{j \in \mathcal{M}} a_{j,i}=1 \end{array}\right. $$
(9)
The tâtonnement process (see e.g. Arrow and Hurwicz (1958)) aims to determine market-clearing conditions by adapting price dynamics to the optimizing behavior of economic agents. The consistency between individual behavior and market dynamics is imposed by a central coordinator from outside the system. In contrast to the tâtonnement process, within our setting boundedly rational agents sequentially adapt their behaviour to market conditions. Market clearing per se does not guarantee that a general equilibrium has been reached as agents might have incentives to update their behaviour despite market clearing.Footnote 2 However, the steady-states of the dynamics are general equilibria (see Proposition 1 in Gualdi and Mandel (2016)). Moreover, these dynamics have strong properties of convergence towards equilibrium. Gualdi and Mandel (2016) numerically show convergence to general equilibrium for all but degenerate values of τp and τw, while (Mandel and Veetil 2019) provides a formal proof of convergence in the limit of small θ. These strong stability properties and the boundedly rational and adaptive nature of the response of agents to economic conditions make the model well-suited to simulate the response of the economy to large unexpected shock, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and the out-of-equilibrium paths it may follow in reverting back to equilibrium.