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Whispering Devices: A Survey on How Side-channels Lead to Compromised Information

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Abstract

While operating, information processing devices or communication systems may emit unwanted signals (or alter existing ones) through electromagnetic waves, light, sound or power drain. These side-channels can be intercepted by anyone with scientific or technical knowledge and appropriate equipment, leading to a potentially high risk of security breaches. This survey focuses on these emanation side-channels and provides an extensive literature review. To provide an in-depth analysis despite the variety of attacks, we propose to classify the side-channels based on their intentionality, the type of attackers and the physical medium. Illustrative use-cases are presented and serve as a basis to infer individual threats. Particular attention is paid to electromagnetic side-channels which exhibit the highest criticality and have therefore been used in the most recent attacks. The main characteristics of the side-channels revealed by state-of-the-art papers are summarized, and recommendations on countermeasures are provided to protect any sensitive equipment.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Univ Rennes 1, CNRS, IRISA, 2 rue du Thabor - CS 46510, 35065, Rennes, France

    Corentin Lavaud, Robin Gerzaguet, Matthieu Gautier & Olivier Berder

  2. Direction Générale de l′Armement, 136 La Roche Marguerite, 35170, Bruz, France

    Erwan Nogues & Stephane Molton

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  1. Corentin Lavaud
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  2. Robin Gerzaguet
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Correspondence to Robin Gerzaguet.

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Table 3 Classification of the papers on side-channel attacks (EM stands for ElectroMagnetic)
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Lavaud, C., Gerzaguet, R., Gautier, M. et al. Whispering Devices: A Survey on How Side-channels Lead to Compromised Information. J Hardw Syst Secur 5, 143–168 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-021-00112-6

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