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Challenges and Opportunities in Analog and Mixed Signal (AMS) Integrated Circuit (IC) Security

Abstract

In the last decade and so, a large amount of research has been done to secure hardware. Security features such as physically unclonable function (PUF), hardware metering, and obfuscation have been developed to protect hardware from threats. Detection and avoidance techniques for IC counterfeiting and hardware Trojan have been introduced to protect the IC supply chain. Till now, research has focused on digital ICs, but analog and mixed signal (AMS) ICs which hold the highest share in the market have been neglected. The solutions developed in digital domain for digital ICs do not extend well to AMS ICs. Thus, a major portion of the IC market remains unsecured. In this paper, we described the challenges and limitations associated with AMS IC security research focusing on three major sections: AMS-enabled security, counterfeiting, and AMS hardware Trojans. We also express a vision for AMS security research.

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Funding

The authors would like to acknowledge the supports from the National Science Foundation grant (CCSS-1610075) and National Institute of Standards and Technology grant (P0013638).

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Correspondence to Md Mahbub Alam.

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Alam, M.M., Chowdhury, S., Park, B. et al. Challenges and Opportunities in Analog and Mixed Signal (AMS) Integrated Circuit (IC) Security. J Hardw Syst Secur 2, 15–32 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-017-0024-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41635-017-0024-z

Keywords

  • AMS counterfeit IC
  • Analog suitable PUF
  • Hardware metering
  • Chaotic cryptography
  • Analog hardware Trojan