Abstract
We consider the potential benefit of obtaining a higher Condorcet Efficiency by using the two-stage election procedures Plurality Elimination Rule and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule that do not require voters to rank the candidates, rather than using Borda Rule that does require such a ranking. We find that there is a small probability that the winner with either Plurality Elimination Rule or Negative Plurality Elimination Rule will be different from the Borda Rule winner. However, one can expect some marginal increase in efficiency from using a two-stage voting rule, particularly Plurality Elimination Rule.
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Notes
In a three-candidate election, the procedure for NPER does not always elect the same candidate as the Coombs Rule, which requires voters to submit a ranking. The Coombs Rule declares a candidate as winner if this candidate is ranked first by a majority of the voters, and it eliminates candidates only if no candidate receives a majority of first-rank votes. But if such a majority-rule winner is also ranked last by the most voters, then NPER eliminates this candidate and determines the winner among the two remaining candidates.
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Gehrlein, W.V., Lepelley, D. & Plassmann, F. An Evaluation of the Benefit of Using Two-Stage Election Procedures. Homo Oecon 35, 53–79 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-017-0055-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-017-0055-2