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Reflecting on the Ethical and Legal Implications of the State-Led War Against International Terrorism

Abstract

This article takes critical issue with the state-led global war against international terrorism, focusing specifically on the ethical and legal implications of that protracted international conflict. Following others, the paper conceptualises terrorism as an aspect of modern political violence that tends to service the overall interest of extant liberal global political economy at the expense of the human security challenges. To this end, the article seeks to shed light on the flux of alliances and allegiances between formal state agents and informal political actors (e.g. religious extremist or terrorist groups and left-/right-wing para-militias, etc.), whose bellicose political activities not only underscore the global war on terror but in part also inform the post-Cold War liberal international order. It is only in viewing the ongoing state-led global war against international terrorism through the prism of the state system’s perennial bellicose activities that we would be able to fully appreciate the adverse effects the global war on terror on the development of both domestic and international law that is critical to safeguarding the security and/or protection of civilians in times of peace and war.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the prioritization of the economic concerns of the Marktvolk as opposed to the redistributive concerns of the Staatsvolk in advanced democracies such as Europe and the political tensions that it engenders, see Streeck (2017).

  2. 2.

    Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, 10 February 2007.

  3. 3.

    It is not that most states today are imminently embroiled in wars, let alone in the global war on terror which is pervasive and more recurrent in some regions of the global political economy landscape than in others. For instance, across Europe today, apart from the Balkans or in Ukraine where war is being waged for various reasons, including of international terrorism, conventional wars between states has been almost eradicated. But doesn’t mean that key European states are not either directly or indirectly involved in the global war on terror in other parts of the world, with the inevitable implications for ethics and law. Similarly, in the Americas where the war on terror is rather complex and pervasive and confined to states such as Columbia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, that does not preclude the fact that states such as the USA and Canada are immensely involved in the war against international terrorism. Also, in East Asia, where conventional wars (except for the political tensions in the South China Sea today and/or the nuclear stand-off on the Korean Peninsula) between states have reduced significantly in the post-Cold war period; and the traditional war on terror is mainly confined to the Philippines, Indonesia and lately Myanmar, counterterrorism measures in the West of China have seen the mass incarceration of millions of identity conscious minority groups such as the Uighurs and Kazakhs on grounds of national security concerns. Astonishingly, that has not undermined China’s image as a major global economic force in the majority Moslem countries, let alone in parts of the world where human rights or issues related to the rule of law is more pronounced.

  4. 4.

    See, Junger (2004).

  5. 5.

    Infantry, Lloyde deMause apprises us, is the Latin equivalent of a child soldier, see de Mause (2002).

  6. 6.

    The scope of this article does not allow us to reflect critically on the cultural objectives of nations as opposed to the sheer economic objectives of the expansive state system; but, in terms of the former, almost all states are founded on the ruins of national culture system, which make in turn them a legitimate target of nationalist resistance movements and sic explains why states are often too prone to invest heavily in the preparedness for wars et cetera.

  7. 7.

    On these notes and the associated literature, I am generally indebted to Dr. Martin Arbeola and Professor Jason W. Moore, who organised the Third Annual Conference of the World Ecology Network at Binghamton University, SUNY, in July 2017.

  8. 8.

    For a prominent counter-current to this view, see Alvarez (2012).

  9. 9.

    For instance, one could see Turkey, which is a NATO member state and deeply enmeshed in the crises in Iraq and Syria, view of the Kurdish YPG as a Syrian branch of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and hence a terrorist organization. For some insights about the murky nature of the shifting alliances and allegiances in the region, see Aymen (2017).

  10. 10.

    For a slightly different perspective on this observation, see Bernard (2011).

  11. 11.

    For critical analysis of the Sunni-Shiite alliance against the West in the wider Middle Eastern context, see Decker (2015); Ali 2015.

  12. 12.

    Details of that 73 min interview which was carried out by the Washington post can be accessed at https://www.rt.com/news/422563-saudi-wahhabism-western-countries/. Accessed on 07 Dec 2018.

  13. 13.

    Winterbaum and Jones (2017). http://www.ips-journal.eu/regions/middle-east/article/show/the-blame-game-2221. Accessed on 18 Aug 2017.

  14. 14.

    Decker, B. T op cit.

  15. 15.

    One could argue that Hamas in this case might have reacted politico-religiously and accepted the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose members were cold bloodedly massacred in their tens of thousands in February 1982 by Bashar al-Assad’s father in the Hamah massacre. For a concise history of the MB and the Hamah event visit: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Muslim-Brotherhood. Accessed 25 Aug 2017. On the recent normalisation of relations between Hamas and the Iranian Mullahs, see Fares Akram and Joseph Federman. ‘New Hamas Leader says it is getting aid again from Iran’. AP News (28 August 2017), accessible at https://apnews.com/0427f88fe857479caa633fad5683aa96. Accessed on 29 Aug 2017.

  16. 16.

    On the flux of alliances and allegiances in the region, see Matthiesen (2017). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/saudi-arabia/2017-11-08/purge-riyadh?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20171109. Accessed 10 Nov 2017.

  17. 17.

    Tabatabai op cit.

  18. 18.

    Winterbotham and Jones op cit.; see also Owen (2016).

  19. 19.

    The DoD intelligence Report is accessible at http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf. Accessed 03 Sept 2017. For additional critical insights into US involvement in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts, see Seumas Milne, “Now the truth emerges: how the US fuelled the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.” The Guardian (03 June 2015, last modified 08 Apr 2017). Accessible at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/03/us-isis-syria-iraq. Accessed on 03 Sept 2017. For a critical review of the CIA and MI6 collusion in facilitating the transfer of ammunitions and weapons from post-Gaddafi’s Libya to the rebels in Syria and Iraq, see Hersh (2014). Available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line. Accessed on 03 Sept 2017.

  20. 20.

    Owen Bennett-Jones op cit., esp. pp. 17–18. For claims about the IS leadership secular connections beyond Syria, see Ali (2017). Norton. And for arguments in support of ISIS religious inclination, see Graeme (2017); see also Tore (2017).

  21. 21.

    We should bear in mind that Colonel Gaddafi was caught under a bridge hole like those often frequented by urban rodents to evade human and other predators.

  22. 22.

    Hersh (2014). Accessible at: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/Seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line. Accessed 3 Sept 2017.

  23. 23.

    Seumas, M. “Now the truth emerges: How the US fuelled the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq.” The Guardian (June 2015). Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/june/03/us-Isis-syria-iraq. Accessed 03 Sept 2017. President Hassan Rouhani recently boasted that ‘without Iran’s involvement, it is impossible to make significant improvement in the situation in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, North Africa and the Persian Gulf’, which literally confirms my observation elsewhere that Iran is serious abetting the Sunni radicals on the Sanai Peninsula and in the rest of North Azania (Africa). Rouhani’s comments can be accessed at http://en.alalam.ir/news/3102621/iran-s-regional-status-has-never-been-stronger-rouhani. Accessed 30 Nov 2017.

  24. 24.

    Vatanka (2017).

  25. 25.

    For more information about the US sanctions on Iran, see The White House Press Release entitled “Fact Sheet: Sanctions Related to Iran” (July 31, 2012). Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/07/31/fact-sheet-sanctions-related-iran. Accessed 10 Dec 2017.

  26. 26.

    Hersh op cit.

  27. 27.

    Taleblu and Merve (2017). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-11-08/kurd-your-enthusiasm?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20171109. Accessed 10 Nov 2017.

  28. 28.

    For instance, President Hassan Rouhani of Iran recently boasted that “without Iran’s involvement, it is virtually impossible to have a significant improvement in the situation in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf.” Rouhani’s statements can be accessed at http://en.alalam.ir/news/3102621/iran-s-regional-status-has-never-been-stronger-rouhani. Accessed 30 Nov 2017.

  29. 29.

    Adrian Rankine-Galloway cited on Russia Today. Available at https://www.rt.com/news/416689-how-us-went-against-kurds. Accessed on 02 Feb 2018.

  30. 30.

    See Jeffrey (2016).

  31. 31.

    For my conception of the State as lacrimae rerum, see Guevara (2011).

  32. 32.

    For more details about Daniella’s comments, visit: https://www.rt.com/op-edge/400658-afghanistan-surge-trump-us (last accessed on 25 August 2017).

  33. 33.

    John (2017).

  34. 34.

    Sam (2017).

  35. 35.

    Fabrice (2017).

  36. 36.

    See, “President Donald Trump recent remarks on US, Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia” at Fort Myer, Arlington Virginia, in a White House Press Release. Accessible at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia. Accessed on 26 Aug 2017.

  37. 37.

    For its implications for domestic and international law, see Barnes (2012). On the conflicting views about jus ad bellum rules involving non-state groups in conflict situations, cf. Major Tilney (2017); see also Keck (2012).

  38. 38.

    For the opposition against Donald Trump national security strategy (NSS), see Lissner (2017).

  39. 39.

    See Theo Farrell and Michael Semple. “Ready for Peace? The Afghan Taliban After a Decade of War.” RUSI Briefing Papers released January 31, 2017. Available at https://rusi.org/publication/briefing-papers/ready-peace-afghan-taliban-after-decade-war%20. Accessed on 26 Aug 2017.

  40. 40.

    It is important to remember that Iran, like North Korea, is currently embroiled in a nuclear dispute with the US and its regional allies. For a comparative analysis of both developments, see Philip and Amos (2017).

  41. 41.

    Alam (2017a).

  42. 42.

    Alam (2017b).

  43. 43.

    See, Salisbury (2018). “Why the catastrophe of Yemen is too profitable for peace.” The World Today vol. 73 no. 4, pp. 28–30.

  44. 44.

    From an economic and/or a politico-religious standpoint, while only those few at the top of the social hierarchy stand to benefit from the intrigues of such surreptitious and rational manoeuvres, the masses in their miserable state of utter profanity seem to be left defenceless to the winds of fortune, as Raffaello Pantucci, the author of We Love Death As You Love Life: Britain’s Suburban Terrorists (2015), following the recent terrorist attacks in Barcelona, commented on RUSI: “Terrorism will always be with us.” For further details, visit https://rusi.org/in-the-news/terrorism-will-always-be-us (last accessed on 19 August 2017).

  45. 45.

    Edward Snowden’s revelation in 2013 exposed the extent to which state actors would go to obtain sensitive information about others, including allies. For instance, the NSA is known to have been spying on the institutions and leaders of key US European and NATO allies in the Snowden revelations.

  46. 46.

    On the intellectual origin of the French Revolution, see Maurice (1989). For concise definition of terrorism, see Fowler and Coulson (1973).

  47. 47.

    On the ontology of revolutionary changes, see Lindahl (2015).

  48. 48.

    Allen (2016).

  49. 49.

    For the distinction between genuine nationalism and political nationalism, see Guevara 2011. Azanism op cit.

  50. 50.

    Winterbotham and Jones op cit, 3.

  51. 51.

    ibid.

  52. 52.

    ibid., 5.

  53. 53.

    ibid, 4.

  54. 54.

    A concise discussion of the Brotherhood political activities in the wider Middle East and North Azania since the early twentieth century is accessible at https://www.britanica.com/topic/Muslim-Brotherhood (last accessed on 27 August 2017). For the tensions between the MB and the Al Sisi government, see Hanna, Michael Wahid and Daniel Benaim, 2018. “Egypt First”. Foreign Affairs. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2018-01-04/egypt-first?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20180105. Accessed on 05 Jan 2018.

  55. 55.

    For the inequality that animates the extant liberal global political economy and which in part explains the rising tide of populism in the affluent West, see Brook (2016).

  56. 56.

    Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, League of Nations Doc. C546 (I) M383 (I) 1937 V (1938).

  57. 57.

    Kolb (1997).

  58. 58.

    See, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of International Criminal Court, G.A. Res. E. Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/10 (July 17, 1998) (“[N]o generally acceptable definition of the crime [.] of terrorism … could be agreed upon for the inclusion within the jurisdiction of the Court”).

  59. 59.

    Since the US code echoes prominently in extant international definition(s), that begs serious ethical questions given the special role the US hitherto played in maintaining the capitalist-led liberal global economic order. For the similarities between the US domestic code and the anti-terrorist provisions in the UK, Australian and Canadian law, see Cancio Meliá and Petzsche op cit. 93f.

  60. 60.

    18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1) (2001), cited in Weatherall op cit., 592–93.

  61. 61.

    Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War Art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict Art. 51(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Art. 13 (2), 1125 U.N.T.S 609 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).

  62. 62.

    SC Res. 955 Art. 4. U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II). For a recent review of the legal developments in the context both the ICTR and ICTY (SC Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) and the US role in creation of both Tribunals, see Matheson and Reid (2016).

  63. 63.

    Agreement for and Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Art. 3 U.N. S.C.O.R, U.N. Doc S/2002/246 appended to letter dated 6 March 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (adopted Jan. 16, 2002) (Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II).

  64. 64.

    SC Res. 827 (May 25, 1993); see also Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 98 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslatvia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 769 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (Count 1).

  65. 65.

    Suresh v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 S. C. R. 3 (Can) ¶¶ 96–98).

  66. 66.

    See also International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Article 2 (1) (b), opened for signature Dec. 10, 1999, 2178 U. N. T. S. 197 (entered into force April 10, 2002).

  67. 67.

    For some critical insights about the incorporation of the TA 2000 into post 9/11 UK counterterrorism measures, see Cancio Melia and Petzsche op cit., 92–94f.

  68. 68.

    In the same year, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) had established that the MG is not a terrorist group in accordance with the Section 129a of Germany’s criminal code: BGH, 28.11.2007—StB 43/07. Cf. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bgh-beschluss-bundesrichter-sehen-militante-gruppe-nicht-als-terrorvereiningung-a-520245.hmtl (last accessed on October 10, 2012).

  69. 69.

    See also, “Greek fires may be treated as terrorism”, The Guardian (27 August 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/aug/27/1 (last accessed 05 September 2017).

  70. 70.

    U.N. Report of the Policy Working Group on the U.N. and Terrorism, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/57/273 (Annex), S/2002/875 (Aug. 6, 2002).

  71. 71.

    On the persistent objection theory, see Yoram (2007) and Jonathan (1985).

  72. 72.

    D’Amato (2014).

  73. 73.

    Saunders (2018).

  74. 74.

    ibid.

  75. 75.

    Lears (2018). Available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/v40/n01/jackson-lears/what-we-dont-talk-about-when-we-talk-about-russian-hacking. Accessed on 28 Jan 2018.

  76. 76.

    See, Elliot (2017).

  77. 77.

    Lissner (2017).

  78. 78.

    For details of the Act, visit http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/congress/title_10.htm (last visited on February 22, 2018).

  79. 79.

    Details of the NSDD can be accessed at https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd-75.pdf. Accessed on 21 Feb 2018.

  80. 80.

    Lissner, F. R. op cit.

  81. 81.

    Bernstein and Williams (2011).

  82. 82.

    See Mishra (2018).

  83. 83.

    In July 2017, Kevin Lui stated that ‘North Korea had vowed to strike the US with a ‘Powerful Nuclear Hammer’ If Kim Jong Un Regime is Threatened.” Available at www.time.com/4873973/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-kim-jong-un/. Accessed on 13 Mar 2018. Also, the North Korean regime recently warned that it will counter the US if it holds any military drill with South Korea on the Korean Peninsula again. Available at https://www.rt.com/news/420380-north-korea-counter-us-drills/. Accessed on 03 Mar 2018. Similarly, Iran had firmly stated that it can only negotiate on its ballistic missile programme if the US and its European allies relinquish their nuclear weapons arsenal. For more details, visit https://www.rt.com/news/420391-iran-missile-negotiations-nuclear-deal (last visited on 03 March 2018). The apprehension that Iran might become another North Korea in the Middle East is noted in an Article published in the Foreign Affairs. For in-depth review, see Phillip and Amos (2017). Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-08-01/will-iran-become-next-north-korea?cid=nlc-fa_twofa-20170803. Accessed on 07 Aug 2017.

  84. 84.

    See, Sadat and McChrystal (2017).

  85. 85.

    Vali (2018).

  86. 86.

    See, Stein (2018).

  87. 87.

    Erdogan had openly threatened to target US forces in northern Syria, which merely reflects the diminishing prominence of US involvement in the Syrian crisis. On this insight, see Eli Lake. “Turkey Is Turning into Next Pakistan.” Bloomberg. Accessible at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-03-02/as-a-u-s-ally-turkey-is-turning-into-the-next-pakistan. Accessed on 03 Mar 2018; see also Stein (2018).

  88. 88.

    Stein (2019).

  89. 89.

    See a recent remark by Michael Stephens, “Syria: It’s Not Getting any Easier, It’s Getting Messier.” Available at https://rusi.org/commentary/syria-it%E2%80%99s-not-getting-any-easier-it%E2%80%99s-getting-messier. Accessed on 24 Feb 2018.

  90. 90.

    Until the capture of the IS de facto capital, Raqqa, in 2018, the official paper that propagated its radical vision to the so-called Islamic world was called Al Naba. Naba (which is a kingship title commonly used among some North and West Azanian royalties) stems from the Mͻͻr (Moor/Maure) word Nab (bull/cow) and has connotations with the kingship or the pharaonic title of early dynastic Ethiopia (misappropriated by modern Egyptologist for ancient Egypt). There are indications that the Arabic word A-nabi/A-nebi (prophet) is also derived from Naba, which means a descendant of the kings. For the cultural role of the Bantu-Ethiopian Pharaohs as cultural messengers of Hyen-Nu (Heru/Horus?)/Amon/Aton, see Guevara 2011. Azanism. University of Hamburg Press.

  91. 91.

    See a commentary on RUSI by Joseph Mills entitled “Israel, Russia and Iran: Interests Trump All.”, accessible at https://rusi.org/commentary/israel-russia-and-iran-interests-trump-all. Accessed on 24 Feb 2018.

  92. 92.

    Stephen op cit.

  93. 93.

    Lissner op cit.

  94. 94.

    Cohen (2018).

  95. 95.

    Wright (2019).

  96. 96.

    Stephen K. Bannon (ex-White House Chief Strategist) is cited as having stated that the Trump regime under his guidance would entail “the birth of a new political order.” On this insight, see, Beiner, R.2018. Dangerous Minds: Nietzsche, Heidegger and the Return of the Far Right. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 11–12.

  97. 97.

    Cohen op cit., 6.

  98. 98.

    ibid., 6–7; Stewart (2018).

  99. 99.

    Singh (2018).

  100. 100.

    Sadat and McChrystal (2017).

  101. 101.

    When President Trump twitted Vladimir Putin on March 21, 2018 to congratulate him on his election victory, he stated that it is in the best interest of the US to positively engage Russia, as Russia is crucial to resolving world issues today. Available at http://www.rt.com/usa/421964-trump-putin-call-election-victory. Accessed 21 Mar 2018.

  102. 102.

    See, Gregory (2018).

  103. 103.

    For instance, the UK recently signalled that it would sell at least 48 Eurofighter Typhoon Jets to the Saudis despite the humanitarian toll of the conflict in Yemen, which is now in its third year. For these comments, see a blog post entitled “Sharing the Best of the British Expertise” on the London Review of Books Homepage by Musab Younis. Available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2018/03/16/musab-younis/sharing-the-best-of-british-expertise/?utm_. Accessed on Mar 20, 2018. For Trump’s undiplomatic remarks about the Saudi Royalty’s security dependence on the USA, visit https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-saudi/trump-i-told-saudi-king-he-wouldnt-last-without-u-s-support-idUSKCN1MD066 (last visited on 14 December 2018).

  104. 104.

    See, Ruthven (2017). Available at https://www.lrb.co.uk/v39/n17/malise-ruthven/the-saudi-trillions. Accessed on 31 Aug 2017.

  105. 105.

    Cohen op cit., 7.

  106. 106.

    Margon (2018).

  107. 107.

    See, Barnes (2012).

  108. 108.

    Boddens-Hosang (2017).

  109. 109.

    See, US Congress Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub.1. No. 107-40, §2(a), 115 Stat.224 (2001). For the expansion of the Obama administration drone strike policy, Craig Whitlock and Greg Miller, citing US officials in the Washington Post, noticed in September 2011 that “US Assembling Secret Drone Bases in Africa (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Seychelles) and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen). Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-building-secret-drone-bases-in-africa-arabian-peninsula-officials-say/2011/09/20/gIQAJ8rOjK_Story.html (quoted in Barnes 2012: 57 n 2). See also, Graeme AM Davies, Marcus Schulzke, and Thomas Almond. “Sheltering the President from blame: Drone Strikes, Media assessments, and heterogenous responsibility.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118762303. Accessed on 2 Apr 2018.

  110. 110.

    See Abramowitz (2002).

  111. 111.

    See Curtis and Goldsmith (2005) (For purposes of historical comparison, these authorisations of military force can be divided into five analytical components: (1) the authorised military resources; (2) the authorised method of force; (3) the authorised targets; (4) the purpose of the use of force; and (5) the timing and the procedural restrictions of the use of force”).

  112. 112.

    See, § 2(a).

  113. 113.

    For conflicting interpretations of the direct nexus requirement as stipulated in the API, see Major Tilney (2017).

  114. 114.

    For an extensive discussion of the 1977 API and its implication for the state-led global war on terror, see Major Barry (2010).

  115. 115.

    On this point, see Major Tilney, Marc R. op cit. pp. 135–140. On the legal paradigm covering US Covert Drone Strike policy, see Brookman-Byrne (2017).

  116. 116.

    Barry, Joshua F. op cit.; see, also Tilney (2017).

  117. 117.

    Carney J. 2015. Obama’s Move in Syria reignites War Power Debate. The Hill. Available at http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/258726-syria-troop-deployment-stirs-war-bill-debate. Accessed on 11 Nov 2017.

  118. 118.

    Alex Waddan remarked that ‘the major legislative accomplishment of the Trump era came in December 2017 in the form of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.’ For further details, see Waddan, A., 2018. Trump Politics- Midterms and Beyond. Political Insight, vol.9 no.2, p. 11.

  119. 119.

    Kip (2018). “Why the US Can No Longer Ignore the ICC.” Foreign Affairs. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2017-11-16/why-us-can-no-longer-ignore-icc?cid=int-rec&pgtype=art. Accessed on 05 Jan 2018.

  120. 120.

    ibid.

  121. 121.

    ibid.

  122. 122.

    For a critical commentary on Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA, visit. https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/iran-nuclear-deal-trump_uk_5af18155e4b0ab5c3d69ab8e (last visited on 08 May 2018).

  123. 123.

    Black (2018). http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2041905818764703. Accessed on 2 May 2018.

  124. 124.

    ibid.

  125. 125.

    Salisbury (2018). Accessed on 29 June 2018. On the Hodeidah war and its implication for peace in Yemen, see Block, Joshua S. “Why Yemen’s war matters.” Jerusalem Post. Available at https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Why-Yemens-war-matters-565175. Accessed on 02 Oct 2018; see also Lenarz, J. “Ending Houthis control of the port city of Hodeidah could lead to peace in Yemen.” Available at https://reaction.life/ending-houthi-control-port-city-hodeidah-lead-peace-yemen/. Accessed on 02 Oct 2018.

  126. 126.

    ibid.

  127. 127.

    For a brief review of the political rational behind flux of shifting alliances in these regions, see Henke (2017).

  128. 128.

    Mashal Mujib and Schmitt Eric, “White House Orders Direct Talks to Jump-Start Afghan Negotiations.” New York Times, available from https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/15/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-direct-negotiations.html. Accessed on 17 July 2018.

  129. 129.

    For the irreconcilable positions held by the Afghanistan government and US negotiators, as well as the ambiguous position of the Taliban on the recent peace talks in Doha, Qatar, see Mashal Mujib, “US and Taliban Agree in Principle to Peace Framework, Envoy Says.” New York Times, available from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/28/world/asia/taliban-peace-dealafghanistan.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage. Accessed on 28 Jan 2019.

  130. 130.

    For instance, John Bolton (the US National Security Advisor) recently warned Iran of “hell to pay” if it crosses the US. For further details on Bolton’s remarks, visit. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-45647863 (last visited on 29 September 2018).

  131. 131.

    On this note, see Greg Jaffe, “Donald Trump asks ‘Why did you wait?’ after CIA delayed drone strike to prevent civilian deaths”, INDEPENDENT. Available at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-cia-drone-strike-generals-war-isis-iraq-syria-afghanistan-middle-east-a8291306.html. Accessed on 29 Sept 2018. For legal issues surrounding target killings by UVAs, see Chayes (2015).

  132. 132.

    Orford (2018).

  133. 133.

    Despite the propaganda tactics displayed on both sides in the Syrian conflict to win the moral high ground…, the recent accusation by Major General Igor Konashenkov (a spokesperson of Russia’s Defence Ministry) that the hotpots of IS and Al Nusra resistance in Syria are now only found in US controlled areas serve to illustrates the complex nature of the region’s shifting geopolitical alliances. For in-depth review of Igor’s claims, visit https://www.rt.com/news/429255-isis-us-zones-syria (last visited on 09 June 2018).

  134. 134.

    For further details about the Obama era Executive Order, visit. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/fact-sheet-executive-order-us-policy-pre-post-strike-measures-address (last visited on 26 September 2018).

  135. 135.

    For the use of weapons in international armed conflicts, see Boothby (2016).

  136. 136.

    See, Boothby (2012).

  137. 137.

    For the Pentagon report, see Ryan Browne, “Pentagon says near 500 civilians killed in US military operations in Trump’s first year.” CNN (June 1, 2018) accessible at https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/01/politics/us-military-report-civilian-deaths/index.html. Accessed on 09 June 2018. On Pentagon’s admission to the inevitability of civilian casualties in the US counterterrorism measures, see a recent news script by Russia Today athttps://www.rt.com/usa/428499-us-killed-500-civilians/. Accessed on 09 June 2018.

  138. 138.

    See, Amnesty International Raqqa Report (2018) entitled “War of Annihilation: Devastating toll on Civilians.”.

  139. 139.

    ibid.

  140. 140.

    See, an Op-ed published in Russia Today by Finian Cunningham entitled “UN Chief urges talks to avoid Idlib bloodbath, while NATO threatens war to defend terrorists.” Available at https://www.rt.com/op-ed/438400-idlib-un-terrorists-syria/. Accessed on 13 Sept 2018.

  141. 141.

    See, Suleiman Al-Khalid, “US Marines conduct big drills with rebels in southern Syria.” REUTERS. Available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-turkey-currency-property/turkey-rules-property-sales-rental-agreements-must-be-in-lira-idUKKCN1LT1M0. Accessed on 13 Sept 2018; Suleiman Al-Khalid, “Turkey boosts arms to Syrian Rebels as Idlib attacks looms.” REUTERS. Available at https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-exclusive/exclusive-turkey-boosts-arms-to-syrian-rebels-as-idlib-attack-looms-rebel-sources-idUKKCN1LS225. Accessed on 13 Sept 2018.

  142. 142.

    BGB, Urteil vom 06.10.2016—III/ZR 140/50, Schadensersatzanspruch gegen Bundesrepublik wegen Luftangriff in Afghnaistan, NJW 50/2016, s. 3656–3663.

  143. 143.

    The CIA concluded in its investigation of Jamal Khashoggi murder in October 2018 that MBS had personally ordered the killing. For details of the CIA investigation, visit https://edition.cnn.com/2018/11/16/politics/cia-assessment-khashoggi-assassination-saudi-arabia/index.html (last visited on 14 December 20180). Also, see Steven A. Cook, “Mohammed bin Salman Is Worse Than a Criminal. He’s a Symbol.” Available at https://www.cfr.org/article/mohammed-bin-salman-worse-criminal-hes-symbol. Accessed on 14 Dec 2018; Oliver Miles 2019. “Reporting the Kingdom”, a blog post on the London Review of Books.

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Raul Diaz, G. Reflecting on the Ethical and Legal Implications of the State-Led War Against International Terrorism. Eur J Secur Res 5, 143–197 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41125-019-00055-8

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Keywords

  • States
  • Globalisation
  • Terrorism
  • War
  • Nations
  • Ethics
  • International law
  • Security