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Institutional Isomorphism of Anti-corruption Agency: The Case of Anti-corruption Commission in Bangladesh

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Abstract

Institutional isomorphism emerged in the 1960s and 1970s to show how institutions in different countries develop similarities through imitation. Countries such as Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong gained massive success by copying successful initiatives from all over the world. Similarly, anti-corruption agencies such as the Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption become global models for combating corruption. Donors such as World Bank, Asian Development Bank, suggest many developing countries create agencies like those to combat corruption. Bangladesh is one of the countries that chose those models and formed an anti-corruption commission (ACC) based on isomorphic pressure from international donors. The aim of this paper is to identify the problems of this isomorphic approach to combating corruption in Bangladesh through the ACC. Based on elite interviews with key informants and document analysis, this paper argues that despite the ACC is an excellent initiative, following the global isomorphism of the ACA model has proved somewhat frustrating. Findings suggest that the ineffectiveness of the ACC is mainly related to failures involving both structure and agency as well as problems within the ACC. Results indicate that these failures have created a ‘toothless tiger’ ACA in Bangladesh.

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Fig. 1

Source: Andrews (2013, p. 44)

Fig. 2

Source: ACC (2015, p. 24)

Fig. 3

Source: Aminuzzaman et al. (2016, p. 6)

Fig. 4

Source: Author

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Notes

  1. Mr. IK is an imaginary name.

  2. Khalifa in Islam is a believer in or follower of Islam as well as very benevolent.

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Professor Rodney Smith for his comments and suggestions. This research would not have been possible without him. The author also thanks two anonymous reviewers whose comments and insight was invaluable in re-shaping this manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by The University of Sydney (University of Sydney International Postgraduate Research Scholarship).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka, 1342, Bangladesh

    Nurul Huda Sakib

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  1. Nurul Huda Sakib
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Correspondence to Nurul Huda Sakib.

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The author reported no potential conflict of interest.

Appendix: Interviewee Codes (Anonymized)

Appendix: Interviewee Codes (Anonymized)

Interviews of this study were conducted under the University of Sydney Project No 2015/577, which was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee on 19 August 2015.

Code

Organisation/profession/department

Date interviewed

IvACC2

Senior Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, Government of Bangladesh (GoB)

21.10.2015

IvACC3

Mid-Range Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

26.10.2015

IvACC5

Junior Officer of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

27.10.2015

IvACC6

Mid-Range Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

02.11.2015

IvACC7

Senior Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

02.11.2015

IvGoB8

Former Cabinet Secretary, GOB

13.11.2015

IvCSNGO10

Prominent Civil Society Member, Organizer, and Academics

22.11.2015

IvAca12

Corruption Expert and Professor of Political Science

05.12.2015

IvAca15

Professor of Public Administration and Governance Expert

07.12.2015

IvACC18

Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

22.12.2015

IvCSAcaNGO22

Prominent NGO Leader and Civil Society Member

07.01.2016

IvGoBCS25

Civil Society Member, Former Senior Official of GOB

24.01.2016

IvJour26

Prominent News Correspondent on Corruption and Governance Issues on a private TV News Channel

28.01.2016

IvACC27

Former Senior Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

29.01.2016

IvCBOLaw28

President of Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs) and Public Prosecutor of ACC, GoB

06.02.2016

IvACC29

Mid-Range Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

08.02.2016

IvACC30

Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

23.02.2016

IvCSAcaAvt31

Prominent Activist, Civil Society Member, and Professor of Economics

02.03.2016

IvPol32

Politician and Standing Committee Member of Bangladesh Nationalist Party

23.03.2016

IvJour33

Staff Correspondent, Cover News on ACC, From a Daily Newspaper

28.03.2016

IvACC39

Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB

04.05.2016

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Sakib, N.H. Institutional Isomorphism of Anti-corruption Agency: The Case of Anti-corruption Commission in Bangladesh. Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev. 5, 222–252 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-020-00143-4

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