Zusammenfassung
Die Bedingung für einen finanziell stabilen Föderalismus lässt sich in einer simplen Formel zusammenfassen: Die Kreise von Entscheidern, Zahlern und Nutznießern müssen weitestgehend übereinstimmen. Nur in diesem Fall institutioneller Kongruenz sind die richtigen Anreize für eine optimale Allokation von Ressourcen gesetzt. Herrscht hingegen institutionelle Inkongruenz, dann kommt es zur Fehlallokation von Ressourcen, typischerweise in steigenden Ausgaben und steigender Verschuldung.
Abstract
The condition for a financially stable federalism may be summarized in a simple formula: The circles of decision-makers, taxpayers, and beneficiaries have to overlap to the highest possible degree. Only in such case of institutional congruence, the right incentives exist for an optimal allocation of resources. In case of institutional incongruence, however, resources are deployed and allocated inefficiently, typically reflected in increasing expenditures and indebtedness.
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Blankart, C.B., Ehmke, D.C. Die Föderalismus Formel. List Forum 45, 19–25 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41025-019-00174-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41025-019-00174-z