Skip to main content
Log in

Demystifying the liberal-post liberal divide: The ‘North–South’ debate on constitutionalism

  • Article
  • Published:
Jindal Global Law Review Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

As perhaps the most widely accepted theory/account of justifying/legitimizing political authority, constitutionalism has attracted much scholarly attention. However, it could be argued that the contemporary comparative constitutional law discourse is marred by an epistemic hierarchy. The ubiquity of the ‘classical liberal model’ in the discussion around constitutionalism has led to a misplaced synonymising of the two, promoting the view that classical liberal constitutionalism is the only or the best form of constitutionalism. Such synonymising entrenched in the scholarship, displays an ignorance of the myriad forms which constitutionalism may assume, thereby effectuating what may be called, a ‘north–south’ divide in the discourse. Placing the constitutionalism of ‘global north’ in the centre, it turns a blind eye to the constitutional experiences of the global south, pushing it into the periphery. Cognizance of this chasm in the scholarship has resulted in an ambivalence against liberal constitutionalism and there are pronounced calls for a post-colonial turn in the theorisation of constitutionalism. Projects such as ‘Transformative Constitutionalism’, are seen as making a departure from the default template, thus characterising a ‘post-liberal’ account of constitutionalism. At the same time, it could also be argued that inferring a regional congruence of a liberal-north vis-a-vis a post-liberal south model, runs the risk of a simplistic and overly broad macro-labelling, ignoring the heterogeneity of the diverse and peculiar constitutional experiences. The present article undertakes a review of the existing scholarship in comparative constitutional law on liberal and post-liberal constitutionalism. Through an interrogation into this liberal-post liberal dichotomy and the north–south divide in comparative constitutional law, it emphasizes upon the need for adoption of inclusive epistemologies for the study of constitutionalism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Thomas Paine, Rights of Man in The Complete Works of Thomas Paine (London) 302–3, 370 as cited in Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1947).

  2. C. Perry Patterson, ‘The Evolution of Constitutionalism’ (1948) 32(5) Minnesota Law Review 427.

  3. Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1947) 21.

  4. ibid 44.

  5. Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford University Press, UK, 2016).

  6. ibid 3.

  7. ibid 10.

  8. ibid 10.

  9. ibid.

  10. ibid 11.

  11. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (first published 1859, Batoche Books 2001) 13.

  12. ibid 6.

  13. “Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.” John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) 137.

  14. Samuel Freeman, Liberalism and Distributive Justice (Oxford University Press, 2018) 2.

  15. ibid.

  16. Michael Freeden, Liberalism: A Very Short Introduction (Kindle Edition, Oxford University Press, 2015) 2.

  17. Gautam Bhatia, The Transformative Constitution: A Radical Biography in Nine Acts (Harper Collins Publishers India, 2019) 21.

  18. Freeden (n 16) 60.

  19. Roberto Mancilla, ‘Rethinking Constitutionalism: Using Epistemology to Show the Inadequacy of the Public/Private Distinction’ (2017) 17(1) Global Jurist.

  20. David T. Butleritchie, ‘The Confines of Modern Constitutionalism’ (2004) 3(1) Pierce Law Review 1.

  21. Mill (n 11) 14.

  22. Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse, Liberalism in James Meadowcroft (ed.), L.T. Hobhouse: Liberalism and Other Writings (Cambridge University Press, 1994) 59.

  23. Freeden (n 16) 60.

  24. Rawls (n 13).

  25. Butleritchie (n 20) 12.

  26. Butleritchie (n 20) 24.

  27. David Bilchitz, ‘Egalitarian Liberalism, Distributive Justice and the New Constitutionalism’ (2014) 61(140) Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 47.

  28. Frank Michelman, ‘Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional Law’ in Samuel Richard Freeman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 415.

  29. ibid 418.

  30. Douglas Sturm, ‘Constitutionalism: A Critical Appreciation and an Extension of the Political Theory of C.H. McIlwain’ (1969) 54 Minnesota Law Review 240.

  31. ibid 242.

  32. ibid.

  33. ibid 243.

  34. ibid 242.

  35. Narnia Bohler-Muller, ‘Western Liberal Legalism and its Discontents: A Perspective from Post-Apartheid South Africa’ (2007) 3(1) Socio-Legal Review 16.

  36. Sotirios A. Barber, ‘Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism’ (2006) 75(2) Fordham Law Review 665.

  37. Jeremy Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism: A Skeptical View’ (2012) New York University School of Law, Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-87.

  38. ibid.

  39. Nicholas Barber, The Principles of Constitutionalism (Oxford University Press, 2018) 3.

  40. “A line can be traced from the institution of the state as a whole, through the doctrine of constitutionalism, to the discrete principles of constitutionalism, and then back to the internal institutional structure of the state.” Barber (n 39) 19.

  41. ibid 8.

  42. ibid.

  43. ibid 82.

  44. Adrienne Stone and Lael K. Weis, ‘Positive and Negative Constitutionalism and the Limits of Universalism: A Review Essay’ (2021) 41(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1253.

  45. Grimm (n 5) 22.

  46. ibid (v).

  47. Alexander Somek, The Cosmopolitan Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2014).

  48. ibid.

  49. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 1992).

  50. Michael Dowdle, and Michael Wilkinson (eds.) Constitutionalism beyond Liberalism (Cambridge University Press 2017) 24.

  51. Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, ‘Post-Liberal Constitutionalism’ (2018) 54(1) Tulsa Law Review 2.

  52. ibid 8-13.

  53. Bruce P. Frohnen, ‘Is Constitutionalism Liberal?’ (2011) 33(3) Campbell Law Review 529.

  54. Farinacci-Fernós (n 51) 8.

  55. Arthur J. Jacobson, ‘Transitional Constitutions’, in Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives (Duke University Press, Durham, 1994) 416 as cited in Jorge M. Farinacci-Fernós, ‘Post-Liberal Constitutionalism’ (2018) 54(1) Tulsa Law Review 21.

  56. Farinacci-Fernós (n 51) 22.

  57. ibid 2.

  58. Transformative Constitutionalism has been defined by Karl Klare as “a long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed to transforming a country’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory and egalitarian direction.” See Karl E. Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14(1) South African Journal on Human Rights 146.

  59. Richard Kay, ‘American Constitutionalism’ in Larry Alexander (ed.) Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge University Press 1998) 16.

  60. Ran Hirschl, ‘How Universal is Comparative Constitutional Law?’ in Ran Hirschl, Comparative Matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 192.

  61. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed.), Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa and Colombia (Cambridge University Press 2013).

  62. ibid 5-11.

  63. ibid 5.

  64. ibid 7.

  65. ibid 10.

  66. ibid 8.

  67. ibid 14.

  68. Klare (n 58) 168.

  69. Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla (ed.) Unstable constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia (Cambridge University Press 2015) 4.

  70. ibid.

  71. Daniel Bonilla Maldonado (ed.), Constitutionalism of the Global South: The Activist Tribunals of India, South Africa and Columbia (Cambridge University Press 2013) 7.

  72. Arun K. Thiruvengadam, ‘Book Review of Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia, Mark Tushnet (ed.) and Madhav Khosla (ed.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)’ (2018) 2 Public Law 367.

  73. Mark Tushnet and Madhav Khosla (ed.) (n 69) 16.

  74. Philip Dann, Michael Riegner and Maxim Bönnemann, (eds.) The Global South and Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020).

  75. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South (Duke University Press 2018), Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide (Routledge 2014).

  76. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The End of the Cognitive Empire: The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South (Duke University Press 2018) 8.

  77. Philip Dann, Michael Riegner and Maxim Bönnemann ‘The Southern Turn in Comparative Constitutional Law: An Introduction’ in Philip Dann, Michael Riegner and Maxim Bönnemann, (eds.) The Global South and Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020) 32.

  78. ibid.

  79. Theunis Roux, ‘The Global South and Liberal Constitutionalism: Incommensurable Opposites?’ (IACL-IADC Blog, July 15, 2021). https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2021-posts/6-15-21the-global-south-and-liberal-constitutionalism-incommensurable-opposites. Accessed 22 November 2022.

  80. Upendra Baxi ‘Preliminary Notes on Transformative Constitutionalism’ in Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi, et.al. (eds.), Transformative constitutionalism: Comparing the apex courts of Brazil, India and South Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, UltraLitho, Johannesburg, 2013) 32.

  81. Theunis Roux ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African Constitution: Distinction without a difference?’ (2009) 20(2) Stellenbosch Law Review 258.

  82. Theunis Roux, ‘A brief response to Professor Baxi’ in Oscar Vilhena, Upendra Baxi, et.al. (eds.), Transformative constitutionalism: Comparing the apex courts of Brazil, Indian and South Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, UltraLitho, Johannesburg, 2013) 48.

  83. Freeden (n 16) 37.

  84. ibid 38.

  85. Judith Shklar, ‘The Liberalism of Fear’ in Nancy L. Rosenblum (ed.), Liberalism and the Moral Life (Harvard University Press, 1989) 21.

  86. The term ‘adjectival constitutionalism’ has been coined by Diana Kapiszewski, Associate Professor of Government, Georgetown University, Washington. Reference to the same has been made by Mark Tushnet in his work, ‘Editorial: Varieties of Constitutionalism’ (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1.

  87. Hirschl (n 60).

  88. See Mark Tushnet, Editorial (2016) 14(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 1.

Acknowledgements

The author is currently enrolled as a Ph.D. research scholar at the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi, undertaking research in the area of transformative constitutionalism.

Funding

No funds, grants, or other support was received by the author at any stage for the preparation of this manuscript.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Swaril Dania.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

The author has no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Swaril Dania—Ph. D. Scholar.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Dania, S. Demystifying the liberal-post liberal divide: The ‘North–South’ debate on constitutionalism. Jindal Global Law Review 14, 9–28 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-023-00192-1

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41020-023-00192-1

Keywords

Navigation