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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 611–628 | Cite as

Experimental Philosophy of Pain

  • Justin Sytsma
  • Kevin Reuter
Article

Abstract

The standard view of pains among philosophers today is that their existence consists in being experienced. The typical line of support offered for this view is that it corresponds with the ordinary or commonsense conception of pain. Despite this, a growing body of evidence from experimental philosophers indicates that the ordinary understanding of pain stands in contrast to the standard view among philosophers. In this paper, we will survey this literature and add to it, detailing the results of seven new studies on the ordinary understanding of pain using both questionnaire and corpus analysis methods.

Keywords

Pain Folk theory Mental state view of pain Bodily view of pain Unfelt pain Corpus analysis 

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Copyright information

© ICPR 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Victoria University of WellingtonWellingtonNew Zealand
  2. 2.University of BernBernSwitzerland

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