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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research

, Volume 34, Issue 3, pp 517–541 | Cite as

The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

  • Edouard Machery
  • Stephen Stich
  • David Rose
  • Mario Alai
  • Adriano Angelucci
  • Renatas Berniūnas
  • Emma E. Buchtel
  • Amita Chatterjee
  • Hyundeuk Cheon
  • In-Rae Cho
  • Daniel Cohnitz
  • Florian Cova
  • Vilius Dranseika
  • Ángeles Eraña Lagos
  • Laleh Ghadakpour
  • Maurice Grinberg
  • Ivar Hannikainen
  • Takaaki Hashimoto
  • Amir Horowitz
  • Evgeniya Hristova
  • Yasmina Jraissati
  • Veselina Kadreva
  • Kaori Karasawa
  • Hackjin Kim
  • Yeonjeong Kim
  • Minwoo Lee
  • Carlos Mauro
  • Masaharu Mizumoto
  • Sebastiano Moruzzi
  • Christopher Y. Olivola
  • Jorge Ornelas
  • Barbara Osimani
  • Carlos Romero
  • Alejandro Rosas Lopez
  • Massimo Sangoi
  • Andrea Sereni
  • Sarah Songhorian
  • Paulo Sousa
  • Noel Struchiner
  • Vera Tripodi
  • Naoki Usui
  • Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado
  • Giorgio Volpe
  • Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian
  • Xueyi Zhang
  • Jing Zhu
Article

Abstract

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.

Keywords

Gettier intuition Knowledge ascription Core epistemology Universal Reflection defense Gender and cultural differences Personality 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This publication was made possible through the support of a grant from the Fuller Theological Seminary/Thrive Center in concert with the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Fuller Thrive Center or the John Templeton Foundation.

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Copyright information

© ICPR 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edouard Machery
    • 1
  • Stephen Stich
    • 2
  • David Rose
    • 2
  • Mario Alai
    • 3
  • Adriano Angelucci
    • 3
  • Renatas Berniūnas
    • 4
  • Emma E. Buchtel
    • 5
  • Amita Chatterjee
    • 6
  • Hyundeuk Cheon
    • 7
  • In-Rae Cho
    • 8
  • Daniel Cohnitz
    • 9
  • Florian Cova
    • 10
  • Vilius Dranseika
    • 4
  • Ángeles Eraña Lagos
    • 11
  • Laleh Ghadakpour
    • 12
  • Maurice Grinberg
    • 13
  • Ivar Hannikainen
    • 14
  • Takaaki Hashimoto
    • 15
  • Amir Horowitz
    • 16
  • Evgeniya Hristova
    • 13
  • Yasmina Jraissati
    • 17
  • Veselina Kadreva
    • 13
  • Kaori Karasawa
    • 15
  • Hackjin Kim
    • 18
  • Yeonjeong Kim
    • 19
  • Minwoo Lee
    • 18
  • Carlos Mauro
    • 20
  • Masaharu Mizumoto
    • 21
  • Sebastiano Moruzzi
    • 22
  • Christopher Y. Olivola
    • 19
  • Jorge Ornelas
    • 23
  • Barbara Osimani
    • 24
  • Carlos Romero
    • 25
  • Alejandro Rosas Lopez
    • 26
  • Massimo Sangoi
    • 3
  • Andrea Sereni
    • 27
  • Sarah Songhorian
    • 28
  • Paulo Sousa
    • 29
  • Noel Struchiner
    • 14
  • Vera Tripodi
    • 30
  • Naoki Usui
    • 31
  • Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado
    • 25
  • Giorgio Volpe
    • 22
  • Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian
    • 17
  • Xueyi Zhang
    • 32
  • Jing Zhu
    • 33
  1. 1.University of PittsburghPittsburghUSA
  2. 2.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA
  3. 3.University of UrbinoUrbinoItaly
  4. 4.Vilnius UniversityVilniusLithuania
  5. 5.The Education University of Hong KongHong KongChina
  6. 6.Jadavpur UniversityKolkataIndia
  7. 7.Ewha Womans UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  8. 8.Seoul National UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  9. 9.Utrecht UniversityUtrechtNetherlands
  10. 10.University of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland
  11. 11.Instituto de Investigaciones FilosóficasUNAMMexico CityMexico
  12. 12.TehranIran
  13. 13.New Bulgarian UniversitySofiaBulgaria
  14. 14.Catholic University of Rio de JaneiroRio de JaneiroBrazil
  15. 15.University of TokyoTokyoJapan
  16. 16.Open University of IsraelRa’ananaIsrael
  17. 17.American University of BeirutBeirutLebanon
  18. 18.Korea UniversitySeoulSouth Korea
  19. 19.Carnegie Mellon UniversityPittsburghUSA
  20. 20.Católica Porto Business SchoolPortoPortugal
  21. 21.Japan Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyNomiJapan
  22. 22.University of BolognaBolognaItaly
  23. 23.Universidad Autónoma de San Luis PotosíSan Luis PotosíMexico
  24. 24.Ludwig-Maximilians Univesität, München – MCMPMunichGermany
  25. 25.UNAMMexico CityMexico
  26. 26.National University of ColombiaBogotáColombia
  27. 27.Scuola Universitaria Superiore IUSS PaviaPaviaItaly
  28. 28.Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele MilanoMilanItaly
  29. 29.Institute of Cognition and CultureQueen’s University BelfastBelfastIreland
  30. 30.University of TurinTurinItaly
  31. 31.Mie UniversityTsuJapan
  32. 32.Southeast University, P. R. ChinaNanjingChina
  33. 33.Sun Yat-Sen UniversityGuangzhouChina

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