The (Non-)classicality of (Non-)classical Mathematics




Graham Priest has recently argued that the distinctive trait of classical mathematics is that the conditional of its underlying logic—that is, classical logic—is extensional. In this article, I aim to present an alternate explanation of the specificity of classical mathematics (and actually for L-mathematics, for a significative amount of instances of 'L').


I examine Priest's argument for his claim and show its shortcomings. Then I deploy a model-theoretic presentation of logics that allows comparing them, and the mathematics based on them, more fine-grainedly.


Such a model-theoretic presentation of logics suggests that the specific character of classical logic consists in the structure that it confers to its truth values and in the structure of the evaluation indices of its formulas, and that this trait is useful to explain the specific character of the logics and the mathematics based on them.


The extensionality of the conditional in classical logic is a by-product of other structural features of a logic, which are more likely to be what gives a kind of mathematics based on it its specific character.


Conditional Extensionality Classical mathematics Non-classical mathematics LP K3 Satisfiability conditions 


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© ICPR 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Philosophical ResearchUNAMMexico CityMexico

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