Philosophical Implications of Religious Pluralism

Abstract

Living in multi-religious societies in almost all parts of the world, religious diversity is a fact of life for all of us in the contemporary world. However, it is possible to take diverse philosophical approaches to this diversity. Religious pluralism is one such approach, which claims that all religions are equally valid. In this paper, I wish to analyse this approach and clarify its philosophical implications. I try to show that its acceptance raises serious questions about our understanding of the concept of truth, our conception of a religious worldview and the nature of believers’ commitment. One philosophical issue raised by acknowledgment of religious diversity pertains to conflicting truth claims of different religions and how these can be said to be true at the same time. I discuss some philosophical perspectives which provide theoretical frameworks to accommodate diverse religious standpoints and thus seem to support pluralism. However, each of these has problematic dimensions raising questions about its tenability. My objective is not to undermine the importance of a pluralistic approach to religious diversity, which I consider as eminently desirable, but to emphasize that acceptance of pluralism challenges many of our widely held conceptions and beliefs. Moreover, I wish to point out that the thesis that all religions are equally valid is not in agreement with the self-understanding and ethos of almost all the major religions of the world. Therefore, acceptance of religious pluralism seems to require a significant revision of how believers generally understand the doctrinal claims and the worldview of the religion they follow and how religious traditions look at their own ontological commitments. Although many religions can accommodate religious tolerance in varying degrees, it seems doubtful whether any religious tradition can accept whole heartedly the thesis of equal validity of all religions. Religious pluralism thus is not a descriptive but a prescriptive or revisionary thesis about religions. I argue that religious pluralism may be a tenable thesis if we either accept a relativistic conception of truth or a non-cognitive analysis of doctrinal statements. Both these suppositions have wide ranging implications; the former requires a significant modification in our generally accepted notion of truth and the latter in our common understanding of religious assertions, and both are opposed to the self-understanding of most of the major religions of the world with respect to their ontologies. I find merit in the philosophical standpoint which tries to explain diversity of religious worldviews with the help of the idea of interpretation of reality. However, this perspective also has problems given the realist framework of religious worldviews. It seems to me that admitting the significance of interpretation in the context of religious experience leads to the conclusion that religious ontologies should be regarded as offering creative interpretations of reality by people in the light of their religious experiences. However, this approach necessarily brings in an element of subjectivity and is prescriptive. The difficulties of providing a satisfactory theoretical basis for religious pluralism, however, cannot be regarded as a justification for exclusivist or intolerant tendencies. It is imperative in the contemporary world to evolve a constructive conception of religious tolerance and strengthen interfaith dialogue.