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Unilateral Support Equilibrium, Berge Equilibrium, and Team Problems Solutions

  • Bertrand CrettezEmail author
Original Article
  • 7 Downloads

Abstract

We compare two notions of equilibrium for other-regarding agents, namely Berge and unilateral support equilibria. A Berge equilibrium is a strategy profile such that the teammates of each agent choose their strategies in order to maximize his utility. A unilateral support equilibrium is a strategy profile such that the teammates of each agent non-cooperatively choose their strategies to maximize his utility. By definition the level of cooperation in a unilateral support equilibrium is no higher than in a Berge equilibrium. Yet, relying on ideas from Team theory, we provide conditions under which a unilateral support equilibrium is also a Berge equilibrium. We also provide conditions under which a unilateral support equilibrium is a Berge–Vaisman equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile which is a Berge equilibrium and such that the payoff of each player is no lower than his maximin value.

Keywords

Berge equilibrium Berge–Vaisman equilibrium Berge–Nash equilibrium Unilateral support equilibrium Team optimal solution Person-by-person optimal solution Mutually beneficial practice 

JEL Classification

C7 D 74 

Notes

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Copyright information

© The Indian Econometric Society 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, CRED, EA 7321ParisFrance

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