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Electoral Cycles and Project Outcomes

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Abstract

Using a novel dataset on announced project-level investments, we examine the determination of project outcomes and the role of elections. Using India as a case study, the findings suggest that projects announced by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibit a lower probability of completion. Furthermore, we show that projects announced by SOEs have a higher probability of being abandoned. Our results are consistent with the political view of government ownership where elected representatives make investment promises that are subsequently reneged.

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Notes

  1. The start date of firm financials is defined as the end date minus the months covered by the financials.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Centre for Advanced Financial Research and Learning, Main Building, Fort, Mumbai, 400001, Maharashtra, India

    Saibal Ghosh

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  1. Saibal Ghosh
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Correspondence to Saibal Ghosh.

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S. Ghosh: I would like to profusely thank, without implicating, two anonymous referees for the incisive comments on an earlier draft, which greater improved the exposition and analysis. Needless to state, the views expressed and the approach pursued in the paper reflects the personal opinion of the author.

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Ghosh, S. Electoral Cycles and Project Outcomes. J. Quant. Econ. 16, 527–552 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40953-017-0080-9

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