Abstract
The aim of this paper is to provide some additional results concerning how economic freedom enhances growth and/or long-run income. Our hypothesis is that institutions and policies of economic freedom may have different effects on long-run income and growth, both in terms of their size and working mechanisms. To test our hypothesis, we apply both Acemoglu et al.’s (Am Econ Rev 91(5):1369–401, 2001) and Mankiw et al.’s (Q J Econ 107(2):407–437, 1992) modeling strategies in our cross-country regression analyses. The major finding is that the institutions of economic freedom are of primary importance in economic development: they matter both in the long run and during the catching up period, and have both direct and indirect effects. On the other hand, the effects of economic freedom policies (monetary and fiscal) matter only during the catching up period, with the fiscal policy having a more straightforward effect. Furthermore, the estimates from the two modeling strategies are in line with each other, which can be seen as a further corroboration of our results.
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Notes
The empirical studies we will refer to in what follows measure economic freedom either by the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index or the Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom.
In the majority of cases, the areas and/or sub-areas of an economic freedom index are used as ‘components’ of economic freedom. Most of the papers we review in Sect. 2 use some of the five areas of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Index, which include (1) size of government, (2) legal structure and security of property rights, (3) sound money, (4) freedom to exchange with foreigners, and (5) regulation of credit, labor, and business (Gwartney and Lawson 2003c). Those papers, however, which deal with the index before the publication of the 2002 report relate to an index with seven components, which include: (1) size of government, (2) structure of the economy and use of markets, (3) monetary policy and price stability, (4) freedom to use alternative currencies, (5) legal structure and property rights, (6) international exchange: freedom to trade with foreigners, and (7) freedom of exchange in capital and financial markets (Gwartney and Lawson 2001, p. 6).
Note that there are, of course, counterarguments as well, such as De Haan and Sturm’s (2006), which says that economic freedom is a latent variable, and what we want is the best estimate of this variable, and in order to find the best proxy we must use various measures and ‘components’.
It has to be noted that our measures of the institutions and policies of economic freedom are ‘constrained’ by the EFW index itself, and may be slightly different from the concepts of institutions and policies used in the literature.
See Baumol (1990) on the distinction between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship.
Available at: http://www.barrolee.com/.
Available at: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/geographydata.htm.
Barbados, Fiji, Hong Kong, Mauritius, Singapore.
Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
Some databases, including the Freedom House (2013) do not provide data for Germany before 1990, only for West and East Germany. In these cases we used the population-weighted averages of the two Germanys’ data.
Note that our result that there is no reverse causality between the economic freedom institutions and income runs counter to some arguments (e.g., Heitger 2004) which maintain that property rights, as an important part of institutions and development, improve together with economic development in a virtuous circle (or deteriorate in a vicious one). A possible explanation for our result may be that our institutions variable includes more than property rights, most importantly regulatory variables, which may degrade the positive effects of property rights.
This finding refines what has been shown by others (e.g. Gwartney et al. 2006), as well.
There are political-economic reasons to believe that a fragmentation of the polity leads to a lower quality economic policy. See, for example, the famous model of Alesina and Tabellini (1990).
Although including so many instruments may weaken the strength of our argument, the formal statistics of the instruments suggest otherwise, since the usual formal tests say that our instruments are relevant and valid. The first stage regressions and the instruments’ validation statistics are available upon request.
It must be emphasized, once again, that our definition of what constitutes institutions and economic policy is constrained by the EFW index, and of course the index itself does not necessarily contain all the elements which are usually thought of as constituting these institutions and policy.
The dataset consists of long-run data for the following 21 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Considering the component ‘property rights’, an augmented Dickey–Fuller test rejects the presence of a unit root at the 5% significance level in nine cases: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland. For the component of ‘international trade’ the unit root is rejected in three cases: Belgium, Greece, and New Zealand. Finally, for the component ‘regulation’, the unit root hypothesis is rejected in 16 cases: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
See footnote 18.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A comparison of the long-run and the short-run estimates
In Sect. 4.4 we made four assumptions in order to be able to compare our short-run estimate with the long-run one. The first two assumptions can be summarized by saying that the change in log income can be written as
where Δln(inst) t is the change in the economic freedom institutions in year t, and \(\hat{\alpha }_{5}\) is the estimation for the effect of economic freedom institutions on the growth rate we derived from the analysis of the period 1980–2010.
The third assumption we made concerns the time series economic freedom institutions follow in the long-run. To be able to make a meaningful estimation of the long-run effect from the short-run one, we have to consider what happens to the measure of economic freedom institutions in the periods we are not able to observe. The regression results on the growth rate can be understood as what would happen if the measure of economic freedom institutions (ln institutions) was increased by one unit at the beginning of a 30-year period and remained at this higher level until this period ends. This 30-year period is just the last 30 years of the long period in question (210 years), and a one-unit difference for this last 30 years does not imply the same difference for the preceding 180 years. It is therefore meaningful to divide this long period into two parts:
To be able to make an educated guess about the difference in economic freedom institutions before 1980, we assume a time series which institutions follow. Suppose that this process is a stationary one for country j as follows:
with θ being the autoregressive parameter to be estimated from the long-run data of economic freedom, while ε t is the error term. Therefore, the difference in economic freedom institutions between two countries follows the process:
Our assumptions above say that this difference is zero in 1800 and it is one in 1980. To make use of this, first note that the difference in a year t (1801 ≤ t ≤ 2010) is
Second, let us suppose that the one-unit difference observed in 1980 is the result of a slow and steady evolution of the institutions of economic freedom through which the same shock occurs each year:
Thus, assuming a one-unit difference for 1980 implies assuming a value for ε because \(\Delta \ln (inst)_{1980} = \sum\limits_{k = 1801}^{1980} {\theta^{1980 - k} \varepsilon = } \sum\limits_{l = 0}^{179} {\theta^{l} \varepsilon = } \frac{{1 - \theta^{180} }}{1 - \theta }\varepsilon = 1\), that is \(\varepsilon = \frac{1 - \theta }{{1 - \theta^{180} }}\).
In this way the expression for the income differences becomes:
When examining the long-run data of Prados de la Escosura (2016) we find that in quite a few countries among the 21, the relevant component is stationary.Footnote 18 Using these long-run data, the value of θ, as averaged over the “stationary countries”, is estimated to be about 0.997, which gives the final result:
As the estimated value of α 5 runs between 0.028 and 0.079 in Tables 3 and 4, this gives an estimate between 3.600 and 10.157 for the income difference in 2010, which shows a substantial overlap with—although it is far from being the same as—the interval between 2.476 and 4.600, the range within which we estimated the effect of economic freedom institutions on income in Table 2.
The time series of economic freedom institutions might not be stationary, however. Using panel unit root tests and considering the overall index, rather than any of its individual components, Sobel and Coyne (2011) came to the conclusion that economic freedom follows a non-stationary process. As we saw,Footnote 19 even the components of economic freedom institutions found in the Prados de la Escosura (2016) database follow a non-stationary process in some of the 21 countries. In accordance with this, let us derive a similar estimate to the one made above, assuming a random walk process for economic freedom institutions:
leading to the difference between our two hypothetical countries in the form:
For 1980, this becomes
Δln(inst)1980 = 180ɛ = 1, implying that ɛ = 1/180.
With the help of this we can again derive an educated guess for the income difference:
Which, finally, is
Using the numbers from Tables 3 and 4 we now end up with an interval of 3.374–9.520 as an alternative estimate of what we have already estimated in Table 2. This interval shows a slightly greater overlap with our estimation.
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Kapás, J., Czeglédi, P. Institutions and policies of economic freedom: different effects on income and growth. Econ Polit 34, 259–282 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40888-017-0063-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40888-017-0063-5