Eurasian Economic Review

, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 69–93 | Cite as

Two state disputes and outside intervention: the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict

  • Ani Harutyunyan
Original Paper


The paper proposes a game theoretical model of a dispute between two states. It analyzes the possible outcome of the dispute and the probability of war depending on the distribution of power between those states, the costs of fighting in the war and the level of uncertainty about each other’s costs. The paper also examines two types of outside intervention analyzing their separate and joint effect on the final outcome and the probability of war. The model is applied to the case of Nagorno–Karabakh conflict and some concluding remarks are provided regarding the probability of war break out and possible resolutions of the conflict.


Interstate conflict Third party intervention Coercive intervention Nagorno–Karabakh Armenia Azerbaijan 

JEL Classification

F50 F51 F52 N40 N44 N45 


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Copyright information

© Eurasia Business and Economics Society 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LICOS-Centre for Institutions and Economic PerformanceKU LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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