Dividend policy, corporate control and the tax status of the controlling shareholder

  • Christian Andres
  • André BetzerEmail author
  • Inga van den Bongard
  • Marc Goergen


This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984–2005. In line with the agency model, we find a negative relation between family control and dividend payouts at low and high levels of control. We also find evidence of reduced speed of adjustment of dividends at intermediate levels of family control. We further document that corporate control is associated with higher dividend payouts if an industrial or commercial corporation is the majority shareholder of the company. Finally, the results do not provide evidence that the tax preference of the largest shareholder matters for dividend payout decisions.


Dividend policy Payout policy Lintner dividend model Tax clientele effects Corporate governance 

JEL Classification

G32 G35 


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Copyright information

© Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Christian Andres
    • 1
  • André Betzer
    • 2
    Email author
  • Inga van den Bongard
    • 3
  • Marc Goergen
    • 4
  1. 1.WHU-Otto Beisheim School of ManagementVallendarGermany
  2. 2.Schumpeter School of Business and EconomicsBergische Universität WuppertalWuppertalGermany
  3. 3.University of MannheimMannheimGermany
  4. 4.IE Business School, IE University and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)MadridSpain

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