Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring activity to take advantage of gaps or differences in regulations or laws. Examples include Facebook modifying its terms and conditions to reduce the exposure of its user data to strict European privacy laws, and Uber and other platform companies organizing their affairs to categorize workers as non-employees. This article explores the constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage through the lens of the technology industry, known for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Specifically, the article explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as constraining forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can arise from new business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of regulatory arbitrage can be observed.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Buy single article
Instant access to the full article PDF.
Price includes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.
Fleischer (2010), p 227.
Regulatory arbitrage may or may not be socially optimal, depending on the circumstances, but it is generally discussed in the literature as a problem. See García (2019), p 207 (‘[A]t its core, regulatory arbitrage is distortionary behavior that can thwart regulatory intent and disadvantage actors who play by the rules.’); Fleischer (2010), p 230 (‘[A] more precise understanding of when and how gamesmanship occurs allows us to address the problem in a targeted fashion that avoids sweeping, overbroad reforms that do more harm than good.’).
See, e.g., Weadon (2012) (discussing lack of international harmonization in OTC derivatives regulation).
See, e.g., Barry (2011), p 73 (‘[R]egulatory arbitrage can be eliminated by crafting legal rules that accurately track the economic substance of transactions… If there is no gap to take advantage of, there is no risk of regulatory arbitrage. When seen in this light, regulatory arbitrage is a phenomenon that follows from having regulations that fail to take economic reality into account.’).
See Partnoy (2019), pp 1030–1031 (‘If regulatory costs are suboptimally high, regulatory arbitrage can be viewed as socially optimal; if regulatory costs are high for valid social purposes (for example, to internalize the costs of externalities), regulatory arbitrage can be viewed as socially suboptimal’); see also O’Hara and Ribstein (2009), pp 20–21 (noting ‘party choice’ in a ‘market for law’ can encourage states to provide desirable laws, but can ‘impose net costs where a party is forced or manipulated into agreeing that a state’s law should apply or where the chosen law harms others not party to the contract’); Choudhury and Petrin (2018), p 34 (‘In short, international arbitrage highlights the ability of corporations to affect the public on a multitude of issues while similarly being able to thwart accountability.’).
For a discussion of the rise of the intangible economy and implications of ‘capitalism without capital’, see Haskel and Westlake (2018), pp 8–11.
See Cohen (2017), p 199 (‘Although such [platform] corporations are nominally headquartered in particular countries and have physical assets in many other countries that are amenable to control in varying degrees, their great economic power translates into correspondingly powerful capacity for regulatory arbitrage.’).
Marian (2017), p 7, fn. 44.
Drucker and Bowers (2017).
Khan (2017), fn. 204.
‘Facebook to exclude billions from European privacy laws’, BBC (19 April 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43822184.
See Cui (2018).
See, e.g., Wu (2003) (discussing how code is used to avoid the law and seek legal advantage); Elert and Henrekson (2016), p 96 (discussing ‘profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework’); Brummer (2015), p 980 (noting that some ‘innovations may have appeal or be popular precisely because of their ability to engage, undermine, or elide existing regulatory and market systems’).
Social license refers to the ‘social approval of those affected by a certain business activity’. Melé and Armengou (2016); see also Sale (2019). The concept draws upon the notion of business as a social institution that requires legitimacy from stakeholders. For further discussion, see Sect. 3.1infra.
Fleischer (2010), p 230.
Ibid., p 231; Bruner (2016), pp 30-38 (discussing capital mobility and regulatory competition); cf. Talley (2015), p 1653 (arguing that ‘[f]ederal law’s creeping displacement of state law has consequently ‘unbundled’ domestic tax law from domestic corporate governance regulation’ in the US). For a discussion of ‘how offshore jurisdictions enable business entities to opt out of otherwise mandatory domestic regulatory laws’, see Moon (2019), pp 1–2.
Fleischer (2010), p 231.
Ibid., pp 232–234; see also Burk (2016), pp 6–7 (‘[Exploitation of loopholes] happens routinely, in all areas of social activity, producing unexpected and often undesired outcomes as regulation changes behavior in unanticipated ways.’); Wu (2003), pp 682–683 (describing code as a technological mechanism to minimize the burden of laws).
Riles (2014), p 71.
Ibid., p 72.
García (2019), p 203.
Ibid., pp 203, 237–238.
See Katz (2010) (discussing circumvention of law and related other phrases such as evasion, avoidance, and loophole exploitation, as well as more context-specific examples such as tax shelters, bootstrapping, and forum-shopping); see also Moon (2019), fn. 7 (‘Scholars typically distinguish tax evasion, a set of illicit activities aimed at reducing taxes, from tax avoidance, which includes various forms of legal maneuvering.’).
In some instances, regulatory arbitrage or legal avoidance may result in an unexpected benefit or may mitigate regulation driven by special interests. For example, some regulatory arbitrage ‘may serve as an impetus for technological innovation, or may signal to Congress an extant imbalance in statutory treatment of similarly situated entities, potentially resulting in societal benefit on balance.’ García (2019), p 203; see also Burk (2016), pp 3–5 (describing serendipitous technology as ‘perverse innovation’ that is a byproduct of regulatory avoidance such as the development of mutagenic crops to avoid strict regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs)); Ayres and Kapczynski (2015), pp 1812–1827 (describing innovation to avoid or lessen the impact of a penalty such as the development of energy-efficient cars and light bulbs).
Wu (2003), p 731.
Ibid., p 732.
Ibid., p 736; Wu (2017), p 10.
Ibid., pp 109, 120–121.
Lobel (2016), p 106.
Ibid., p 156 (‘[D]efinitional defiance is central to the business model of the platform.’); Tomassetti (2016), p 78 (‘[C]laims about technological sophistication and the knowledge economy can be euphemisms for profit seeking not through productive enterprise, but through regulatory arbitrage, speculation, and other forms of asset manipulation.’). This process is dynamic and the law responds in turn, such as by developing new statutes and case law on the issue of employee status.
See Katz (2010).
For a classic work that considers the complexity and limits of financial arbitrage in the real world given that it requires capital and entails risk, particularly in the agency context, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Fleischer (2010), p 230.
Ibid., pp 231–232.
Fleischer (2010), p 258.
Ibid., pp 262–274.
Ibid., pp 252, 264; cf. Barry (2011), p 71 (noting that ‘professional constraints are by no means a perfect prevention mechanism’, but they ‘do shift deals between different structures and [this] can affect the degree of regulatory arbitrage’).
Fleischer (2010), p 273.
Ibid., pp 283–288 (discussing ‘the politics of the deal’).
See Berle (1959), pp 90–91, 114; see also Cheffins (2018–2019) (discussing mid-twentieth century notions of ‘countervailing power’ on corporations); Pollman (2019a), pp 634–639 (discussing Adolf Berle’s concept of ‘inchoate law’ that arises when corporations fail to self-regulate within expected social norms of responsibility).
Lobel (2016), p 157 (‘[T]he economic and social logic of the platform, pushing down transaction costs in all stages of the deal, as well as creating new markets that map onto new preferences and lifestyles, is the primary raison d’être of the rise of the platform.’); Stone (2017) (describing Uber’s philosophy, ‘our product is so superior to the status quo that if we give people the opportunity to see it or try it, in any place in the world where government has to be at least somewhat responsive to the people, they will demand it and defend its right to exist’).
Ram and Kazmin (2017).
The Greyball tool was part of an Uber program called VTOS, short for ‘violation of terms of service’. It used data collected from the Uber app and other techniques to identify riders that it viewed as using or targeting its service improperly, such as public officials who were posing as customers to investigate or gather evidence that Uber was operating illegally. The tool showed such riders a fake version of the app and blocked them from booking rides. Isaac (2017a, b).
Transport for London, 22 September, 2017, https://www.ltda.co.uk/assets/files/downloads/TfL%20licensing%20decision%20letter.pdf.
Crerar (2017). The number of controversies and scandals plaguing Uber, along with the company’s own statements, suggested that corporate culture was a contributing factor to the actions that prompted a loss of social license. See Partnoy (2019), pp 1033–1036 (noting that cultural and psychological factors could influence regulatory arbitrage); Langevoort (2017) (discussing the role of corporate culture in compliance regimes).
Wolfe and Levine (2018).
For example, thousands of taxi drivers filed one of the largest class actions in Australian history against Uber for ‘conspiracy to act unlawfully’, seeking hundreds of millions of dollars in damages. Jacks (2018).
Armour, Enriques, Ezrachi and Vella (2018).
For a discussion of the history of the relationship between corporate law and social welfare, see Bratton (2017).
See Cohen (2017), p 176 (describing how ‘[p]latform companies are encountering legal systems worldwide at a time of crisis’).
Larry Fink’s 2019 letter to CEOs: purpose and profit, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.
Larry Fink’s 2018 letter to CEOs: a sense of purpose, BlackRock, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter.
Ibid.; see also Sorkin (2018).
For a discussion of this point in the context of economist Charles Tiebout’s model of jurisdictional competition, see Bratton and McCahery (1997). For a discussion of the tax ‘frictions’ literature, see Fleischer (2010), pp 232–233, 258. Gloukhovtsev et al. (2018) provide a ‘marketing systems’ perspective and a case study of regulatory arbitrage and alcohol policy in Finland.
Levin and Downes (2018).
Ibid. (‘[G]oogle’s own interest in fiber stemmed from a conviction that faster speeds would eventually generate more revenue and services for the broader Alphabet enterprise, making the investment justifiable if not profitable.’).
Levin and Downes (2018).
See ibid.; see also Van Loo (2018) (arguing that the US lags in consumer financial technology because of a lack of an agency with the authority and expertise to promote consumer financial competition).
See Bratton and McCahery (1997), pp 222–223 (‘[I]ndividual sorting proves difficult to effect because of the complex packaging of public goods and regulations. Although private goods tend to be produced and sold separately, public goods tend to be jointly produced and made available on a bundled basis.’).
See, e.g., Rodrigues and Schleicher (2012) (discussing how ‘location decisions are valuable because of the “agglomeration” benefits they provide’); Porter (1998) (explaining that ‘[b]eing a part of a cluster allows companies to operate more productively in sourcing inputs; accessing information, technology, and needed institutions; coordinating with related companies; and measuring and motivating improvement’); Ibrahim (2010), p 717 (‘Silicon Valley’s success has led other regions to attempt their own high-tech transformations, yet most imitators have failed.’).
See Goshen and Hamdani (2016) (discussing entrepreneurs’ pursuit of private benefits and idiosyncratic vision); see also Bratton and McCahery (1997), p 234 (‘Family, community, and cultural ties also may make movement an undesirable response to dissatisfaction with public goods, taxes, or regulation.’).
See, e.g., Zetlin (2018).
See Streitfeld (2018).
De Blasio (2019).
Weise et al. (2019).
As discussed above, this path has not been without cost and friction. Uber’s business model has notably incurred billions of dollars of losses and arbitraging employee status has led to lawsuits, settlements, and other expenses, leading to speculation that the company is engaged in a big bet or long game to driverless vehicles. See, e.g., Sherman (2017).
Pollman and Barry (2017), p 383.
Ibid. Not all companies succeed at regulatory entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Tusk (2018), p 9 (discussing startup companies that failed or encountered prolonged difficulty with regulatory entrepreneurship).
Pollman and Barry (2017), pp 398–408 (discussing how regulatory entrepreneurs may break the law or operate in legal gray areas while trying to change the law, grow too big to ban, mobilize users and other stakeholders for political gain, and use traditional political techniques such as lobbying).
See, e.g., Mancuso (2019).
See, e.g., Holley (2018).
See Tusk (2018).
Pollman and Barry (2017), pp 410–424.
Ibid., pp 419–421.
Ibid., pp 411–412, 421. Strong support from large numbers of users and stakeholders can give regulatory entrepreneurs bargaining leverage with relevant regulators. See, e.g., Burfield (2018), pp 114, 246–258 (advising companies engaged in regulatory entrepreneurship to know their ‘power map’ and to mobilize ‘citizen power’ for leverage with regulators); Tusk (2018), pp 156–157, 169–172, 212–213 (discussing how regulatory entrepreneurs might use both ‘honey and vinegar’ with regulators, such as by creating a positive narrative, threatening jurisdictional exit, and mobilizing customers as political advocates).
Allen HA (2019) Regulatory sandboxes. Geo Wash Law Rev 87:579–645
Andreessen M (2014) What it will take to create the next great Silicon Valleys, plural, Andreessen Horowitz. https://a16z.com/2014/06/20/what-it-will-take-to-create-the-next-great-silicon-valleys-plural/
Armour J, Enriques L, Ezrachi A, Vella J (2018) Putting technology to good use for society: the role of corporate, competition and tax law. J Br Acad 6(s1):285–321
Ayres I, Kapczynski A (2015) Innovation sticks: the limited case for penalizing failures to innovate. Univ Chic Law Rev 82:1781–1852
Barlow JP (1996) A declaration of the independence of cyberspace. Electronic Frontier Foundation. https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence
Barry JM (2011) On regulatory arbitrage. Tex Law Rev 89:69–78
Berle AA (1959) Power without property: a new development in American political economy. Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York
Blank JD, Staudt N (2012) Corporate shams. NY Univ Law Rev 87:1641–1709
Bratton WW (2017) The separation of corporate law and social welfare. Wash Lee Law Rev 74:767–790
Bratton WW, McCahery JA (1997) The new economics of jurisdictional competition: devolutionary federalism in a second-best world. Georget Law J 86:201–278
Brummer C (2015) Disruptive technology and securities regulation. Fordham Law Rev 84:977–1052
Bruner CM (2016) Re-imagining offshore finance: market-dominant small jurisdictions in a globalizing financial world. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Budds D (2017) The fascinating history of ‘Designed in California’, Fast Company. https://www.fastcompany.com/90129351/the-history-of-designed-in-california
Buell S (2011) Good faith and law evasion. UCLA Law Rev 58:611–666
Burfield E (2018) Regulatory hacking: a playbook for startups. Portfolio/Penguin, New York
Burk DL (2016) Perverse innovation. William & Mary Law Rev 58:1–34
Campo-Flores A (2017) Cities rush to build infrastructure—for self-driving cars. WSJ. https://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-rush-to-build-infrastructurefor-self-driving-cars-1510236002
Chander A (2014) How law made Silicon Valley. Emory Law J 63:639–694
Cheffins BR (2018–2019) Corporate governance and countervailing power. Bus Lawyer 74:1–52
Choudhury B, Petrin M (2018) Corporate duties to the public. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Chung E (2015) Amazon tests delivery drones at a secret site in Canada—here’s why. CBC. https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/amazon-tests-delivery-drones-at-a-secret-site-in-canada-here-s-why-1.3015425
Cohen J (2017) Law for the platform economy. UC Davis Law Rev 51:133–204
Coolican D, Jin L (2018) The dynamics of network effects, Andreessen Horowitz. https://a16z.com/2018/12/13/network-effects-dynamics-in-practice/
Crerar P (2017) Uber boss Dara Khosrowshahi says sorry and promises to ‘make things right’ for Londoners…as he pledges to fight TfL ban. Evening Standard. https://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/uber-boss-says-sorry-to-londoners-and-pledges-to-fight-tfl-licence-ban-a3642631.html
Cui W (2018) The digital services tax: a conceptual defense. Working paper. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3273641. Accessed 19 July 2019
De Blasio B (2019) Bill de Blasio: the path Amazon rejected. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/opinion/amazon-new-york-bill-de-blasio.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage#commentsContainer
Demuijnck G, Fasterling B (2016) The social license to operate. J Bus Eth 136:675–685
Dowd M (2017) She’s 26, and brought down Uber’s C.E.O. What’s next?. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/style/susan-fowler-uber.html
Drucker J, Bowers S (2017) After a tax crackdown, Apple found a new shelter for its profits. NY Times, 6 November 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html
Duhigg C (2018) Did Uber steal Google’s intellectual property?. New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/22/did-uber-steal-googles-intellectual-property
Elert N, Henrekson M (2016) Evasive entrepreneurialism. Small Bus Econ 47:96–113
Enrich PD (1996) Saving the states from themselves: commerce clause constraints from state tax incentives for business. Harv Law Rev 110:377–468
Fleischer V (2010) Regulatory arbitrage. Tex Law Rev 89:227–289
Florida R (2014) The rise of the creative class, revisited. Basic Books, New York
Florida R, Mellander C (2016) Rise of the startup city: the changing geography of the venture capital financed innovation. Calif Manag Rev 59:14–38
Freeman J, Rossi J (2012) Agency coordination in shared regulatory space. Harv Law Rev 125:1131–1211
Galloway S (2017) The four: the hidden DNA of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google. Portfolio/Penguin, New York
García K (2019) Copyright arbitrage. Calif Law Rev 107:199–266
Gilson RJ (1999) The legal infrastructure of high technology industrial districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and covenants not to compete. NY Univ Law Rev 74:575–629
Gloukhovtsev A, Schouten JW, Mattila P (2018) Toward a general theory of regulatory arbitrage: a marketing systems perspective. J Public Policy Mark 37:142–151
Goshen Z, Hamdani A (2016) Corporate control and idiosyncratic vision. Yale Law J 125:560–617
Harvard Business Review (2019) Can Mark Zuckerberg rebuild trust in Facebook?. https://hbr.org/podcast/2019/04/can-mark-zuckerberg-rebuild-trust-in-facebook
Haskel J, Westlake S (2018) Capitalism without capital: the rise of the intangible economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Holley P (2018) Electric-scooter companies conquer with a simple strategy: act first, answer questions later. Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2018/06/22/electric-scooter-companies-conquer-with-a-simple-strategy-act-first-answer-questions-later/?utm_term=.03d45ad49574
Ibrahim DM (2010) Financing the next Silicon Valley. Wash Univ Law Rev 87:717–762
Isaac M (2017) How Uber deceives the authorities worldwide. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-authorities.html
Isaac M (2017) Justice department expands its inquiry into Uber’s greyball tool. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/technology/uber-greyball-investigation-expands.html
Jacks T (2018) ‘Largest’ class action in country as lawsuit against Uber goes national. Sydney Morning Herald. https://www.smh.com.au/national/largest-class-action-in-country-as-lawsuit-against-uber-goes-national-20181127-p50ipb.html
Katz L (1996) Ill-gotten gains: evasion, blackmail, fraud, and kindred puzzles of the law. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Katz L (2010) A theory of loopholes. J Legal Stud 39:1–31
Khan L (2017) Amazon’s antitrust paradox. Yale Law J 126:710–805
Langevoort DC (2017) Cultures of compliance. Am Crim Law Rev 54:933–977
Langevoort DC, Thompson RB (2013) ‘Publicness’ in contemporary securities regulation after the JOBS Act. Georget Law J 101:337–386
Levin B, Downes L (2018) Why Google Fiber is high-speed internet’s most successful failure. Harv Bus Rev. https://hbr.org/2018/09/why-google-fiber-is-high-speed-internets-most-successful-failure
Levy S (2017) One more thing: inside Apple’s insanely great (or just insane) new mothership. Wired. https://www.wired.com/2017/05/apple-park-new-silicon-valley-campus/
Levy A (2019) Salesforce’s Marc Benioff unplugged for two weeks, and had a revelation that could change the tech industry. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/30/salesforce-marc-benioff-talks-tech-ethics-time-magazine-and-vacation.html
Litman J (2002) War stories. Cardozo Arts Entertain Law J 20:337–365
Lobel O (2013) Talent wants to be free: why we should learn to love leaks, raids, and free riding. Yale University Press, New Haven
Lobel O (2016) The law of the platform. Minn Law Rev 101:87–166
MacMillan D (2016) Uber raises $3.5 billion from Saudi Fund. Wall Street J. http://www.wsj.com/articles/uberraises-3-5-billion-from-saudi-fund-1464816529
Mancuso K (2019) The rise of electric scooter regulations. Regul Rev. https://www.theregreview.org/2019/01/03/mancuso-electric-scooter-regulations/
Marian O (2017) The state administration of international tax avoidance. Harv Bus Law Rev 7:1–65
McNamee R (2019) Zucked: waking up to the Facebook catastrophe. Penguin Press, New York
Melé D, Armengou J (2016) Moral legitimacy in controversial projects and its relationship with social license to operate: a case study. J Bus Eth 136:729–742
Moon WJ (2019) Regulating offshore finance. Vanderbilt Law Rev 72:1–54
Murgia M (2017) Amazon primed for UK expansion with AI and drones. Fin Times. https://www.ft.com/content/8d045294-2c2c-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7
O’Hara EA, Ribstein LE (2009) The law market. Oxford University Press, New York
O’Sullivan A (2018) The good and the bad of FAA reauthorization: drone policy. Mercatus Center. https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/good-and-bad-faa-reauthorization-drone-policy
Oei SY (2018) The trouble with gig talk: choice of narrative and the worker classification fights. Law Contemp Probl 81:107–136
Osnos E (2018) How much trust can Facebook afford to lose?. New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-much-trust-can-facebook-afford-to-lose
Partnoy F (1997) Financial derivatives and the costs of regulatory arbitrage. J Corp Law 22:211–256
Partnoy F (2019) The law of two prices: regulatory arbitrage, revisited. Georget Law J 107:1017–1043
Pollman E (2019a) Quasi governments and inchoate law: Berle’s vision of limits on corporate power. Seattle Univ Law Rev 42:617–639
Pollman E (2019b) The rise of regulatory affairs in innovative startups. In: Smith DG, Hurt C, Broughman B (eds) The Cambridge handbook on law and entrepreneurship in the United States. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (forthcoming)
Pollman E (2019c) Startup governance. Univ Pa Law Rev (forthcoming)
Pollman E, Barry JM (2017) Regulatory entrepreneurship. South Calif Law Rev 90:383–448
Porter ME (1998) Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harv Bus Rev. https://hbr.org/1998/11/clusters-and-the-new-economics-of-competition
Prassl J (2018) Humans as a service: the promise and perils of work in the gig economy. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Ram A, Kazmin A (2017) Uber’s Indian drivers strike for fourth day over earnings squeeze. Fin Times. https://www.ft.com/content/9653ace2-f1d9-11e6-8758-6876151821a6
Rawson C (2012) Why Apple’s products are ‘Designed in California’ but ‘Assembled in China’. Engadget. https://www.engadget.com/2012/01/22/why-apples-products-are-designed-in-california-but-assembled/
Reints R (2018) Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff lashes out at San Francisco Billionaires ‘Hoarding’ Their Money. Fortune. http://fortune.com/2018/10/17/marc-benioff-proposition-c-homelessness/
Riles A (2014) Managing regulatory arbitrage: a conflict of laws approach. Cornell Int Law J 47:63–119
Rodrigues DB, Schleicher D (2012) The location market. George Mason Law Rev 19:637–664
Sale HA (2011) The new ‘public’ corporation. Law Contemp Probl 74:137–148
Sale HA (2013) Public governance. Geo Wash Law Rev 81:1012–1035
Sale HA (2019) Social license and publicness. Georgetown University Law Center working paper. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3403706. Accessed 19 July 2019
Satariano A (2018) Uber regains its license to operate in London, a win for its new C.E.O. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/technology/uber-london.html
Schragger RC (2009) Mobile capital, economic regulation, and the democratic city. Harv Law Rev 123:482–540
Schumpeter J (1942) Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Harper Perennial, New York
Sherman L (2017) Why can’t Uber make money?. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2017/12/14/why-cant-uber-make-money/#1253265910ec
Shleifer A, Vishny RW (1997) The limits of arbitrage. J Fin 52(1):35–55
Siddiqui F (2017) Uber triggers protest for collecting fares during taxi strike against refugee ban. Wash Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/01/29/uber-triggers-protest-for-not-supporting-taxi-strike-against-refugee-ban/?utm_term=.7b5c4832b00e
Somerville H (2018) Study finds Uber’s growth slows after year of scandal; Lyft benefits. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-growth/study-finds-ubers-growth-slows-after-year-of-scandal-lyft-benefits-idUSKCN1IF31A
Sorkin AR (2018) BlackRock’s message: contribute to society, or risk losing our support. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/business/dealbook/blackrock-laurence-fink-letter.html
Stemler A (2017) Myth of the sharing economy and its implications for regulating innovation. Emory Law J 67:197–241
Stone B (2017) The $99 Billion Idea. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-uber-airbnb-99-billion-idea/
Streitfeld D (2018) Was Amazon’s headquarters contest a bait-and-switch? Critics say yes. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/amazon-hq2-long-island-city-virginia.html
Synced (2018) Global survey of autonomous vehicle regulations. Medium. https://medium.com/syncedreview/global-survey-of-autonomous-vehicle-regulations-6b8608f205f9
Talley EL (2015) Corporate inversions and the unbundling of regulatory competition. Va Law Rev 101:1649–1748
Thierer A (2016) Permissionless innovation: the continuing case for comprehensive technological freedom. Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington
Tomassetti J (2016) Does Uber redefine the firm? The postindustrial corporation and advanced information technology. Hofstra Labor Employ Law J 34:1–78
Tusk B (2018) The fixer: my adventures saving startups from death by politics. Penguin Random House, New York
Van Loo R (2018) Making innovation more competitive: the case of fintech. UCLA Law Rev 65:232–279
Volpicelli G (2018) Uber’s London licence has been approved but there’s a big catch. Wired. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uber-london-licence-tfl-verdict
Weadon BM (2012) International regulatory arbitrage resulting from Dodd–Frank derivatives regulation. NC Bank Inst 16:249–272
Weise K et al (2019) Amazon’s hard bargain extends far beyond New York. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/technology/amazon-new-york-politics-jobs.html?action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage
Wilburn KM, Wilburn R (2011) Achieving social license to operate using stakeholder theory. J Int Bus Eth 4(2):3–16
Wolfe J, Levine AS (2018) New York today: capping Uber. NY Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/nyregion/new-york-today-sunglasses-eye-safety.html
Wu T (2003) When code isn’t law. Va Law Rev 89:679–751
Wu T (2017) Strategic law avoidance using the internet: a short history. South Calif Law Rev Postscript 90:7–20
Wu T (2018) The curse of bigness: antitrust in the new gilded age. Columbia Global Reports, New York
Zetlin M (2018) Here’s what Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff would do if he were president—even though he’s not running. Inc. https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/marc-benioff-salesforce-ceo-us-president-msnbc-kara-swisher-interview.html
Zuboff S (2019) The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. Hachette Book Group, New York
For helpful conversations and comments, thanks to Jordan Barry, Vic Fleischer, Kristelia García, Frank Partnoy, Christine Riefa, Arad Reisberg, Hillary Sale, Adam Thierer, and the participants of the Third Annual Oxford Business Law Blog Conference at the University of Oxford. Special thanks to Luca Enriques for excellent discussion and suggestions.
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
About this article
Cite this article
Pollman, E. Tech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 20, 567–590 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-019-00155-x
- Regulatory arbitrage
- Social license
- Social contract
- Social responsibility
- Innovation cluster
- Regulatory entrepreneurship