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The Banking Union and National Authorities 2 years down the Line—Some Observations from Germany

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Abstract

With the institutional setting for the Banking Union having been established and become fully operational, market participants, supervisory staff, and academics are gradually getting to terms with the reality of the new two-tier system of supervisory and resolution authorities within the Eurozone. Drawing from media coverage, input from practitioners and the on-going academic debate, the present article seeks to present an—inevitably provisional—assessment of the new regime from a German perspective. While regulatees and their advisers within the country appear to have got used to the new reality, the paper also identifies a number of residual concerns, some of which are attributable to the specific characteristics of the German financial sector, others indicative of broader problems.

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Notes

  1. E.g. (in German), Geber (2013); Kämmerer (2013); Kämmerer and Starski (2013); Lehmann and Manger-Nestler (2014); Ohler (2014); Peters (2014); Ruthig (2014); Tröger (2013); Waldhoff and Dieterich (2013); Zimmer et al. (2014); see also (in English but presenting a German perspective) Schneider (2013). And cf., for a highly critical assessment in the economic literature, Kerber (2014). For a detailed review of both the German and international literature on the Banking Union project, cf. Binder (2013), reprinted in an updated version (2014).

  2. But see (discussing problems of legal redress against decisions of the ECB and the SRB) Kämmerer (2016); and see (presenting the results of an empirical study of the views on the Banking Union held among public-sector Sparkassen) Gischer and Walther (2015).

  3. Cf., e.g., European Central Bank (2016b), pp. 30-46 (discussing the on-going implementation of the ‘SSM model of supervision’); see also, European Central Bank (2016a), setting out the work programme for further development through 2016.

  4. Cf., e.g. (reporting concerns among German market participants with regard to the assumptions underlying the banking stress tests conducted under the auspices of the European Banking Authority and the European Central Bank), Markus Frühauf, ‘Wachsende Zweifel an Banken-Stresstests’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 July 2016, No. 165, p. 19.

  5. E.g., Markus Frühauf, ‘Das Dilemma der EZB-Bankenaufsicht’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 July 2016, No. 159, p. 17; Michael Heise, ‘Ein Stresstest für die Banken’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 July 2016, No. 171, p. 16.

  6. E.g., Markus Frühauf, ‘EZB: Die Aufsichtsräte der Banken sind zu lasch’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 June 2016, No. 145, p. 31.

  7. Cf., e.g. (reporting on policy statements by the business associations of private banks, public savings banks, and cooperative banks, respectively), Markus Frühauf and Philipp Krohn, ‘Finanzhäuser attackieren die Europäische Zentralbank’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 April 2016, No. 85, p. 23.

  8. E.g., Steffen (2016), pp. 92 and 94.

  9. See, again, Gischer and Walther (2015) (reflecting wide-spread concerns among representatives of public-sector Sparkassen); and cf. Markus Frühauf, ‘Kollateralschäden der Bankenaufsicht’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 November 2016, No. 270, p. 19 (reporting on a massive wave of consolidation involving large numbers of German cooperative banks, and on corresponding lobbying initiatives to reduce the regulatory burden of smaller banking institutions within the country).

  10. Steffen (2016), pp. 92 and 94.

  11. European Central Bank (2016b), p. 9.

  12. E.g., Steffen (2016), pp. 94–95, citing unidentified market participants. Also cf. Meissner (2016) (discussing the relevance of the SREP for the implementation of the Banking Union generally); Schuster and Pitz (2016) (reviewing critically the ECB’s approach to the calculation of SREP capital ratios so far).

  13. See, generally, Schoenmaker and Véron (2016).

  14. See General Court of the European Union, Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg Förderbank v. European Central Bank (16 May 2017). In that case, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg Förderbank (‘L-Bank’) challenged the ECB’s decision to assume full supervisory responsibility with regard to L-Bank pursuant to Art. 6(4) and Art. 24(7) of Council Regulation (EU) 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institution [2013] OJ L 287, p. 63 (‘SSM Reg’). The bank itself had argued that it was a less significant institution within the meaning of Art. 6(4) SSM Reg and thereby did not qualify for direct ECB supervision, which the ECB refused to recognise. The Court confirmed the ECB’s decision.

  15. European Central Bank (2016b), p. 12: approx. 1,500 decisions taken in 2015, including a total of 921 authorisation procedures, 213 decisions in the context of the SREP, and 137 own funds decisions, addressed to 123 significant banking groups and the (potential) acquirers of SSM banks, of which 34 communicate in a language other than English. See also, ibid., pp. 53–54, for a more detailed discussion of enforcement actions and sanctions (albeit, again, without country-specific information).

  16. This, again, seems to be a finding not confined to Germany, cf. Schoenmaker and Véron (2016), pp. 38–43.

  17. On the role of JSTs, see, generally European Central Bank (2014), pp. 16–17; see also European Central Bank (2015), pp. 34–37.

  18. E.g., Steffen (2016), pp. 91–92: ‘The JST for Deutsche Bank […] comprises almost 70 individuals of at least 12 nationalities. Almost 40 of the JST members are German and work for BaFin and the Bundesbank; the rest are from countries in which Deutsche Bank has significant branches or are ECB employees’.

  19. Cf. the definition of ‘credit institutions’ in Art. 4(1)(1) of Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 [2013] OJ L 176, p. 1 (hereafter: the ‘CRR’, for Capital Requirements Regulation).

  20. Which qualify as ‘banking business’ pursuant to section 1(1), sentence 2, nos. 1 and 2, respectively. See, generally (in German), Binder (2017a), paras. 8 et seq.

  21. Ibid., no. 8.

  22. Ibid., no. 4.

  23. Ibid., no. 10.

  24. Ibid., no. 12.

  25. Binder (2017a).

  26. E.g., with the Law for the Protection of Retail Investors (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) of 3 July 2015, Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1114.

  27. See, for details, BaFin’s website at www.bafin.de, sub ‘Consumer’.

  28. Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC [2013] OJ L 176, p. 338 (hereafter: the ‘CRD IV’, for Capital Requirement Directive).

  29. Supra n. 19.

  30. Cf. Art. 4(1)(d) and 4(3) SSM Reg.

  31. See, Arner and Lin (2003), e.g. (discussing the various policy options available).

  32. From a German perspective, the model of a single authority responsible for the cross-sectoral supervision of financial intermediaries and markets has been the concept of choice since the 2000s, following the merger of the previous supervisory authorities for banks, securities markets, and insurance companies on 1 May 2002. It should be noted that the decision to create a single supervisory authority mirrored the global trend towards single supervisors at the time, and in particular the creation of the Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom, where prudential supervision has since been reallocated to the Bank of England. On the contemporary debate in Germany and its international background, see Binder (2003).

  33. For further discussion, see Binder (2017c).

  34. E.g., Grundmann (2015), pp. 367-379; commented on by Hadjiemmanuil (2015), pp. 383 et seq.

  35. Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 60, p. 34.

  36. See, generally, e.g., Josipović (2014); Mak (2015), and, for a German perspective, Binder (2017b).

  37. I.e., ‘private’ banks incorporated as companies or partnerships, ‘public’ savings banks and Landesbanks owned by local councils or federal states, and cooperate banks.

  38. For an introduction to the system and its legal and economic foundations, see, e.g., Behr and Schmidt (2015). See also Hüfner (2010).

  39. European Central Bank (2016b), p. 5.

  40. Regulation (EU) 2016/445 of the European Central Bank of 14 March 2016 on the exercise of options and discretions available in Union law (ECB/2016/4) [2016] OJ L 78, p. 60.

  41. European Central Bank (2016c); see also European Central Bank (2016d).

  42. European Central Bank (2016b), p. 15.

  43. Cf., e.g., European Central Bank (2016b), p. 32: ‘extensive peer comparisons and transversal analyses’ between SSM banks as part of the SREP activities in 2015. But see also ibid., p. 33, acknowledging that ‘The banking landscape under the SSM’s responsibility varies; compared with other jurisdictions, the SSM covers a much larger set of diverse institutions in different countries with still partly heterogeneous legal systems. The SSM methodology will therefore continue to evolve whenever necessary.’ For a detailed discussion of the SREP implementation in the Banking Union, see, again, Meissner (2016).

  44. For further discussion, see Binder (2015), pp. 486–487.

  45. Cf. European Central Bank (2016b), p. 15.

  46. For a detailed discussion of the relevant problems, see, e.g., Mülbert and Wilhelm (2015), paras. 6.38-6.47.

  47. See Steffen (2016), pp. 95–96.

  48. Ibid.

  49. Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms… [2014] OJ L 173, p. 190 (‘BRRD’).

  50. Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 [2014] OJ L 225, p. 1 (‘SRM Reg’).

  51. See European Central Bank (2016b), pp. 27–28; Single Resolution Board (2016), pp. 13–14.

  52. See also Single Resolution Board (2016), p. 19.

  53. See, e.g., Binder (2015), p. 483; Binder (2016b); Binder (2016c); Singh (2016); de Serière (2015).

  54. See, e.g., Gardella (2015a), paras. 11.42 and 11.43; Wojcik (2016), pp. 113–115.

  55. Financial Stability Board (2015). See Hüpkes (2015); Wojcik (2016), pp. 115–116.

  56. See, in particular, Art. 7 SRM Reg (on the division of powers within the SRM), Art. 18 SRM Reg (on the resolution procedure), Art. 23 SRM Reg (on the ‘resolution scheme’ to be adopted by the SRB and to be executed by national authorities), Art. 29 (implementation of decisions), Arts. 30 and 31 (general requirements regarding cooperation and information exchange).

  57. See, generally, Jens-Hinrich Binder (2016) Systemic Bank Crises—Is ‘Bank Resolution’ the Answer?’, Working Paper (discussing the suitability of BRRD-based resolution approaches in the context of systemic crises against the backdrop of the current banking problems in Italy). A short version of that paper has been published (in German) as J.H. Binder, ‘Systemkrisenbewältigung durch Bankenabwicklung?’, Börsen-Zeitung, 12 July 2016, p. 4.

  58. Cf. Arts. 56, 57 and 37(10)(a) BRRD.

  59. Binder, supra n. 57.

  60. For a critical discussion of the bail-in tool in this regard, cf. Binder (2016a), para. 2.60.

  61. See also Gardella (2015b), pp. 210–213.

  62. Cf. Arts. 15-18 BRRD and, correspondingly, Art. 10 SRM Reg. And see further the sources cited supra, n. 54.

  63. For further discussion, see Binder (2016d).

  64. See, again, references supra n. 54.

  65. Cf. Binder (2016d), at p. 589.

  66. Cf., Götz and Tröger (2016), for a valuable discussion of problems and potential remedies.

  67. See, e.g., Gardella (2015b), pp. 220–221; Hüpkes (2015), pp. 203-204; Wojcik (2016), pp. 135–137.

  68. Cf. Art. 7(2), 18 and 23 SRM Reg.

  69. See, respectively, Landgericht (Higher Regional Court) of Munich I, decision of 8 May 2015 (case 32 O 26502/12), reported in BeckOnline Database (file BeckRS 32 O 26502/12), and Goldman Sachs International v. Novo Banco S.A. [2015] EWHC 2371 (Comm.). See also Binder (2016d), at pp. 590-597, for an in-depth discussion of the residual problems for the cross-border coordination and recognition of bank resolution measures under the BRRD and the SRM Regulation.

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  1. Department of Private Law, Commercial Law, Corporate and Securities Law, Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

    Jens-Hinrich Binder

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The present paper was prepared for the ADEMU workshop ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism—Experience from the First Years of an Interplay with National Banking Supervision’ at the European University Institute, Florence, on 11 October 2016. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments by Chryssa Papathanassiou, Edouard Fernandez-Bollo, Raffaele D’Ambrosio, Stefan Grundmann, Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, as well as insightful input from numerous conversations with practitioners from banking institutions, law firms, and supervisory authorities. Later developments in supervisory and resolution practice, in particular the successful resolution of the spanish Lender Banco Popular, are not addressed, since they did not involve German banking institutions.

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Binder, JH. The Banking Union and National Authorities 2 years down the Line—Some Observations from Germany. Eur Bus Org Law Rev 18, 401–420 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-017-0076-0

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