Hague Journal on the Rule of Law

, Volume 11, Issue 1, pp 171–188 | Cite as

The Possibility and Desirability of Rule of Law Conditionality

  • Gábor HalmaiEmail author


The paper claims that during the fight over the compliance with the core values of the EU pronounced in Article 2 TEU with backsliding Member States the EU institutions using both the traditional mechanism (infringement procedures and Article 7), and the newly established Rule of Law Framework have proven incapable of enforcing compliance, which considerably undermined not only the legitimacy of the Commission, but also that of the entire rule of law oversight. Hence, new means of value conditionality should also be activated, such as cutting funds for member states that do not comply with certain basic institutional requirements of the rule of law. As the paper argues, this is possible through implementing the Common Provision Regulation, and can be carried out on a case-by-case basis. Putting conditionality into the Multiannual Financial Framework after the 2020 budget period is another potential avenue to enforce compliance with joint values.


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Press 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of LawEuropean University InstituteFlorenceItaly

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