Abstract
Xunzi was chronologically third of the three great Confucian philosophers of the classical period, following Confucius and Mencius. I have elsewhere argued for a constructivist, as opposed to a realist, interpretation of Xunzi’s philosophy. On the constructivist account, sages and exemplary persons are responsible for the contingent social artifice that characterize the way. Unlike realism, according to which there is just one right way, constructivism is compatible with pluralism. This article responds to the work of Aaron Stalnaker, specifically his critique of the constructivist account as it pertains to the concept li 理 (pattern). Stalnaker appeals to Xunzi’s use of the phrase “dali” 大理, which he translates “the Great Pattern.” Stalnaker also emphasizes certain passages that he believes suggest a realist interpretation of Xunzi. I explain why this issue is fundamentally about whether or not Xunzi’s view presupposes transcendence, and then I explain why neither the passages Stalnaker emphasizes nor Xunzi’s use of the phrase dali strongly suggest a transcendent realism. Finally, I highlight other passages that tend to suggest a constructivist interpretation. While a decisive conclusion cannot be drawn, I argue that, on the whole, the constructivist account appears to provide the more consistent interpretation of Xunzi’s worldview.
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Notes
To a lesser degree, I also challenged claims made by A.C. Graham, David Nivison, Henri Maspero, Chad Hansen, Paul Goldin, and John Knoblock. More recently, Kim-chong Chong also articulated a metaphysical realist interpretation of Xunzi’s view of li. He writes, “Ritual principles are part of this metaphysical order that can be discerned through an investigation of its inherent rationale or li 理” (2007, p. 92). On the other hand, I find general support for my constructivist position in the work of Roger Ames, David Hall, and Henry Rosemont, as well as A. S. Cua, Lee Yearley, and Robert Cummings Neville to name just those writing in English.
Stalnaker views “Xunzi as a moral universalist committed to the unique power and rightness of the Confucian Way in all its specificity” (2002, p. 296). The word “rightness” (not to mention the word “unique”) suggests a “one-right-answer” worldview.
For example, Xunzi writes, “[Master Song] made alterations to [the concepts of honor and disgrace] with a single morning’s deliberation. His theory will certainly not work in practice. This is analogous to using mud balls to dam up a large river or sea. It is like using the Jiao pygmies to support Mount Tai. In no time they will stumble and fall and it will break into pieces” (ICS: 18/89/7; K: 18.9). “ICS:” refers to the Institute of Chinese Studies’ A Concordance to the Xunzi, Lau and Chen 1996, and “K:” refers to section numbers in John Knoblock’s (1988-1994) translation of the Xunzi. These same section numbers are also used in Hagen and Coutinho (2018). Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.
In more recent work Stalnaker reaffirms his view that Xunzi believes in a “Great Pattern” that “underlies all reality, natural and social, and is the ultimate justification for the rightness of the Confucian Way” (2006, p. 82 n27).
In my earlier paper, I emphasized li as an activity. I wrote, “Li involves the highlighting of patterns. Li is li-ing, that is, patterning, highlighting particular aspects of a subject matter for some purpose” (Hagen 2001, p. 192). For example, Xunzi asks, “Which is better, contemplating things as if they were given, or patterning (li) them so as not to miss their potential?” (ICS: 17/82/16–17; K: 17.10). Clearly, Xunzi favors the latter. Cf. A. C. Graham’s translation of another passage: “‘[M]usic’ is the unalterable in harmonising, ‘ceremony’ is the irreplaceable in patterning” (1989, 261; ICS: 20/100/14; K: 20.3).
As Hall and Ames describe it, “[I]n its earliest occurrence, li conjures up the image of ‘dividing up land into cultivated fields in a way consistent with the natural topography.’ [Book of Songs 210]” (1995, pp. 212–13; emphasis in original).
Indeed, some have argued that early Chinese philosophy generally avoids common Western dualism. But that claim is far too general to defend here.
“[C]onstructivism allows conceptual room for pluralism, as well as progress without teleology. While some ways of organizing social constructs are more conducive to forming a harmonious society than others, conceptually ordering our world is an ongoing process that has no final and perfect articulation” (Hagen 2001, p. 183).
Note that Hall and Ames’ have suggested that there is a fundamental conflict between transcendence and pluralism: “[T]he appeal to transcendence itself seems in large measure to be grounded in attempts to meet the challenge of pluralism of beliefs and practices by recourse to objective, unassailable norms” (1998, p. 189).
Stalnaker then cites a passage near the beginning of Xunzi’s “Dispelling Obsessions” chapter (ICS: 21/102/5–6; K: 21.1), which involves dali, “the Great Pattern,” and which I will address in the section on that topic.
Knoblock renders the first part of the passage as follows: “If what the mind permits coincides with reason [li]…” (K: 22.5a).
Similarly, Stalnaker elsewhere writes, “[J]udgments can correctly target the ‘Great Pattern’ underlying the incipient order in both natural and human realms, or they can miss it partially or completely” (Stalnaker 2006, p. 75).
Note that this passage follows immediately after the passage involving “dang li” discussed, below.
The word “reason,” as John Knoblock uses it in this context, is akin to “natural order” and “the rational basis of all order” (1988, p. 80). It smacks of “Reason” with a capital “R,” of a univocal rationality. On my interpretation, li is more akin to “reasonableness” then “Reason.” Yang Liang, in his ninth century commentary on Xunzi, at one point glosses li as heyi, appropriate or suitable (理謂合宜) (Yang 1996, p. 197). As to whether it is internal or external, I would say that there is an external element and an internal element. This is why sometimes Xunzi talks as though it was external (ICS: 26/125/10: K: 26.5), and other times as though it was internal (ICS: 23/113/5; K: 23.1a).
More literally, jue 決 means to “open a passage for and lead forth a stream” (Karlgren 1957, p.93).
Another example of this is the relation between ritual propriety and character: “Ritual propriety is that by which one’s person (shen 身) is attuned (zheng 正). A teacher is the means by which ritual propriety is attuned” (ICS: 2/8/1; K: 2.11).
The text has been amended: dang li has been substituted for zhi dang. If the amendment is a mistake, then Stalnaker’s point disappears, as the character li would disappear from the passage. Nevertheless, I will assume that the text as amended is correct.
This is an issue too large to be addressed here. However, if my analysis in The Philosophy of Xunzi is on target then it does jell well with other parts of the text. Below are a few relevant passages:
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“How are we able to put social divisions into practice? I say it is yi (a sense of appropriateness). If yi is used in forming divisions then there will be harmony.” (ICS: 9/39/11; K: 9.16a).
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“The myriad things … lack an intrinsically appropriate articulation, but have a use for people. This refers to the art-of-discriminating-regular-patterns (shu 數).”
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A tradition says: “Order is produced by exemplary people.” (ICS: 9/35/20; K: 9.2; and ICS: 14/66/26; K: 14.2). (Order, zhi, is commonly paired with li.).
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“Constructs constitute the flow of order, but they are not its wellspring. Exemplary people are the wellspring of order.” (ICS: 12/57/14–15; K: 12.2).
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Mikiso Hane, in his translation of Maruyama Masao’s Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan, notes: “Sorai’s term sakui means, as a concrete noun, something like ‘artifact.’ However, it does not have the pejorative connotations that the adjectival form ‘artificial’ has attained in English. It is therefore often translated as ‘creation.’ But in both its religious and aesthetic uses, ‘creation’ has implications of spontaneity and naturalness that make it impossible to oppose it to ‘nature’ as Sorai and Professor Maruyama do. Hence, I have chosen ‘invention’ (and its adjectival forms, compounds and so on). The reader should bear in mind, however, that sakui certainly does not mean ‘thinking up’ an institution, as ‘invention’ can in English; it definitely implies constructing, putting into practice” (Maruyama 1974, pp. 191–192 n3).
While Stalnaker reads this as about the past ten thousand generations, I read it as looking forward for ten thousand generations. From the grammar of the passage, either reading seems equally plausible. But the forward-looking reading is preferable since Xunzi did not think that the norms that govern the five relations had been in effect from such a distant time past. He viewed these things as products of ancient sages—but not that ancient.
The passage asserts that people who fail to even distinguish between the small and the large surely “cannot reach the level of [those who understand, or contribute to] significant patterns (dali) of the world” (ICS: 18/87/5; K: 18.5c).
The passage continues: “If these are mastered, there will be a revival of the classics (復經). If there is doubt about two [conflicting views], then there will be confusion. There are not two ways [i.e. holistic guiding discourses] in the world; a sage is never of two minds [cf. K: 14.7 & K: 1.6]. Now, the feudal lords have different governments, and the hundred schools have different theories. Certainly some are affirmed, and some are rejected; some are well governed, some in chaos” (ICS: 21/102/5; K: 21.1; see Stalnaker 2004, p. 65).
Xunzi does use the word “foundation” (ji 基), but it would be a mistake to read Western foundationalism into it. One can express the idea that “A rests on B, and B, in turn, rest on A” using the language of “foundation,” but the idea is clearly not foundationalism. For example, a poem begins “Let me lay a foundation…” (ICS: 25/120/3–4; K: 25.1). Clearly, the foundation is not “given” but depends upon the one laying it. Or again, “A foundation must be established” (ICS: 25/120/12–13; K: 25.13) or “Let us shepherd a foundation” (ICS: 25/120/12; K: 25.11). As Knoblock notes, Yang Liang interprets “shepherd” here to mean “to put in order.” If people put a foundation into order, then the foundation is not foundational in the foundationalist sense.
This translation is interpretive, of necessity, for the meaning of the original Chinese text is less than perfectly clear. To avoid misunderstanding, I would like to be explicit about what I am not arguing. I am not saying, “The text clearly says, ‘Weaving norms into the world…’ so Stalnaker’s interpretation must be wrong.” I am merely arguing that, given the plausibility of the reading I have given the passage, the passage does not constitute clear evidence for Stalnaker’s claim that dali should be understood as an antecedently fixed “Great Pattern.” Rather, it can be plausibly read as suggestive of a constructivist worldview.
Cf. John Knoblock’s translation: “By laying out the warp and woof of Heaven and Earth, he tailors the functions of the myriad things. By regulating and distinguishing according to the Great Ordering Principle, he encompasses everything in space and time.” (K: 21.5e). Here Knoblock provides constructivist renderings for the first couple clauses, but when it comes to the “Great Ordering Principle” (dali) he seems to treat it in a realist manner. There is nothing in the text to indicate that this is the more appropriate reading of it. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the language that even Knoblock himself uses in the preceding sentence.
In a footnote Stalnaker comments, “It is difficult to avoid seeing Zhuangzi’s story of Cook Ding, the splendidly skillful butcher who cuts oxen by going along with ‘Heaven’s pattern’ in them, behind this discussion of the Xunzian sage ‘cutting’ the ‘Great Pattern’ into the cosmos” (2004, p. 60 n21). Is Xunzi’s sage to be seen as cutting the Great Pattern into the cosmos? That doesn’t sound like a realist interpretation. On the other hand, if Cook Ding is just going along with “Heaven’s pattern,” which is antecedently existing and determinate, are we to read Zhuangzi as a realist as well?
Why does Stalnaker put the word “order” in quotation marks here? Perhaps it is an acknowledgement that this kind of “ordering” isn’t really ordering at all.
The other side of the mutual influence between yi and li is expressed succinctly: “Those with a sense-of-appropriateness (yi) follow constructive-patterns (li)” (ICS: 15/71/21; K: 15.2).
Yan 焉, “from it,” could mean “from the world,” but in the same paragraph it is used several times more clearly meaning “from people,” suggesting that liyi and wen li reside in people. They are internal—though not naturally so. They have been internalized through habituation. A little later in the same chapter Xunzi explains: “What resides in people that they are capable of through learning and can accomplish through work is called wei 偽 (artifice/acquired-character)” (ICS: 23/113/19; K: 23.1c).
The process by which something becomes tradition is not strictly top down. Xunzi’s discussion of names, for instance, suggests that terms only become “appropriate” after people have accepted them. Xunzi writes, “Terms have no intrinsic appropriateness (名無固宜). They are arranged by decree. Arrangements that are settled upon to the point of becoming customary are called appropriate. If something differs from the arrangement, then it is called inappropriate. Terms do not have intrinsic actual objects. By arranging the objects, we thereby name them. If the arrangement has become fixed and has succeeded in becoming customary, the term may be called the object’s name” (ICS: 22/109/10–11; K: 22.2 g). This passage provides another example of how a constructivist interpretation of li (patterns) fits well with other aspects of Xunzi’s philosophy, namely, with zhengming (proper terminology). One can imagine a similar ratification process in which exemplary ritualized conduct that catches on and becomes normative tradition, and with “patterns” more generally.
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Hagen, K. Xunzi and the “Great Pattern”. Int. Commun. Chin. Cult 8, 193–211 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-021-00221-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40636-021-00221-5