Cyber-Physical Resilience of Electrical Power Systems Against Malicious Attacks: a Review
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Purpose of Review
In this paper, we study the literature on cyber-physical security of electrical power systems. The paper is intended to address the security strengths and weaknesses of the electrical power systems against malicious attacks.
The concept of holistic resilience cycle (HRC) is introduced to improve cyber-physical security of electrical power systems. HRC is a systematic view to the security of the power systems, characterized by its four stages as closely interconnected and explicable only by reference to the whole. HRC includes four stages of prevention and planning, detection, mitigation and response, and system recovery.
Power systems are evolving from traditional settings towards more autonomous and smart grids. Cyber-physical security is critical for the safe and secure operations of the power systems. To achieve a higher security level for power systems, the research community should follow a systematic approach and consider all stages of the holistic resilience cycle in addressing security problems of the power systems.
KeywordsCyber-physical security Holistic resilience cycle Cyber attacks Physical attacks False data intrusion attacks Internet of things
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.
Human and Animal Rights and Informed Consent
This article does not contain any studies with human or animal subjects performed by any of the authors.
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