Cyber-Physical Resilience of Electrical Power Systems Against Malicious Attacks: a Review

  • Sarmad Mehrdad
  • Seyedamirabbas MousavianEmail author
  • Golshan Madraki
  • Yury Dvorkin
Energy Markets (R Sioshansi and S Mousavian, Section Editors)
Part of the following topical collections:
  1. Topical Collection on Energy Markets


Purpose of Review

In this paper, we study the literature on cyber-physical security of electrical power systems. The paper is intended to address the security strengths and weaknesses of the electrical power systems against malicious attacks.

Recent Findings

The concept of holistic resilience cycle (HRC) is introduced to improve cyber-physical security of electrical power systems. HRC is a systematic view to the security of the power systems, characterized by its four stages as closely interconnected and explicable only by reference to the whole. HRC includes four stages of prevention and planning, detection, mitigation and response, and system recovery.


Power systems are evolving from traditional settings towards more autonomous and smart grids. Cyber-physical security is critical for the safe and secure operations of the power systems. To achieve a higher security level for power systems, the research community should follow a systematic approach and consider all stages of the holistic resilience cycle in addressing security problems of the power systems.


Cyber-physical security Holistic resilience cycle Cyber attacks Physical attacks False data intrusion attacks Internet of things 


Compliance with Ethical Standards

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Human and Animal Rights and Informed Consent

This article does not contain any studies with human or animal subjects performed by any of the authors.


People of particular interest, published recently, have been highlighted as: • Of importance •• Of major importance

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sarmad Mehrdad
    • 1
  • Seyedamirabbas Mousavian
    • 2
    Email author
  • Golshan Madraki
    • 2
  • Yury Dvorkin
    • 3
  1. 1.Mechanical and Aeronautical Engineering DepartmentClarkson UniversityPotsdamUSA
  2. 2.David D. Reh School of BusinessClarkson UniversityPotsdamUSA
  3. 3.Electrical and Computer EngineeringNYU Tandon School of EngineeringBrooklynUSA

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