Abstract
We study the long-run dynamics of a repeated non-symmetric hawk–dove type interaction between agents of two different populations. Agents choose a strategy based on their previous experience with the other population by sampling from a collective memory of past interactions. We assume that the sample size differs between populations and define a measure of harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove interaction. We then show how the properties of the long-run equilibrium depend on the harshness of conflict and the relative length of the sample. In symmetric interactions, if conflict is harsh, the population which samples relatively more past interactions is able to appropriate a higher payoff in the long-run, while the population with a relatively smaller sample does so if conflict is mild. These results hold subject to constraints on the sample size which we discuss in detail. We further extend our results to non-symmetric hawk–dove games.
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Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) through the PRIN project Co.S.Mo.Pro.Be. “Cognition, Social Motives and Prosocial Behavior” (grant n. 20178293XT) and from the IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca through the PAI project Pro.Co.P.E. “Prosociality, Cognition, and Peer Effects”.
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E.B., L.B., S.I., and E.V. contributed equally to setting the model and developing theoretical results, as well as to writing the paper.
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Bilancini, E., Boncinelli, L., Ille, S. et al. Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the hawk–dove game. Econ Theory Bull 10, 333–351 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00237-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-022-00237-z