Abstract
This paper incorporates fairness constraints into the classic single-unit reduced-form implementation problem (Border in Econometrica, 59(4):1175–1187, 1991, Econ Theory 31(1):167–181, 2007; Che et al. in Econometrica 81(6): 2487–2520, 2013; Manelli and Vincent in Econometrica, 78(6):1905–1938, 2010) with two agents. To do so, I use a new approach that utilizes the results from Kellerer (Math Ann 144(4):323–344, 1961) and Gutmann et al. (Ann Prob 19(4):1781–1797, 1991). Under realistic assumptions on the constraints, the conditions are transparent and can be verified in polynomial time.
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12 November 2021
A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00213-z
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I would especially like to thank Paata Ivanisvili for his advice on the proofs provided in this work. My thanks also go out to Igor Kopylov for providing useful discussions and comments and Stergios Skaperdas for his suggestions on this paper. Finally, I am grateful to the two anonymous referees and the editor, whose insightful suggestions greatly improved this work. Any errors that remain are my own.
The original online version of this article was revised due to few author corrections were missed by the production team. Now, they have been corrected.
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Yang, E. Reduced-form mechanism design and ex post fairness constraints. Econ Theory Bull 9, 269–293 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00211-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-021-00211-1