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Economic Theory Bulletin

, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp 55–62 | Cite as

Implementation with socially responsible agents

  • Makoto Hagiwara
  • Hirofumi Yamamura
  • Takehiko Yamato
Research Article
  • 246 Downloads

Abstract

We consider the implementation problem with socially responsible agents who want to report a socially desirable outcome to a mechanism designer. We design a simple and natural mechanism in which each agent reports an outcome. We show that if there are at least two socially responsible agents, then the mechanism implements any unanimous social choice correspondence in Nash equilibria with at least three agents.

Keywords

Social responsibility Nash implementation Outcome mechanism Common knowledge 

JEL Classification

C72 D71 D78 

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Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  • Makoto Hagiwara
    • 1
  • Hirofumi Yamamura
    • 2
  • Takehiko Yamato
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of EngineeringTokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Department of Law and Economics, School of EconomicsHokusei Gakuen UniversitySapporoJapan

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