Economic Theory Bulletin

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 125–136

Competing over a finite number of locations

Research Article

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-015-0068-6

Cite this article as:
Núñez, M. & Scarsini, M. Econ Theory Bull (2016) 4: 125. doi:10.1007/s40505-015-0068-6


We consider a Hotelling location game where retailers can choose one of a finite number of locations. Consumers have strict preferences over the possible available store locations and retailers aim to attract the maximum number of consumers. We prove that a pure strategy equilibrium exists if the number of retailers is large enough. Moreover, as the number of retailers grows large, in equilibrium the distribution of retailers over the locations converges to the distribution of consumers’ preferences.


Hotelling games Pure equilibria Large games Political competition 

JEL Classification

C72 D72 R30 R39 

Copyright information

© Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.THEMA (UMR CNRS 8184)Université de Cergy-Pontoise, UFR d’Economie et GestionCergy-Pontoise CedexFrance
  2. 2.Dipartimento di Economia e FinanzaLUISSRomeItaly

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