The International Sports Law Journal

, Volume 14, Issue 1–2, pp 128–137 | Cite as

Betting scandals and attenuated property rights: how betting-related match-fixing can be prevented in future

  • Helmut Dietl
  • Christian Weingärtner


Recently, a number of high-profile betting scandals have shocked European football. Such scandals threaten the integrity of the sport which is one of its major assets. Football officials have taken prominent measures to avoid further scandals. Unfortunately these counter-measures in place have not yet been successful. Additional or different measures seem to be necessary to protect the integrity of the sport. We introduce a new perspective and analyze the economic causes of betting scandals from a property rights perspective. In addition, we evaluate three different theoretical solution approaches and show that neither taxation nor regulation can effectively prevent further match-fixing scandals. An allocation of property rights seems to be the only promising approach for the football institutions. This solution, however, is only advantageous, if the property rights are legally defendable. Our paper provides the introduction to a highly relevant question in the field of law and sports management. It sets the basis for further analysis especially with regard to law research.


Property rights Attenuation Betting Scandal Match-fixing Corruption 



We thank the participants of the 16th Annual Conference of the “Arbeitskreis Sportökonomie e.V.” in Magglingen/Switzerland for their valuable comments. In addition we thank Prof. Maennig, Prof. Franck and Prof. Hoehn for their precious suggestions and comments.


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Copyright information

© T.M.C. Asser Instituut 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of BusinessUniversity of ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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