Abstract
We study the pricing game between competing retailers under various random coefficient attraction choice models. We characterize existence conditions and structure properties of the equilibrium. Moreover, we explore how the randomness and cost parameters affect the equilibrium prices and profits under multinomial logit (MNL), multiplicative competitive interaction (MCI) and linear attraction choice models. Specifically, with bounded randomness, for the MCI and linear attraction models, the randomness always reduces the retailer’s profit. However, for the MNL model, the effect of randomness depends on the product’s value gap. For high-end products (i.e., whose value gap is higher than a threshold), the randomness reduces the equilibrium profit, and vice versa. The results suggest high-end retailers in MNL markets exert more effort in disclosing their exact product performance to consumers. We also reveal the effects of randomness on retailers’ pricing decisions. These results help retailers in making product performance disclosure and pricing decisions.
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This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72001198 and Nos. 71991464/71991460), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. WK2040000027), the National Key R&D Program of China (Nos. 2020AAA0103804/ 2020AAA0103800), USTC (University of Science and Technology of China) Research Funds of the Double First-Class Initiative (No. YD2040002004), Collaborative Research Fund (No. C1143-20G), and General Research Fund (No. 115080/17).
Appendices
Appendix
1 Proof of Theorem 1
Since \(\frac{1}{Q_i(p_i, {\varvec{p}}_{-i})}\) is a convex function, we know that
Therefore, \(2Q_i (\partial Q_i/\partial p_i)^2-\partial ^2 Q_i/\partial p_i^2\geqslant 0\). Taking second-order derivative to \(R_{i}\) with respect to \(Q_i\), we have
The last inequality is due to the fact that \(Q_i\) is strictly decreasing in \(p_i\) hence \(\partial Q_i/\partial p_i<0\). From the second-order derivative, we see that \(R_{i}\) is concave in \(Q_i\). Combining with the monotone mapping between \(Q_i\) and \(p_i\) that is guaranteed by Assumption 1, we obtain that \(R_{i}\) is quasi-concave in \(p_i\). Finally, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is derived from the Debreu–Glicksberg–Fan Theorem.
2 Proof of Proposition 1
Condition 1 is
For Condition 3, we have
Then,
From the above results, we conclude that the two conditions each includes a non-empty set of functions that are not covered by the other condition.
3 Proof of Proposition 2
A sufficient condition for Condition 2 is the concavity of \(\frac{a_i(\alpha _i,p_i)}{a_0+\sum _{l=1}^{n}a_l(\alpha _l,p_l)}\) with respect to \(p_i\).
4 Proof of Proposition 3
Denote \(R_d\) as the profit function under the deterministic model, i.e.,
Then, taking first-order derivative to \(R_d\) with respect to p yields to
Therefore, since \(R_d\) is quasi-concave in p, \(p_d^*\) takes the value such that the first-order derivative equals to 0.
Analogously, \(p_r^*\) takes the value such that the first-order derivative of the profit function under the model with random coefficient equals to 0.
Our target is to compare \(p_r^*\) with \(p_d^*\). From the quasi-concavity of \(E_{\delta }R_d (\alpha +\delta ,p)\), we know that if \(E_{\delta } \frac{\partial R_d (\alpha +\delta ,p)}{\partial p} \big |_{p=p_d^*}>0\), then \(p_r^*>p_d^*\). And if \(E_{\delta } \frac{\partial R_d (\alpha +\delta ,p)}{\partial p} \big |_{p=p_d^*}<0\), then \(p_r^*<p_d^*\). Therefore, our target reduces to comparing \(E_{\delta } \frac{\partial R_d (\alpha +\delta ,p)}{\partial p} \big |_{p=p_d^*}\) with 0. The key for this comparison is to show the concavity/convexity of \(\frac{\partial R_d (\alpha ,p)}{\partial p} \big |_{p=p_d^*}\) with respect to \(\alpha \) on a small interval containing \(\alpha \).
Taking partial derivatives, we have
Bring Eq. (A1) into Eq. (A2), we have
Therefore, if \(\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)<3a_0\), then \(\frac{\partial ^3 R_d (\alpha ,p)}{\partial p \partial \alpha ^2} \big |_{p=p_d^*}>0\), and vice versa.
In addition, it is straightforward to check that \(\frac{\partial ^3 R_d (\alpha ,p)}{\partial p \partial \alpha ^2}\big |_{p=p_d^*}\) is continuous in \(\alpha \). As a consequence, there exists an interval \([\alpha -{\bar{\delta }}_1,\alpha +{\bar{\delta }}_1]\) such that \(\frac{\partial R_d (\alpha ,p)}{\partial p}\big |_{p=p_d^*}\) is strictly convex in \(\alpha \) for \(\alpha \in [\alpha -{\bar{\delta }}_1,\alpha +{\bar{\delta }}_1]\) if \(\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)<3a_0\). By the property of convex function, if the random term \(\delta \) supports on \([-{\bar{\delta }}_1,{\bar{\delta }}_1]\), then
Therefore, \(p_r^*>p_d^*\) if \(\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)<3a_0\) holds. Similarly, if \(\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)>3a_0\), there exists \({\bar{\delta }}_2\) such that if \(\delta \) supports on \([-{\bar{\delta }}_2,{\bar{\delta }}_2]\), then \(p_r^*<p_d^*\).
Finally, from Eq. (A1), we have
Since the left-hand side of the above equation is strictly increasing in \(\alpha -\gamma p_d^*\), the inequality \(\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)<3a_0\) is equivalent with \(\alpha -\gamma c<4+\log (3a_0)\), and \(\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)>3a_0\) is equivalent with \(\alpha -\gamma c>4+\log (3a_0)\). Hence, we have completed the proof.
5 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall that \(R_d(\alpha ,p)= \frac{\exp (\alpha -\gamma p)}{a_0+\exp (\alpha -\gamma p)} (p-c)\). Taking second-order derivative to \(R_d\) with respect to \(\alpha \), we have
Therefore, if \(a_0-\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)>0\), then \(R_d(\alpha ,p_d^*)\) is strictly convex with respect to \(\alpha \) on an interval containing \(\alpha \); And if \(a_0-\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)<0\), then \(R_d(\alpha ,p_d^*)\) is concave with respect to \(\alpha \) on an interval containing \(\alpha \). Combining with Eq. (A3), \(a_0-\exp (\alpha -\gamma p_d^*)>0\) is equivalent with \(\alpha -\gamma c<2+\log a_0\).
Therefore, if \(\alpha -\gamma c<2+\log a_0\), by the convexity of \(R_d(\alpha ,p_d^*)\), there exists \({\bar{\delta }}_3>0\) such that if \(\delta \) supports on \([-{\bar{\delta }}_3,{\bar{\delta }}_3]\),
On the other hand, if \(\alpha -\gamma c>4+\log 3a_0\), combining with Proposition 3, we have
Therefore, it is straightforward to show that \(R_d(\alpha ,p_r^*)\) is strictly concave with respect to \(\alpha \) on an interval containing \(\alpha \). Analogously, there exists \({\bar{\delta }}_4>0\) such that if \(\delta \) supports on \([-{\bar{\delta }}_4,{\bar{\delta }}_4]\),
6 Proof of Proposition 5
The main procedure is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. Now, the profit functions have the following form:
Taking derivatives, we have
Since \(p_d^*\) satisfies the first-order condition, we can derive that
Bring Eq. (A5) into Eq. (A4), we have
Therefore, following the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, if \(\alpha p_d^{*-\gamma }<a_0\), \(\frac{\partial R_d(\alpha ,p)}{\partial p }\big |_{p=p_d^*}\) is strictly convex with respect to \(\alpha \) on an interval containing \(\alpha \), and therefore \(p_r^*>p_d^*\); Otherwise, if \(\alpha p_d^{*-\gamma }>a_0\), then \(p_r^*<p_d^*\).
To simplify the condition \(\alpha p_d^{*-\gamma }<a_0\) one step further, revisit Eq. (A5), we have
If \(\gamma \leqslant 2\), it is easy to note that \(\alpha p_d^{*-\gamma }<a_0\) for sure, otherwise the right-hand side of Eq. (A6) would be negative and cannot equal to the left-hand side of Eq. (A6). Therefore, \(p_r^*>p_d^*\) for sure if \(\gamma \leqslant 2\). On the other side, if \(\gamma >2\), since the right-hand side of Eq. (A6) is increasing in \(\alpha p_d^{*-\gamma }\), the equivalent condition can be written as:
which complete the proof.
7 Proof of Proposition 6
Taking second-order derivative to \(R_d(\alpha , p)\) with respect to \(\alpha \), we have
that is negative for either \(p=p_d^*\) or \(p=p_r^*\). This implies that \(R_d(\alpha ,p_r^*)\) is strictly concave with respect to \(\alpha \). Therefore,
that complete the proof.
8 Proof of Proposition 7
The proof approach is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. Now taking derivaties, we have
Therefore, since \(p_d^*\) satisfies the first-order condition, i.e., makes Eq. (A7) equals to zero, we can take \(p_d^*\) into Eq. (A8) and obtain that
By the similar argument as that in the proof of Proposition 3, we know that \(\frac{\partial R_d(\alpha ,p)}{\partial p}\big |_{p=p_d^*}\) is strictly concave in \(\alpha \) and therefore \(\frac{\partial R_r({\tilde{\alpha }},p)}{\partial p}\big |_{p=p_d^*}<\frac{\partial R_d(\alpha ,p)}{\partial p}\big |_{p=p_d^*}=0\). Combining with the quasi-concavity of \(R(\alpha , p)\) with respect to p, we know that \(p_r^* < p_d^*\). The only requirement is that the attraction factor has to be positive, i.e., \(\alpha +\delta -\gamma p_d^*>0\).
9 Proof of Proposition 8
Taking second-order derivative to \(R_d\) with respect to \(\alpha \), we have
for either \(p=p_r^*\) or \(p=p_d^*\), which implies the concavity of \(R_d(\alpha , p)\) with respect to \(\alpha \).
Therefore, with a positive attraction factor, i.e., \(\alpha +\delta >0\),
10 Proof of Theorem 2
Unimodality for \(R_1\):
We know that \(-\frac{\ln (1+x)}{x}\) is increasing in x. We want \(g(p_1)\) to be increasing too.
Let \(f(p_1)=\frac{\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1+b-r_1p_1}-\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1-b-r_1p_1}}{\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1-b-r_1p_1}+K}\). \(g(p_1)=\frac{\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1-b-r_1p_1}-\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1+b-r_1p_1}}{\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1+b-r_1p_1}+K}\),
We want \(f(p_1)\) to be increasing.
Unimodality for \(R_2\):
Denote \(a_1^L=\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1-b-r_1p_1}\) and \(a_1^R=\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _1+b-r_1p_1}\),
\(a_2=\mathrm{e}^{\alpha _2-r_2p_2}\) and \(a_2'=-r_2a_2\).
where \(h(p_2)=\frac{(a_0+a_2)(a_1^L-a_1^R)}{(a_0+a_1^L+a_2)a_1^R}<0\) and is increasing in \(p_2\).
Let \(f(p_2)=\frac{a_0}{a_0+a_2}\frac{\ln (1+h(p_2))}{h(p_2)} +\frac{a_2a_1^R}{(a_0+a_2)(a_0+a_1^R+a_2)}\).
In the RHS of the above equation, \(-\frac{\ln (1+h(p_2))}{h(p_2)}\) is negative and increasing. \(f(p_2)\) is always positive. We want \(f(p_2)\) to be increasing as well. If so, then \(R_2\) is unimodal in \(p_2\).
We know that \(\ln (1+x)\leqslant x\) for \(x\in (-1,+\infty )\). Therefore, \(\frac{\ln (1+x)}{x}\geqslant 1\), for \(x\in (-1,0)\).
11 Proof of Table 1
Following the same approach as in the proof of Proposition 3, we first determine the sign of \(\frac{\partial R_{ir}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_i}\big |_{p_1=p_{1d}^*,p_2=p_{2d}^*}\) based on the concavity/convexity of \(\frac{\partial R_{ir}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_i}\) with respect to \(\alpha _1\). In the following derivation, we assume that the partial differentiation and the integration on \(\delta \) are interchangeable. Taking second-order derivative of \(\frac{\partial R_{id}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_i}\) with respect to \(\alpha _1\), we have
Therefore, if \(a_{1d}^{*}<3(a_0+a_{2d}^{*})\), then \(\frac{\partial R_{1d}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_1}\big |_{p_1=p_{1d}^*,p_2=p_{2d}^*}\) is convex in \(\alpha _1\). As a consequence, there exists a support interval of \(\delta \) that ensures the convexity of \(\frac{\partial R_{1r}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_1}\big |_{p_1=p_{1d}^*,p_2=p_{2d}^*}\). With this support interval of \(\delta \),
In this way, we are able to determine the signs of \(\frac{\partial R_{1r}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_1}\big |_{p_1=p_{1d}^*,p_2=p_{2d}^*}\) and \(\frac{\partial R_{2r}(p_1,p_2)}{\partial p_2}\big |_{p_1=p_{1d}^*,p_2=p_{2d}^*}\) when \(a_{1d}^*\) belongs to different intervals, as given in Table 1.
12 Proof of Proposition 9
Taking the uniform distribution function into Eq. (4), we have
Therefore, \(({\tilde{p}}_1^*,{\tilde{p}}_2^*)\) takes the value that satisfies the first-order condition:
Here, \({\tilde{a}}_1^*=\exp (\alpha _1+\delta -\gamma _1 {\tilde{p}}_1^*)\) and \(a_2^*=\exp (\alpha _2-\gamma _2 {\tilde{p}}_2^*)\). For simplicity of the expressions, denote \(a_{1L}^*=\exp (\alpha _1-b-\gamma _1 {\tilde{p}}_1^*)\), \(a_{1R}^*=\exp (\alpha _1+b-\gamma _1 {\tilde{p}}_1^*)\), \(\varSigma _L^*=a_0+a_{1L}^*+a_2^*\), \(\varSigma _R^*=a_0+a_{1R}^*+a_2^*\). Then, the first-order conditions yield to the following equation set:
In the following analysis, we assume that b is sufficiently small and use Taylor expansion to further simplify the equation set. Denote that \(a_{1}^*=\exp (\alpha _1-\gamma _1 {\tilde{p}}_1^*)\) and \(\varSigma ^*=a_0+a_1^*+a_2^*\). Some useful results are listed as follows:
Now, the first equation in (A9) can be simplified in the following way.
In the same way but with more effort taking, the second equation in (A9) is simplified as follows:
Substitute \(\varSigma ^*\) with \(a_0+a_1^*+a_2^*\), the proof is done.
13 Proof of Proposition 10
The two thresholds for the deterministic model satisfy \(a_{1d}^*=\frac{a_0+a_{2d}^*}{3}\) and \(a_{1d}^*=3(a_0+a_{2d}^*)\), respectively. Take case 1 as an example, i.e., the threshold for \(p_{1r}^*>p_{1d}^*\) and \(p_{2r}^*<p_{2d}^*\). With \(p_{1r}^*>p_{1d}^*\) and \(p_{2r}^*<p_{2d}^*\), and that \(a_{i}=\exp (\alpha -\gamma _i p_i)\) is decreasing in \(p_i\), we obtain \(a_{1r}^*<a_{1d}^*\) and \(a_{2r}^*>a_{2d}^*\), and hence
If \(a_{1r}^*>\frac{a_0+a_{2r}^*}{3}\), for b that is small enough,
which contradicts \(p_{2r}^*<p_{2d}^*\). Hence, we obtain there exists \(l_1<\frac{1}{3}\), such that \(a_{1r}^*=\frac{a_0+a_{2r}^*}{l_1}\). Likewise, we are able to obtain the results for cases 2 and 3.
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Feng, XY., Xie, YY. & Yan, HM. Price Competition in the Random Coefficient Attraction Choice Models with Linear Cost. J. Oper. Res. Soc. China 10, 623–658 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-021-00366-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-021-00366-5