Applied Health Economics and Health Policy

, Volume 16, Issue 4, pp 433–443 | Cite as

The Case for a Private Healthcare Insurance Monopoly

  • Paul E. Orzechowski
Current Opinion


This article advocates for a regulated private monopoly as an audacious solution to replace Obamacare, help manage Medicare and Medicaid and reform the US healthcare insurance industry. Contemporary economics vilifies monopolies and praises the ‘magic wand’ of perfect competition without much debate on the merits of these assumptions. The problems with the perfect competition model as applied to healthcare insurance are well established, but exploration of other possible economic models (i.e. monopoly and oligopoly) as a replacement for Obamacare is non-existent. New thinking about the role of monopolies may help achieve public policy goals and make health insurance available to the largest number of people at a reasonable premium while containing medical costs.



The author thanks two anonymous referees and the editor (Timothy Wrightson) for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

Compliance with Ethical Standards


The author did not receive any funding related to this article.

Conflict of interest

The author has no conflicts of interests related to this article.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of Staten Island, City University of New York (CUNY)Staten IslandUSA

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