Abstract.
We consider the problem of allocating m commodities among n agents with single-peaked preferences. When m≥2 and n=2 any strategy-proof and efficient solution is dictatorial. We propose an extension of the Uniform Rule that (in the two-agents case) is the only one that satisfies strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and a weak requirement related to efficiency. Alternatively, the envy-freeness property may be replaced by weak-anonymity.
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Received: 7 November 1997/Accepted: 1 August 2000
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Amorós, P. Single-peaked preferences with several commodities. Soc Choice Welfare 19, 57–67 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8325-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8325-6