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Optimal bidding in emission constrained economic dispatch

Abstract

Emission levels play a crucial role for the thermal power companies to limit their flue gas in the competitive market. Realistic power bidding optimizations demand the responsibility of power regulators for searching of the optimal power bidding from economic emission aspect. Different discrete bidding situations have been analyzed in this attempt when a number of thermal power generating utilities demand bidding price at different percentages of their respective marginal price. These utilities compete among themselves not only for gaining maximum profit, but also they are made bound here to offer energy price along with flue gas emission level as minimum as possible. Pareto optimization has been searched by establishing Nash equilibrium of Game Theory considering minimum total objective of fuel cost and flue gas emission from the consumers’ aspect along with maximum profit gain for the power bidders. These multi-objective optimization results show that at economic and environmentally constrained situations, power bidders can earn more profit not only at optimally higher bidding price, but also at optimally lower bidding price along with selling higher quantity of electricity. Those bidders who bid at optimally lower marginal price along with selling lower quantity of electricity to satisfy minimum total objective are found suffering loss. Overall study shows that cost functions and emission functions as well as marginal prices of respective units play important role in different environmentally constrained bidding situations. An Indian Utility of 62 buses has been used for study, and program code is written in MATLAB R2013b platform.

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Acknowledgements

Authors would like to thank the Department of Power Engineering, Jadavpur University, Salt Lake Campus, Block: LB, Plot: 8, Sector-III, Kolkata-700098, India, for extending all sorts of cooperation for the completion of this research work that has been carried out since January 5, 2017.

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Correspondence to D. Palit.

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Editorial responsibility: Parveen Fatemeh Rupani.

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Palit, D., Chakraborty, N. Optimal bidding in emission constrained economic dispatch. Int. J. Environ. Sci. Technol. 16, 7953–7972 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13762-018-2160-6

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Keywords

  • Deregulation
  • Economic emission dispatch
  • Electric energy market
  • Game Theory