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Exclusive exponent blinding is not enough to prevent any timing attack on RSA

  • CHES 2015
  • Published:
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Abstract

In this paper we treat a timing attack on RSA implementations, which apply the Chinese remainder theorem and Montgomery’s multiplication algorithm and are protected by exponent blinding. Our attack is applicable to square & multiply exponentiation and to table-based exponentiation algorithms, extending known timing attacks on unprotected implementations. Simulation experiments are conducted, which confirm the theoretical results. Interestingly, increasing the blinding length does not counteract our attack. Our attack can be adjusted to fulfil mild format restrictions. Effective countermeasures exist. This article extends a conference paper by new results.

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Correspondence to Werner Schindler.

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This article is based on the earlier article [15], ©IACR 2015, doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48324-4_12.

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Schindler, W. Exclusive exponent blinding is not enough to prevent any timing attack on RSA. J Cryptogr Eng 6, 101–119 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0124-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0124-7

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