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Hardware attacks: an algebraic approach

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Abstract

Many VLSI chips now contain cryptographic processors to secure their data and external communications. Attackers target the hardware to imitate or understand the system design, to gain access to the system or to obtain encryption keys. They may also try to initiate attacks such as denial of service to disable the services supported by a chip, or reduce system reliability. In this paper, an algebraic methodology is proposed to examine hardware attacks based on the attack properties and associated risks. This methodology is employed to construct algorithms to develop hardware attack and defence strategies. It can also be used to predict system vulnerabilities and assess the security of a system.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Victoria, Victoria, BC, Canada

    Samer Moein, Fayez Gebali & T. Aaron Gulliver

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  1. Samer Moein
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  2. Fayez Gebali
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  3. T. Aaron Gulliver
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Correspondence to Samer Moein.

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Moein, S., Gebali, F. & Gulliver, T.A. Hardware attacks: an algebraic approach. J Cryptogr Eng 6, 325–337 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0117-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-016-0117-6

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