Journal of Cryptographic Engineering

, Volume 3, Issue 2, pp 111–128 | Cite as

Charm: a framework for rapidly prototyping cryptosystems

  • Joseph A. Akinyele
  • Christina Garman
  • Ian Miers
  • Matthew W. Pagano
  • Michael Rushanan
  • Matthew Green
  • Aviel D. Rubin
Regular Paper

Abstract

We describe Charm, an extensible framework for rapidly prototyping cryptographic systems. Charm provides a number of features that explicitly support the development of new protocols, including support for modular composition of cryptographic building blocks, infrastructure for developing interactive protocols, and an extensive library of re-usable code. Our framework also provides a series of specialized tools that enable different cryptosystems to interoperate. We implemented over 40 cryptographic schemes using Charm, including some new ones that, to our knowledge, have never been built in practice. This paper describes our modular architecture, which includes a built-in benchmarking module to compare the performance of Charm primitives to existing C implementations. We show that in many cases our techniques result in an order of magnitude decrease in code size, while inducing an acceptable performance impact. Lastly, the Charm framework is freely available to the research community and to date, we have developed a large, active user base.

Keywords

Applied cryptography Protocols Software Privacy 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joseph A. Akinyele
    • 1
  • Christina Garman
    • 1
  • Ian Miers
    • 1
  • Matthew W. Pagano
    • 1
  • Michael Rushanan
    • 1
  • Matthew Green
    • 1
  • Aviel D. Rubin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceJohns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreUSA

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