Abstract
This Commentary critiques an extremely relational view of robot moral status, drawing out its practical implications for ethics and law. It also suggests next steps for AI ethics if extremely relational reasoning is compelling. Section I introduces the topic, distinguishing an ‘extremely relational’ view from more moderate relational views. Section II illustrates extremely relational views using the example of embodiment. Section III explores practical implications of extremely relational views for ethics and law. Section IV offers possible responses to extreme relationism. Section V concludes by suggesting next steps for AI ethics.
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Jecker, N.S. Extremely Relational Robots: Implications for Law and Ethics. Philos. Technol. 37, 52 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00735-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-024-00735-x