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Taking Stock of Extension Theory of Technology

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Abstract

In this paper, I will focus on the extension theories of technology. I will identify four influential positions that have been put forward: (1) technology as an extension of the human organism, (2) technology as an extension of the lived body and the senses, (3) technology as an extension of our intentions and desires, and (4) technology as an extension of our faculties and capabilities. I will describe and critically assess these positions one by one and highlight their advantages and their shortcomings and limitations. Along the way, I will explicate some of the differences and similarities between the various approaches. I conclude the paper with some suggestions for future research directions that will be beneficial for advancing theory building and that will drive forward the philosophical refinement of extension theory.

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Notes

  1. Eudemian Ethics book 7, 1241 b.

  2. A similar point has been raised by Brey (2000). He gives some counterexamples to the alleged morphological projection of human organs: lighters, telephones, and fishing nets.

  3. It is important to note that cups and books can be used as an extension of the senses. We can imagine someone using a book in the same way a blind man uses his cane. Technologies cannot be reduced to a designed intent; rather they are ambiguous and can be embedded in a variety of ways. Or as Ihde (1990) calls it, technologies are “multistable” (144). See also Ihde (2002), 106.

  4. For a more detailed comparison of Kapp and Rothenberg, see Brey (2000).

  5. In some cases, however, technology may be the only way to realize an intention. Think of the desire to propel subatomic particles and the intention to fulfill this desire. Here, the use of a particle accelerator is inevitable.

  6. I do not share Lawson’s (2008) verdict that Brey leaves his notion of extension unclear.

  7. Further advantages of the capabilities account are that it helps to explain the evolutionary trajectory of technology, that it raises the question whether our extension are in line with our desires and what consequences the extension of faculties has for our self-understanding. For more, see Brey (2000).

  8. I take this idea from the debate on extended mind and the bounds of cognition. See, for example, Adams and Aizawa (2008).

  9. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my attention.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Tanja Hentschel and Felicitas Selter for feedback on earlier drafts, as well as one anonymous reviewer for valuable comments.

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  1. Research Center for Neurophilosophy and Ethics of Neuroscience, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Schellingstraße 10, room J 309, 80799, Munich, Germany

    Steffen Steinert

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Steinert, S. Taking Stock of Extension Theory of Technology. Philos. Technol. 29, 61–78 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-014-0186-3

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