Abstract
We analyze replicator dynamics with strategy-dependent time delays in a certain three-player game with one pure and two mixed Nash equilibria. In such a model, new players are born from parents who interacted in the past. We show that stationary states depend on time delays. Moreover, at certain time delays, interior equilibria cease to exist.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the National Science Centre, Poland for a financial support under the Grant No. 2015/17/B/ST1/00693.
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Let us denote \(\alpha =\frac{\tau _A}{\tau _A-\tau _B}\). The equation \(F(x)=0\) is equivalent to \(F_L(x)= F_R(x)\), where
First, we consider the case \(\tau _B>\tau _A\). We calculate the second derivative of \(F_L\) with respect to x and we get
After some computations (reducing the expression in brackets to a common denominator and plotting—or estimating—a polynomial of the fifth degree of the numerator) it is possible to show that \(F_L''(x)<0\) for all \(x\in (0,1)\) and \(\alpha <0\). Thus, \(F_L\) is concave. On the other hand, the derivatives of \(F_R\) read
where
Plotting the polynomial of the fifth degree shows that the coefficient in \(\alpha \) is positive for \(x\in (0,1)\), and therefore, \(h(x)<0\) for \(x\in (0,1)\). Thus, \(F_R\) is convex. This proves that equation \(F_L(x)=F_R(x)\) has at most two solutions in (0, 1).
Note that in this case (\(\tau _A<\tau _B\)), we have
and
If we compare the value of \(F_L\) and \(F_R\) at \(x=\frac{1}{2}\), we deduce that if
then \(F_L(\frac{1}{2}) > F_R(\frac{1}{2})\) so there are exactly two solutions of \(F_L(x)=F_R(x)\) in the interval (0, 1).
On the other hand, one can easily estimate that
for all \(x\in (0,1)\). Because \((1-x)^2+4x(1-x)\le 4/3\) and \(x^2 + 2(1- x)^2\ge \frac{2}{3}\), one deduce that \(F_R(x) \ge \frac{1}{2}\). This completes the proof of part (ii) of the theorem.
Now, assume that \(\tau _A>\tau _{B}\) which implies that \(\alpha >1\). In this case, it is convenient to change variables. Let
The problem of finding solution of \(F_L(x)=F_R(x)\) for \(x\in (0,1)\) transforms to the problem of finding solution of \(G_L(y)=G_R(y)\) for \(y>0\), where
It is very easy to calculate limits of \(G_L\) and \(G_R\) at 0 and at \(+\infty \) and get
We calculate the derivative of \(G_L\) and we get
It is easy to see that for \(\alpha >1\), the function \(G_L\) is decreasing for \(y\in (0,{\tilde{y}})\) with \(\displaystyle {\tilde{y}} = \frac{1+\sqrt{33}}{8}\), and it is increasing for \(y>{\tilde{y}}\). Note also that
while \(G_R(Y)>0\) for \(y>0\). Now, we prove that \(G_R\) is increasing on \((0,{\tilde{y}})\). We calculate the derivative of \(G_R\) with respect to y and we obtain
with
Because \({\tilde{y}}<2\) and \(\alpha >1\), we easily see that \(g(y)>0\) for \(y\in (0,{\tilde{y}})\). Thus, \(G_R\) is increasing in \((0,{\tilde{y}})\), and therefore, there exists exactly one solution of \(G_L(y)=G_R(y)\) in \((0,{\tilde{y}})\).
One can see that \(G_L(x) =0\) for \({\hat{y}}_1=2-\sqrt{3}\) and \({\hat{y}}_2=2+\sqrt{3}\). As \({\hat{y}}_2>2>{\tilde{y}}\), we see that \(g(y)<0\) for \(y>{\hat{y}}_2\), thus \(G_R\) is decreasing while \(G_L\) is increasing for \(y>{\hat{y}}_2\). Thus, the second solution to \(G_L(y)=G_R(y)\) exists in the interval \(({\tilde{y}}, +\infty )\) if and only if \(G_L(+\infty )>G_R(+\infty )\), that is \(\alpha \ln 2 > 2^{1-\alpha }\). Some simple algebra finishes the proof of the theorem. \(\square \)
1.1 Formula Used for Drawing Stationary Solutions
Here, we derive a formula that gives us a better relation between \(\tau _A\), \(\tau _B\), and \({\bar{x}}\) than the equation \(F(x)=0\). As before, let us denote
The equation \(F(x)=0\) is then equivalent to
Thus,
where \(W_L\) is a Lambert W function, that is \(x = W_L(x)\exp \bigl (W_L(x)\bigr )\). Now, using the definition of \(\alpha \) we get
In this manner, we get a relation between \(\tau _A\) and \(\tau _B\) at the stationary state x, namely
In an analogous manner—denoting \(\beta = \frac{\tau _B}{\tau _A+\tau _B}\)—we get another relation between \(\tau _A\) and \(\tau _B\) at the stationary state x, namely
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Bodnar, M., Miȩkisz, J. & Vardanyan, R. Three-Player Games with Strategy-Dependent Time Delays. Dyn Games Appl 10, 664–675 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00340-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00340-0