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Combinatorial Aspects of Parker’s Model

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Abstract

Parker’s model under rare mutation is considered when there is a finite set of available strategies. The question of when all of those strategies are present in the stationary distribution, i.e., the Markov chain is irreducible, is addressed, via graph theoretic and combinatorial entities. Specific cases for \(n=3,4,5,6\) are addressed, in the first three cases all the feasible cases are specified, and for \(n=6\) a superset of the feasible cases (possibly the set itself) is given.

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Acknowledgments

Support is acknowledged from the European Union through funding under FP7-ICT-2011-8 project HIERATIC (316705).

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  1. School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK

    Chris Cannings

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  1. Chris Cannings
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Correspondence to Chris Cannings.

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Cannings, C. Combinatorial Aspects of Parker’s Model. Dyn Games Appl 5, 263–274 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0103-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0103-5

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