Abstract
Trust is essential in virtually all economic interactions. In this paper, we build on previous work analyzing the “trust game” from the perspective of evolutionary dynamics. There are two players: an “investor” and a “trustee.” The investor begins with one monetary unit and can choose to transfer it to the trustee. The transfer, if made, is multiplied by a factor b>1 representing the gains that arise from cooperation. The trustee can then return a fraction of his choosing to the investor. Previous work has shown that adding information to this game can lead to trusting and trustworthy behavior. But in those models, information spreads instantaneously and investors never face conflicting information. Here, we relax both of these assumptions. We introduce delays in information propagation so that an investor may still be acting on old information after a trustee has changed his behavior. And we give investors “memories” and thereby allow for the possibility that they might face conflicting information about trustees. In both cases, we find that the trust and trustworthiness induced by information is robust to delays and conflicts. Even if it takes time for information to spread, and even if investors sometimes deem information to be unreliable, the benefits of trust are realized with just moderate levels of information about trustees. We conclude that information (or “reputation”) is a robust explanation for the trust and trustworthiness observed among humans.
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Both authors were supported by Foundational Questions in Evolutionary Biology Prize Fellowships from the John Templeton foundation.
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Manapat, M.L., Rand, D.G. Delayed and Inconsistent Information and the Evolution of Trust. Dyn Games Appl 2, 401–410 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-012-0055-6