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KI - Künstliche Intelligenz

, Volume 28, Issue 3, pp 147–158 | Cite as

A Survey of Multi-Agent Decision Making

  • Nils BullingEmail author
Technical Contribution

Abstract

In this article we give a high-level overview of various aspects relevant to multi-agent decision making. Classical decision theory makes the start. Then, we introduce multi-agent decision making, focussing on game theory, complex decision making, and on intelligent agents. Afterwards, we discuss methods for reaching agreements interactively, e.g. by negotiation, bargaining, and argumentation, followed by approaches to coordinate and to control agents’ decision making.

Keywords

Multi-agent systems Multi-agent decision making Game theory Negotiation Bargaining Mechanism design  Norms Multi-agent organizations Bounded rationality  Planning 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Mehdi Dastani, Jürgen Dix, Franziska Klügl, and Leon van der Torre for valuable comments and discussions.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of InformaticsClausthal University of TechnologyClausthal-ZellerfeldGermany

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