Abstract
We propose an elementary theory of wars fought by fully rational contenders that features three of the main rationalist explanations for armed conflicts: uncertainty, commitment, and indivisibility. Two parties play a Markov game that combines stages of bargaining, where offers are made, with claim stages, where one side can commit to impose surrender on the other. Under uncertainty on the persistence of claims, long confrontations occur in the unique equilibrium of the game: war arises when reality disappoints initial (rational) optimism, and it persists when both agents are optimists but reality proves both wrong. Bargaining proposals that are rejected initially might eventually be accepted after several periods of confrontation. We provide an explicit computation of the equilibrium, evaluating the probability of war, and its expected losses as a function of (i) the costs of confrontation, (ii) the asymmetry of the split imposed under surrender, and (iii) the strengths of contenders at attack and defense. Changes in these parameters display non-monotonic effects.
Article PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
References
Banks JS (1990) Equilibrium behavior in crisis bargaining games. Am J Political Sci 34: 599–614
Bester H, Warneryd K (2006) Conflict and the social contract. Scand J Econ 108(2): 231–249
Bevia C, Corchon L (2010) Peace agreements without commitment. Games Econ Behav 68: 469–487
Blainey G (1973) The causes of war. Free Press, New York
Crawford V (1982) A model of disagreement in bargaining. Econometrica 50: 607–637
Fearon JD (1994) Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. Am Political Sci Rev 88(3): 577–592
Fearon JD (1995) Rationalist explanations for war. Int Organ 49: 379–414
Filson D, Werner S (2002) Bargaining model of war and peace: anticipating the onset, duration and outcome of war. Am J Political Sci 46: 819–838
Gleditsch K (2004) A revised list of wars between and within independent states, 1816–2002. Int Interact 30: 231–262
Goddard SE (2006) Uncomman Ground: indivisible territory and the politics of legitimacy. Int Organ 60: 35–68
Hassner R (2003) To have and to hold: conflicts over sacred space and the problem of indivisibility. Secur Stud 12: 1–33
Jackson MO, Morelli M (2007) Political bias and war. Am Econ Rev 97(4): 1353–1373
Lemke D, Reed W (2001) War and rivalry among great powers. Am J Political Sci 45(2): 457–469
Leventoglu B, Slantchev B (2007) The armed peace: a punctuated equilibrium theory of war. Am J Political Sci 51(4): 755–771
Leventoglu B, Tarar A (2008) Does rivate information lead to delay or war in crisis bargaining. Int Stud Q 52(3): 533–553
Merlo A, Wilson C (1995) A stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information. Econometrica 63: 371–399
O’Neil B (1999) Honor, symbols and war. Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor
Powell R (1996) Bargaining in the shadow of power. Games Econ Behav 15: 255–289
Powell R (1999) In the shadow of power. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Powell R (2004) Bargaining and learning while fighting. Am Political Sci Rev 48: 344–361
Powell R (2006) War as a commitment problem. Int Organ 60: 169–204
Ross ML (2003) Oil, drugs and diamonds: the varying role of natural resources in civil war. In: Ballentine K, Sherman J (eds) The political economy of armed conflict: beyond greed and grievance. Lynne Rienner, Boulder
Sanchez-Pages S (2009) Conflict as a part of the bargaining process. Econ J 119(539): 1189–1207
Sanchez-Pages S (2011) Bargaining and conflict with incomplete information. In: Garfinkel M, Skaperdas S (eds) The Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict. Oxford University Press, Oxford (forthcoming)
Schelling TC (1960) Strategy of conflict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Schelling TC (1966) Arms and influence. Yale University Press, New Haven and London
Schultz KA (1998) Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. Am Political Sci Rev 92(4): 829–844
Slantchev B (2003) Principle of convergence in wartime negotiations. Am Political Sci Rev 47: 621–637
Slantchev B (2004) How initiators end their wars: the duration of warfare and the terms of peace. Am J Political Sci 48(4): 813–829
Smith A (1998) Fighting battles, winning wars. J Confl Resolut 43: 301–320
Smith A, Stam AS (2004) Bargaining and the nature of war. J Confl Resolut 48: 783–813
Sun T (1988) In: J Clavell (ed) The art of war. New York
Toft MD (2006) Issue indivisibility and time horizons as rationalist Explanations for war. Secur Stud 15: 34–69
von Clausewitz C (1976) In: Howard M, Paret P (eds) On war. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Wagner RH (2000) Bargaining and war. Am J Political Sci 44: 469–484
Wittman D (1979) How a war ends: a rational model approach. J Confl Resolut 23(4): 743–763
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
About this article
Cite this article
Ponsati, C., Sanchez-Pages, S. Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war. SERIEs 3, 157–179 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0073-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0073-4