On the justification of deduction and induction

Original Paper in Formal Epistemology

DOI: 10.1007/s13194-017-0177-1

Cite this article as:
Huber, F. Euro Jnl Phil Sci (2017). doi:10.1007/s13194-017-0177-1

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end. I will begin by presenting a contemporary variant of Hume (1739/1896, 1748/1993)’s argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principle of induction. Then I will criticize the responses the resulting problem of induction has received by Carnap (1963b, 1968) and Goodman (1954), as well as praise Reichenbach (1938, Journal of Philosophy, 37, 97–103, 1940)’s approach. Some of these authors compare induction to deduction. Haack (Mind, 85, 112–119, 1976) compares deduction to induction, and I will critically discuss her argument for the thesis that we cannot justify the principles of deduction next. In concluding I will defend the thesis that we can justify induction deductively relative to one end, and deduction inductively relative to a different end, and that we can do so in a non-circular way. Along the way I will show how we can understand deductive and inductive logic as normative theories, and I will briefly sketch an argument to the effect that there are only hypothetical, but no categorical imperatives.

Keywords

Justification of induction Carnap Goodman Reichenbach Justifiation of deduction Haack 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and TechnologyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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